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This is the first academic work to show the need for, or to offer, a 
regulatory framework for exchange-traded funds (“ETFs”). The economic 
significance of this financial innovation is enormous. U.S.-listed ETFs now 
hold more than $3.6 trillion in assets and comprise seven of the country’s 
ten most actively traded securities. ETFs also possess an array of unique 
characteristics raising distinctive concerns. They offer what we here 
conceptualize as a nearly frictionless portal to a bewildering, continually 
expanding universe of plain vanilla and arcane asset classes, passive and 
active investment strategies, and long, short, and leveraged exposures. And 
we argue that ETFs are defined by a novel, model-driven device that we refer 
to as the “arbitrage mechanism,” a device that has sometimes failed 
catastrophically. These new products and the underlying innovation process 
create special risks for investors and the financial system. 
Despite their economic significance and distinctive risks, ETFs remain 
a regulatory backwater. The United States has neither a dedicated system of 
ETF regulation nor even a workable, comprehensive conception of what an 
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ETF is. A motley group of statutes divide similar ETFs into a plethora of 
different regulatory cubbyholes that were originally intended for very 
different vehicles such as mutual funds, commodity pools, and operating 
companies. Other regulatory constraints center on a process of 
discretionary review that generally allows the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) to assess the merits of each proposed ETF on an ad 
hoc, individualized basis. This process of review is opaque and unfocused. It 
is also inconsistent over time, with the effect that older funds often operate 
under lighter regulation than newer ones. And because it has its roots in 
statutes originally designed for other kinds of vehicles, the regulation of 
ETFs fails to address the ETF’s distinctive characteristics. Rooted in a 
disclosure system largely designed for mutual funds, the SEC’s disclosure 
mandates for ETFs fail to comprehend the significance and complexities of 
the arbitrage mechanism and often require no public disclosure of major 
breakdowns in the mechanism’s workings. 
Our proposal contemplates a single regulatory framework for all ETFs. 
The treatment of all ETFs would be unified. This systematic approach, 
rooted in the arbitrage mechanism common to all ETFs, would largely 
displace the hodge-podge of regulatory regimes that vary widely across both 
the different ETF regulatory cubbyholes in use today and different ETFs 
within each such cubbyhole. The functional elements of the framework would 
streamline and rationalize the creation, substantive operations, and 
disclosure of all ETFs. Such elements would include a shift away from ETF-
by-ETF discretionary review and toward written rules of general 
applicability. In terms of the creation of ETFs, we would narrow the range 
of ETFs subject to close substantive scrutiny while retaining some discretion 
for the SEC to address concerns related to the arbitrage mechanism or 
related structural engineering issues, risky or complex ETFs not adequately 
addressed by suitability rules and investor education, and large negative 
externalities. In terms of disclosure, we contemplate quantitative and 
qualitative information addressing what we here call “trading price 
frictions,” such as those relating to the performance of the arbitrage 
mechanism and related engineering during the trading day, model-related 
complexities, and evolving understandings and conditions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The exchange-traded fund (“ETF”) is one of the key financial 
innovations of the modern era. The ETF, a new vehicle for collective 
investment, now stands alongside shares of individual companies, mutual 
funds, and hedge funds as one of the most important investments in the 
world. Seven of the ten most actively traded securities in the United States 
in 2016 were ETFs,1 and the trading volume of shares in the SPDR S&P 500 
ETF (“SPY”) exceeded the trading volume of shares in Apple, the world’s 
most valuable company.2 Assets in U.S.-based ETFs multiplied more than 
35-fold from year-end 2002 to July 30, 2018 (to $3.61 trillion), more than 
ten times the three-fold increase over that same period in the assets of mutual 
funds, the paradigmatic vehicle for collective investment.3 As of 
September 30, 2017, each of the top fifteen holdings of Bridgewater 
Associates, the world’s largest hedge fund, was an ETF.4 In January 2018, 
worldwide ETF assets reached $5 trillion.5 
Individual ETFs and the process through which they evolve and through 
which new types of ETFs are invented, commercially introduced, and 
diffused in the marketplace together constitute a phenomenon that is not only 
financially significant, but also idiosyncratic in raising distinctive issues vital 
to investors and society.6 ETFs offer a unique investment premise to both 
 
 1. Dani Burger, Stocks Are No Longer the Most Actively Traded Securities in Stock Markets, 
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 12, 2017, 9:57 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-12/stock-
exchanges-turn-into-etf-exchanges-as-passive-rules-all. 
 2. Robin Wigglesworth, ETFs Are Eating the US Stock Market, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2017), 
https://www.ft.com/content/6dabad28-e19c-11e6-9645-c9357a75844a?mhq5j=e3. 
 3. Specifically, from year-end 2002 to July 30, 2018, ETF assets increased from $102 billion to 
$3.61 trillion; while over the same period, mutual fund assets increased from $6.38 trillion to $19.24 
trillion. INV. CO. INSTITUTE, 2017 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 9 (57th ed. 2017) [hereinafter ICI, 
2017 FACT BOOK]; ETF Assets and Net Issuance August 2018, INV. CO. INSTITUTE (Aug. 30, 2018), 
https://www.ici.org/etf_resources/research/etfs_07_18 [hereinafter, ICI, July 2018 ETF Assets]; Trends 
in Mutual Fund Investing July 2018, INV. CO. INSTITUTE (Aug. 30, 2018), 
https://www.ici.org/research/stats/trends/ trends_07_18.  
 4. See Bridgewater Assocs., LP, Form 13F Holdings Report (Form 13F) (Nov. 13, 2017). Cf. 
Nathan Reiff, What Are the Biggest Hedge Funds in the World, INVESTOPEDIA (July 5, 2017), 
https://www.investopedia.com/news/what-are-biggest-hedge-funds-world (discussing Bridgewater’s 
size). 
 5. Chris Flood, ETF Market Smashes Through $5tn Barrier After Record Month, FIN. TIMES 
(Feb. 11, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/5cf7237e-0cdc-11e8-839d-41ca06376bf2. 
 6. We use the term ETF for any pooled investment that trades publicly and offers certain parties 
the right to create and redeem shares through the arbitrage mechanism we describe in infra Section I.A. 
Cf. infra Section IV.A (distinguishing ETF thus defined from exchange-traded note (“ETN”) and 
exchange-traded product (“ETP”)). In the context of ETFs, we use the term “innovation process” to refer 
both to the way an individual ETF evolves and to the manner in which a new type of ETF is developed, 
introduced commercially, and diffused in the marketplace. This follows earlier applications to modern 
financial innovation of the Schumpeterian tradition of breaking down the process of technological change 
  
2018] A REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR ETFs 843 
individual and institutional investors: what we here conceptualize as a nearly 
“frictionless,” often low-cost portal to a bewildering, continually expanding 
universe of plain vanilla and arcane asset classes, passive and active 
investment strategies, and long, short, and leveraged exposures.7 
ETFs are nearly frictionless in the sense that, throughout the trading 
day, they offer almost instantaneous access to and exit from investment 
exposures at prices that closely reflect the value of the assets an ETF holds. 
But this frictionless exposure depends largely on the effectiveness of a novel, 
theory-driven device that we refer to as the “arbitrage mechanism.” We 
believe the arbitrage mechanism to be the ETF’s defining characteristic, 
because it is absent from the market microstructure of all other traded 
securities and from the ETF’s closest cousins, the mutual fund and the 
closed-end fund. The arbitrage mechanism’s effectiveness is essential to the 
integrity of ETF trading prices and the ETF’s core investment premise. And 
this mechanism has sometimes failed catastrophically, even with very large 
and simple ETFs. 
Certain ETFs may pose heightened risks for investors and threaten to 
create negative externalities for financial markets. An ETF involving 
leveraged or leveraged inverse exposures or arcane, illiquid, or small asset 
classes might not only have a less effective arbitrage mechanism or 
unanticipated risk-return pattern, but also might disrupt asset prices in 
financial markets. An ETF offering straightforward long exposure to a small 
asset class may grow so large as to distort the market for that asset class, thus 
undermining not only the integrity of that market, but also the ETF’s ability 
to deliver on its investment premise. This appears to have occurred, for 
instance, with an ETF invested in junior gold mining stocks. Under certain 
circumstances, even plain vanilla investing strategies in which ETFs are 
playing an increasingly important role may, at least in the view of some 
observers, raise the possibility of material externalities. For example, if the 
overall assets of ETFs, mutual funds, and other market participants tracking 
the Standard & Poor’s (“S&P”) 500 Index grow large enough, a combination 
of the concentration in assets held, investor panic in the face of volatility, 
and expectations of easy exit might raise systemic risk concerns. 
 
to invention, innovation, and diffusion. See Henry T. C. Hu, Swaps, the Modern Process of Financial 
Innovation and the Vulnerability of a Regulatory Paradigm, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 333, 337–40 (1989) 
[hereinafter Hu, Regulatory Paradigm]. We use the term “ETF phenomenon” to refer both to particular 
ETF products and to the underlying innovation process. 
 7. There were 923 U.S.-listed ETFs at year-end 2010, 1,412 at year-end 2014, and 1,923 on July 
31, 2018. ICI, 2017 FACT BOOK, supra note 3, at 59; ICI, July 2018 ETF Assets, supra note 3. Of course, 
many new ETFs do not represent new types of ETFs. 
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Despite the ETF phenomenon’s importance, it remains a regulatory and 
academic backwater. America has neither a dedicated system of ETF 
regulation, nor even a workable, comprehensive legal conception of what an 
ETF is. ETFs are subject to extensive regulation, but none of this regulation 
was developed with ETFs in mind. ETF regulation spills haphazardly from 
an odd mix of stock exchange listing rules and a motley group of statutes 
designed for older, fundamentally different products. The United States has 
almost no written rules that address the distinctive problems of ETFs 
directly, thus forcing ETFs to squeeze into regulatory cubbyholes intended 
for different vehicles like mutual funds, commodity pools, and even ordinary 
operating companies.8 Appropriate ETF regulation is so lacking that the SEC 
has managed to hold it together mainly through a system of highly 
improvisatory, ad hoc administrative review generally applicable at the 
moment of each new fund’s proposed creation. 
This regulatory state of affairs causes two basic types of problems: first, 
it introduces pathologies to the process of regulatory administration, and 
second, it fails to address the ETF phenomenon’s most distinctive 
characteristics. The pathologies of administrative process are almost 
inevitable given how ETF regulation is fragmented across a series of 
different statutes that impose disparate rules on functionally identical funds. 
Current ETF regulation is also excessively discretionary. Whether a 
proposed ETF can be introduced usually depends on the SEC granting the 
request of the ETF sponsor for ad hoc, individualized, exemptive relief and, 
sometimes, SEC approval of the individualized request of the listing 
exchange for a listing exchange rule change. In this process, the SEC’s 
professional staff engages in a substantive review of the proposed ETF and 
decides, with few meaningful statutory or administrative limits, whether to 
allow the fund to be introduced and, if so, what conditions the fund must 
comply with when in operation. This process is unfocused and sometimes 
opaque even to industry professionals, and the process inhibits innovation 
through its unpredictability, cumbersomeness, and complexity. 
The current state of regulatory affairs also has the practical effect of 
grandfathering older ETF sponsors into more permissive rules than newer 
ones. Procrustean responses to proposed ETFs that offer leveraged or 
leveraged inverse exposures, for example, fail to deal with root issues and, 
in favoring certain older ETF sponsors, create unlevel playing fields. Some 
older ETF sponsors are able to introduce new ETFs through a relatively 
 
 8. This fundamental “cubbyhole” problem with respect to the regulation of financial innovations 
was first identified by the sources cited infra note 82 and, as suggested by the Sections of this Article 
referenced in that note, is a recurring theme with respect to the regulation of ETFs. 
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abbreviated process. In contrast, newer ETF sponsors may have to confront 
a more intensive substantive review. 
Running beneath these problems is a failure to systematically recognize 
and respond to the ETF phenomenon’s unique characteristics. The most 
distinctive feature of the ETF is its arbitrage mechanism. The purpose of this 
mechanism is to help bring together the price at which an ETF’s shares trade 
on a stock exchange and the pro rata value of the fund’s underlying assets, 
which is known as its net asset value (“NAV”).9 This parity between trading 
price and NAV is essential to an ETF’s unique role as a nearly frictionless, 
nearly universal, financial portal. The arbitrage mechanism poses risks, 
because it relies entirely on market incentives to lead certain “authorized 
participants” (“APs”) to enter into just the right transactions at just the right 
times with an ETF and traders in the secondary market so that the trading 
price of a share will be close to the share’s NAV. 
ETF disclosure regulation, however, pays little attention to what we call 
“trading price frictions,” such as those related to ineffective arbitrage 
mechanisms or bid-ask spreads. An effective arbitrage mechanism is 
essential to the investment premise of the ETF; yet SEC disclosure rules deal 
badly with simple matters like the past performance of the arbitrage 
mechanism, raising a serious risk of investor complacency. Bid-ask spreads 
faced by investors whenever they buy or sell ETF shares on a stock 
exchange, which can be significant to returns from investing in ETFs, are 
outside the purview of SEC disclosure mandates. This is largely because 
most ETFs are subject to a longstanding system of financial disclosure 
largely designed for mutual funds—a financial product that has no such 
trading price frictions because, unlike ETFs, its shares do not trade.10 Thus 
no arbitrage mechanisms or bid-ask spreads can exist in the mutual fund 
context. The disclosure system focuses on changes in NAV, certain 
operating expenses, and various sales loads and redemption fees, because 
these are the main concerns of mutual fund investors. But with ETFs, trading 
price frictions associated with the performance of the arbitrage mechanism 
and bid-ask spreads can be critical to investor decision-making. 
The arbitrage mechanism sometimes has failed catastrophically in 
 
 9. We will discuss more specifically the concept of net asset value, and the complexities and 
ambiguities associated with this and related concepts, in Sections I.B and V.B.  
 10. In contrast to an ETF, in which an investor normally buys or sells shares in the secondary 
market, in a mutual fund, the investor buys and “redeems” shares directly with the mutual fund itself, 
typically at the net asset value (“NAV”) of the mutual fund shares. As to the general operation of mutual 
funds, see, for example, John Morley, The Separation of Funds and Managers: A Theory of Investment 
Fund Structure and Regulation, 123 YALE L.J. 1228 (2013) [hereinafter Morley, Funds and Managers]. 
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periods of market stress. On February 5, 2018, the shares of an arcane, 
“inverse volatility” ETF, with about two billion dollars in assets the prior 
trading day, closed at a trading price roughly eighteen times its NAV—and 
suffered a 96% drop in its NAV to boot.11  
Even plain vanilla ETFs can experience deviations from NAV that are 
surprising in at least two ways. First, major deviations from NAV have 
occurred even in the ETFs that are least subject to such deviations. Early on 
August 24, 2015, major deviations from NAV occurred with respect to a 
number of large, well-established ETFs offering simple passive long 
exposure to broad portfolios of highly liquid domestic stocks. During the 
May 6, 2010 flash crash, the arbitrage mechanism of many ETFs invested in 
domestic equities “failed dramatically for approximately 20 minutes” to 
similar effect, in the words of one large ETF sponsor. 
Second, although trading rules and other market structure factors can 
be important to the effectiveness of the arbitrage mechanism and must be 
continually monitored, ETF-specific factors can also matter. For instance, 
large, well-established ETFs subject to identical market structures could 
experience striking differences in deviations. Early on August 24, 2015, the 
country’s second-largest ETF—one tracking the S&P 500—traded markedly 
below its NAV while the country’s largest ETF—one also tracking the same 
index—traded at or slightly above its NAV. The two ETFs invested in nearly 
identical highly liquid shares of domestic companies in identical proportions 
and were subject to the same market structure and market conditions. 
Something specific to these ETFs must have mattered, be it in terms of 
differences in APs, arbitrage mechanisms, clienteles, or otherwise. 
Yet the SEC’s mandatory disclosure regime for past performance did 
not require any of the ETFs suffering extraordinary deviations on August 24, 
2015 to make either quantitative or qualitative disclosures about their 
occurrence. Nor did the regime require any such ETF to set out any analysis 
of possible reasons for the deviations it experienced. 
As a result, the SEC’s system of required disclosures can contribute to 
investor complacency, if not misunderstanding. Using the SEC-mandated 
arbitrage mechanism performance scorecard, the country’s second-largest 
ETF properly and accurately reported a perfect “100.00” percent 
performance for a period that included August 24, 2015, despite the major 
deviation it suffered early that day. The key item of qualitative disclosure of 
past performance, the “Management’s Discussion of Fund Performance” 
 
 11. See infra Sections I.B and IV.C (discussing the ProShares Short VIX Short-Term Futures 
ETF). 
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(“MDFP”), was largely developed with mutual funds in mind, a product that 
has no arbitrage mechanism. The MDFP nowhere specifies discussion of the 
past performance of the arbitrage mechanism, and ETFs appear to have 
interpreted it as not requiring such a discussion. 
ETF disclosure regulation also fails to properly respond to the model-
based nature of the arbitrage mechanism, something especially surprising 
given the major model-related disruptions associated with the modern 
process of financial innovation.12 The arbitrage mechanism and its 
effectiveness vary among ETFs, depending on, among other things, the 
assets an ETF holds. Irrespective of particulars, every arbitrage mechanism 
embodies a theoretical model hypothesizing the voluntary behavior of APs 
and other market participants in a variety of circumstances. Like all models, 
this model depends on assumptions and suffers from “model risk”—the risk 
that the model may be faulty. It is difficult to ascertain how realistic the 
assumptions are and how robust the model is to failures to satisfy the 
assumptions. Moreover, a model developed assuming a certain business, 
legal, and regulatory environment may work quite differently when the 
environment changes. These model-related uncertainties are especially large 
before an ETF actually starts trading and the model is tested and validated in 
the real world. The first few generations of investors in an ETF serve, in 
effect, as the participants in a clinical trial of safety and efficacy, not unlike 
the participants in trials required for new drugs by the Food & Drug 
Administration. These uncertainties magnify as ETFs grow more arcane or 
complicated. 
ETF regulation has also suffered from academic neglect. The entire 
corpus of law review literature on ETFs comprises five articles.13 All but one 
 
 12. The concept that certain structural factors would lead to modeling problems and related forms 
of misunderstanding with respect to financial innovations even at sophisticated financial institutions was 
first advanced in 1993. See generally Henry T. C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of 
Information Failure and the Promise of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J. 1457, 1476–94 (1993) 
[hereinafter Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives]. Perhaps the two most dramatic recent illustrations of this 
concept both involved credit derivatives: the collapse of the American International Group (“AIG”) in 
2008, one of the seminal events of the global financial crisis; and the JPMorgan Chase’s Chief Investment 
Officer debacle in 2012. See Henry T. C. Hu, Disclosure Universes and Modes of Information: Banks, 
Innovation, and Divergent Regulatory Questions, 31 YALE. J. REG. 565, 623–36 (2014) (discussing 
JPMorgan Chase) [hereinafter Hu, Disclosure Universes]; Kara Scannell, At SEC, a Scholar Who Saw It 
Coming, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 24, 2010), https://www.wsj.com/articles 
/SB10001424052748703415804575023402762491286 (discussing AIG). See also discussion infra 
Section V.C.1 (discussing how the events of August 24, 2015 taught ETF advisors that additional 
assumptions were necessary for the arbitrage mechanisms to be effective). 
 13. See generally William A. Birdthistle, The Fortunes and Foibles of Exchange-Traded Funds: 
A Positive Market Response to the Problems of Mutual Funds, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 69 (2008) (describing 
ETFs and comparing them to mutual funds); Daniel J. Grimm, A Process of Natural Correction: 
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are from 2008 or earlier, and most focus on discrete, narrow aspects of ETF 
operations. One of the best of these articles thoughtfully analyzes the 
mechanics of an ETF and the ETF’s advantages and disadvantages relative 
to a mutual fund, but it stops short of describing and assessing the general 
structure of ETF regulation or offering a framework for new regulations as 
we do here.14 
Thus this Article makes two basic contributions. The first is to be the 
only law review article to show the need for an overarching regulatory 
framework for ETFs. The second is to offer the outlines of such a framework. 
Under our proposed framework, the arbitrage mechanism would be the 
organizing principle. Unlike the situation today, all collective investment 
vehicles utilizing the arbitrage mechanism would constitute an “ETF,” and 
thus, all types of ETFs, irrespective of the assets invested in, the strategies 
followed, or the exposures offered, would come under the same regulatory 
umbrella. The ETF would enjoy an independent legal status. ETFs, investors, 
and the public interest would be served by a unified framework attuned to 
the idiosyncrasies of the ETF phenomenon. This framework includes a 
streamlined, transparent, and primarily rules-based system for creating new 
ETFs that would allow most ETFs to avoid individualized SEC substantive 
review, while leaving the SEC enough discretion to adequately address the 
most troublesome new funds. 
Importantly, we would not mark out funds for such close scrutiny on 
the basis of product type—for example, leveraged ETFs, bitcoin ETFs, and 
so forth. Such a cubbyhole-based approach is vulnerable to the financial 
innovation process and changing market dynamics. Instead, we rely on three 
circumstances that, today and in the foreseeable future, will be matters of 
high regulatory significance. 
We also propose rules governing the disclosure and substantive 
operations of all ETFs. We suggest, for example, that certain substantive 
elements of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (“ICA”), which regulates 
most ETFs, should be extended to cover other ETFs that currently escape its 
 
Arbitrage and the Regulation of Exchange-Traded Funds Under the Investment Company Act, 11 U. PA. 
J. BUS. L. 95 (2008) (discussing actively managed ETFs); Peter N. Hall, Bucking the Trend: The 
Unsupportability of Index Providers’ Imposition of Licensing Fees for Unlisted Trading of Exchange 
Traded Funds, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1125 (2004) (discussing certain licensing fees); Thor McLaughlin, Eyes 
Wide Shut: Exchange Traded Funds, Index Arbitrage, and the Need for Change, 22 REV. BANKING & 
FIN. L. 597 (2008) (discussing how outsiders may game ETFs engaged in indexed investing); John Yoder 
& Bo J. Howell, Actively Managed ETFs: The Past, Present, and Future, 13 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 231 (2013) 
(discussing actively managed ETFs). 
 14. See generally Birdthistle, supra note 13 (describing ETFs and comparing them to mutual 
funds). 
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application.  
We propose disclosure requirements of a quantitative nature that would 
be granular enough to capture intraday breakdowns in the arbitrage process 
such as those that occurred on August 24, 2015. The essential historical 
information relating to intraday and at-the-close deviations from NAV would 
appear in traditional SEC disclosure documents and on the ETF’s public 
website. More granular historical information, if merited on cost-benefit 
grounds, would only be available on the ETF’s website in a downloadable 
form amenable to data analytics. 
New disclosure requirements of a qualitative nature would consider the 
arbitrage mechanism as a key component of “performance” for the purposes 
of the MDFP. More generally, we suggest that all ETFs provide broader, 
more prospective information about the arbitrage mechanism and related 
structural engineering matters through an approach in the style of 
“Management’s Discussion and Analysis” (“MD&A”) requirements that 
comprehend the arbitrage mechanism’s model-related complexities. This 
discussion should provide both a particularized assessment of the 
effectiveness of a fund’s arbitrage mechanism and related engineering—
including the implications of changes in the business, legal, or regulatory 
environment and the results of real-world testing—and outline the ETF’s 
efforts to monitor and improve the associated engineering.  
Finally, if any truly significant deviations from NAV occur at any time 
during a trading day, we would require disclosures the next business day 
through a Form 8-K-style SEC filing to alert investors and through web 
disclosure. Trading price frictions also arise from bid-ask spreads. Steps 
should be taken to begin mandating an appropriate degree of public 
disclosure as to such spreads, at least in terms of information of a quantitative 
nature. 
Collectively, these disclosure reforms should help inform investors and 
the SEC about possible trading price frictions associated with ETFs, 
facilitate sensible innovations in ETFs, encourage ETFs to improve their 
arbitrage mechanisms, and reduce systemic risk The reforms should also 
help facilitate SEC and industry initiatives relating to trading rules, other 
market structure matters, and additional factors associated with trading price 
frictions. 
Part I of this Article summarizes the theory underlying the arbitrage 
mechanism and evidence as to patterns in the mechanism’s actual 
performance. Part II sets out and analyzes the current de facto structure of 
the process for introducing new ETFs. Part III sets out and analyzes current 
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disclosure regimes applicable to ETFs. Part IV presents our proposal 
regarding regulation of a substantive nature. Part V presents our proposal for 
disclosure requirements. 
On June 28, 2018, just prior to this Article’s scheduled publication in 
the July 2018 issue of this law review, the SEC issued a proposal to change 
the regulatory state of affairs as to certain ETFs. (We call this the “June 2018 
SEC Proposal”).15 The June 2018 SEC Proposal, concurrent and prior 
statements by SEC Commissioners, and other published materials refer to 
drafts of this Article that had been posted in March 2018 on the Social 
Science Research Network (“SSRN”); this Article is largely as set forth in 
those and a subsequent draft.16 This Article offers a brief descriptive 
summary of major aspects of the June 2018 SEC Proposal in the Appendix. 
However, we do not attempt to contrast that proposal with ours in either the 
Appendix or the main body of this Article. We will offer an analysis of the 
June 2018 SEC proposal and related matters in a forthcoming issue of this 
law review. 
The SEC is to be commended for its proposal. Moving towards a more 
rules-based approach with respect to certain ETFs is a step in the right 
direction. We also welcome the SEC’s indicated openness to reconsidering 
the matter of better disclosures relating to the arbitrage mechanism and other 
distinctive aspects of ETFs, one of the core themes set forth in our Article. 
However, much more would need to be done to achieve a comprehensive 
regulatory framework for ETFs. 
 
 
 15. Exchange-Traded Funds, Securities Act Release No. 33-1051583, Fed. Reg. 37,332 (proposed 
July 31, 2018) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 239, 270, 274), https://www.sec.gov/rules 
/proposed/2018/33-10515.pdf [hereinafter June 2018 SEC Proposal]. 
 16. See, e.g., June 2018 SEC Proposal, supra note 15, at 113 n.291, 117 n.303, 176–77 nn.407–09 
and accompanying text; Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Commissioner, SEC, Statement of Commissioner Robert 
J. Jackson, Jr. on Proposed Rules Regarding Exchange Traded Funds (June 28, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-jackson-exchange-traded-funds-062818; Hester 
M. Peirce, Commissioner, SEC, Looking at Funds Through the Right Glasses (Mar. 19, 2018), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/peirce-looking-funds-through-right-glasses; Robert St. George, SEC 
Faces Call to Update ETF Regulations, CITIWIRE (Apr. 20, 2018), http://citywireusa.com/professional-
buyer/news/sec-faces-call-to-update-etf-regulations/a1107444; Henry T. C. Hu, The $5tn ETF Market 
Balances Precariously on Outdated Rules, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content 
/08cc83b8-38e0-11e8-b161-65936015ebc3 (op-ed based on March 18 draft of the Article). Cf. 
BlackRock, BlackRock Supports Discussion About the Future of ETF Regulation, ISHARES.COM 
(Apr. 2018), https://www.ishares.com/us/insights/blackrock-supports-discussion-about-future-of-etf-
regulation (statement on the foregoing April 23 op-ed and related matters). We posted two drafts of this 
Article on Social Science Research Network (“SSRN”) in March 2018 (one on March 9 and one on March 
18) and posted a third draft on August 16, all at http://ssrn.com/abstract=3137918.  
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I.  THE ETF’S DEFINING CHARACTERISTIC: THE ARBITRAGE 
MECHANISM 
A.  THE THEORY 
The ETF’s central investment premise rests on its role as a unique, 
nearly frictionless portal to seemingly endless combinations of asset classes, 
investment strategies, and long, short, and inverse exposures. ETFs allow 
investors not only to enter and exit positions nearly instantaneously 
throughout the trading day, but, critically, to also do so at little cost—that is, 
at a trading price nearly equal to the NAV of the shares. Such a mechanism 
is absent from the market microstructure of other traded securities, such as 
stocks, and of mutual fund shares.17 In our view, this novel, unique, and 
model-based device, which we refer to as the “arbitrage mechanism,” ought 
to be the starting point for a comprehensive framework for ETF regulation. 
The arbitrage mechanism is a way of trying to help ensure that the price 
of an ETF on a stock exchange is approximately equal to the value of the 
assets that underlie the shares. The idea, to be more precise, is to help ensure 
that the fund’s stock market price is always nearly equal to the fund’s NAV, 
which is the value of the assets in the ETF’s portfolio, minus the net of 
liabilities, all divided by the number of shares outstanding.18 An ETF 
investor would like to be able to count on the trading price being close to the 
NAV whenever she purchases or sells the ETF’s shares, irrespective of the 
usual tumult of the market forces of supply and demand. Much of the 
difficulty in designing ETF regulation comes from the variation in how 
closely the trading prices adhere to the NAV and the possibility of the 
arbitrage mechanism not meeting its objectives. 
In a simple ETF that holds the constituent stocks of a domestic equity 
index, the arbitrage mechanism roughly works as follows: At the beginning 
of each day, a fund announces a list of securities in its portfolio, which is 
known as the “creation basket.”19 Throughout the day, individual investors 
and market professionals (such as market makers and institutional investors) 
 
 17. Technically, uncollateralized debt obligations known as ETNs also have an arbitrage 
mechanism, but that mechanism operates differently from that of ETFs. See discussion infra Section 
IV.A. 
 18. See infra note 40 (referring to Sections in this Article discussing ambiguities and complexities 
in the concept of NAV). 
 19. Some funds also announce a separate list known as a “redemption” basket for use exclusively 
in redemptions. Current listing standards require beginning-of-day disclosure for actively managed ETFs, 
but not index-based ETFs. See, e.g., NYSE, RULES OF THE NYSE ARCA, INC. r. 8.600-E(d)(2)(B)(i) 
(2017) [hereinafter RULES OF NYSE ARCA]. Nevertheless, as a matter of practice, almost all index-based 
ETFs disclose their portfolios at the beginning of the day.  
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can invest or divest from exposure to this portfolio by buying and selling the 
shares of the ETF on a stock exchange. In addition, certain market 
professionals known as “authorized participants” (“APs”) can also create 
new shares of the fund or redeem existing ones by engaging in transactions 
directly with the fund. If an AP wants to create shares, the AP can assemble 
and deliver the various securities that make up the fund’s announced creation 
basket and then hand the securities over to the fund in exchange for a 
proportionate number of shares of the fund. An AP who wishes to create new 
shares of an S&P 500 index fund, for example, can deliver the proportionate 
number of the 500 stocks (give or take) that make up the fund’s portfolio.20 
Similarly, an AP can sell, or “redeem,” a fund’s shares by buying the fund’s 
shares and giving them back to the fund in exchange for a proportionate 
number of the securities in a “redemption basket.” An AP who redeems 
shares of an S&P 500 fund, for example, will receive the proportionate 
basket of the 500 securities in the fund’s portfolio.21 Note that these direct 
transactions with a fund usually only take place in very large blocks of 
shares, which are commonly known as “creation units” and “redemption 
units.” This restriction to large blocks avoids the costs of processing millions 
of tiny transactions and simplifies administration by ensuring that 
transactions happen in standard sizes.22 
Note that not every investor can transact directly with a fund. Only a 
financial institution that has previously contracted with the fund to be an AP 
may do so.23 APs are broker-dealers and clearing agents that have signed an 
authorized participant agreement with an ETF. Investors who are not APs 
may nevertheless be able to create or redeem shares by placing an 
appropriate order with an AP, because APs can create and redeem either for 
their own accounts or for those of their clients.24 
 
 20. An S&P 500 ETF, like an S&P 500 mutual fund, may not necessarily hold all 500 shares of 
the S&P 500 index. We are simplifying for clarity.  
 21. Note that the shareholder may not receive the portfolio securities until the very end of the day 
when the redemption is processed. In the meantime, the shareholder is likely to hedge by short-selling 
the portfolio securities, in the expectation that the shareholder can close out the short sale later by 
delivering the securities once the redemption is processed. Request for Comment on Exchange-Traded 
Products, Exchange Act Release No. 75165, 80 Fed. Reg. 34,729, 34,733 (June 17, 2015) [hereinafter 
2015 SEC Request for Comments]. 
 22. Evidence indicates that creation and redemption transactions tend to be small and rare relative 
to the size of most funds. Rochelle Antoniewicz & Jane Heinrichs, Understanding Exchange-Traded 
Funds: How ETFs Work, ICI RESEARCH PERSPECTIVE, September 2014, at 10 fig.4. 
 23. See, e.g., Fourth Amended and Restated Application for an Order Under Section 6(c) of the 
Investment Company Act of 1940 (Form 40-APP/A) at 13–14, In re Van Eck Assocs. Corp., No. 812-
13605 (Oct. 7, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/869178/000093041310005013/c62957 
_appa.htm. 
 24. See, e.g., id.  
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APs are important because the creation and redemption transactions that 
they enter into with the ETF should have the effect of helping limit how 
much the fund’s trading price will deviate from the fund’s NAV.25 While 
trading by market makers and other market participants can also serve to 
cause a general tendency for the trading price to gravitate to the NAV, the 
possibility of AP creations and redemptions tends to place both a floor and a 
ceiling on the stock exchange price of a fund’s shares. The arbitrage 
mechanism tends to set a floor, because if the trading price ever goes too 
low, APs will have the incentive to buy up shares on the exchange and 
redeem them from the fund in-kind at the NAV. If the NAV is $20.00, for 
example, and the price drops to $19.50, an investor can buy up shares on the 
stock exchange at $19.50 and then turn a 50-cent profit by redeeming the 
shares from the fund for a basket of securities worth $20.00. The act of 
buying up the fund’s shares on the exchange will tend to drive the trading 
price of the shares back up until the NAV comes close to $20.00, making 
such arbitrage unprofitable. The arbitrage mechanism similarly serves as a 
ceiling on the stock market price, since if the price of shares rises too far 
above the NAV, an investor will buy up the basket of portfolio securities at 
a price equal to the NAV and use them to create new shares of the fund. The 
AP will then have the incentive to sell the new shares on the stock exchange, 
thereby driving the price back down until it gets close enough to the NAV 
that this arbitrage becomes unprofitable. 
It is important to emphasize that an AP’s contracts with an ETF do not 
actually require the AP to create or redeem shares at any time.26 An AP faces 
no fiduciary duty and no contractual obligation to create or redeem. The 
arbitrage mechanism assumes that an AP will create or redeem because it is 
acting out of financial incentive and a desire to profit from gaps between the 
trading price and the NAV. 
It is also important to emphasize that the market microstructure of ETF 
shares is novel. The microstructure for other tradable securities, including 
shares in public companies, relies on market forces of supply and demand, 
with professional trading firms providing market liquidity, including firms 
designated as market makers by exchanges. In contrast, an ETF hopes that 
the voluntary, self-interested behavior of a specific group of firms—the APs 
 
 25. For an explanation of these incentives, see Richard A. Defusco et al., The Exchange Traded 
Funds’ Pricing Deviation: Analysis and Forecasts, 35 J. ECON. & FIN. 181 (2011). 
 26. See, e.g., U.S. Oil Fund, LP, Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of 1933 (Form 
S-1) (Apr. 7, 2006) (“An authorized purchaser is under no obligation to create or redeem baskets, and an 
authorized purchaser is under no obligation to offer to the public units of any baskets it does create.”) 
[hereinafter U.S. Oil Fund 2006 Registration Statement]. 
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for that ETF—can interact with such market forces whenever necessary in 
such a way as to help align the trading price with the NAV. 
The arbitrage mechanism opens up a number of advantages over other 
types of investment funds. Unlike an open-end mutual fund, which may 
invest in similar assets and which also permits redemptions, the shares of an 
ETF trade on a stock exchange, allowing investors to buy and sell from each 
other at market-clearing prices in real time. A mutual fund, by contrast, does 
not list its shares on a stock exchange, effectively forcing investors, directly 
or through their brokerage accounts, to buy and sell only in direct 
transactions with the fund. And a mutual fund only processes these 
transactions once a day, often leaving investors to wait out market 
movements before they can buy or sell.27 (On the other hand, with mutual 
funds, the ordinary investor can without question buy or sell precisely at the 
NAV while no ETF offers this certainty.) Additionally, because certain ETFs 
can transact in-kind, they offer significant tax advantages to investors, 
permitting funds to unload shares that have appreciated in value in direct, in-
kind transactions with APs, thereby avoiding the need to realize taxable gains 
on those shares.28 
This, then, is the simple architecture of how the arbitrage mechanism 
works. In practice, however, the arbitrage mechanism varies widely across 
ETFs, even among simple index funds. Some funds, for example, establish 
the creation basket at the beginning of the day using only a sample of the 
securities in the portfolio, while other funds establish the creation basket 
using pro rata portions of all of the securities in the portfolio.29 Some funds 
transact entirely or almost entirely in their portfolio securities; some funds 
 
 27. Mutual funds are not precluded from processing transactions more than once a day. From 1986 
through 2006, mutual funds in the “Fidelity Select Portfolios” series offered hourly pricing. See Kathie 
O’Donnell, Fidelity to End Hourly Pricing on Select Funds, INV. NEWS (July 24, 2006, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20060724/REG/607240754/fidelity-to-end-hourly-pricing-on-
select-funds. The tendency to process transactions only once a day made mutual funds vulnerable to 
manipulation in the early 2000s. See Eric Zitzewitz, How Widespread Was Late Trading in Mutual 
Funds?, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 284, 285–88 (2006). 
 28. Jeffrey M. Colon, The Great ETF Tax Swindle: The Taxation of In-Kind Redemptions, 
122 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1, 20–30 (2017). 
 29. Charles Schwab & Co., Inc., Comment Letter on Exchange-Traded Products at 4–5 (Aug. 17, 
2015), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-11-15/s71115-28.pdf [hereinafter Charles Schwab]. In a 
comment letter to the SEC, Charles Schwab & Co. examined three different fixed-income ETFs that each 
sought to track the Barclays U.S. Aggregate Bond Index on August 7, 2015 and discovered that one of 
them, which used the pro rata method, included 1,486 securities in its creation basket, even as the other 
two, which used the sampling method, included only sixty-four and fifty-six securities in their creation 
baskets, respectively. Id. at 4 n.10. 
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transact in a mix of cash and securities; other funds are cash-settled.30 
The differences in the arbitrage mechanism become even greater for 
funds that hold assets such as derivatives or commodities. The United States 
Oil Fund LP (“USO”), for example, invests in oil futures contracts, rather 
than stocks.31 Instead of asking APs to redeem and create shares by 
transacting in baskets of securities, the fund asks APs to transact exclusively 
in cash, creating complicated timing issues about how and when to calculate 
a NAV.32 The iShares Gold Trust (“IAU”) dispenses with cash and asks its 
APs to deliver and receive physical bars of gold.33 The trust has an elaborate 
set of procedures set up to process deposits and deliveries of gold, which 
must meet the specifications for weight, purity, and other characteristics as 
set forth in gold delivery rules of the London Bullion Market Association.34 
As with simple stock index funds, similar commodities or derivatives 
funds can vary in their arbitrage mechanisms. IAU is the second-largest ETF 
invested to track the price of gold bullion after the SPDR Gold Trust 
(“GLD”).35 The two funds would thus seem to be quite similar, but IAU 
issues and redeems in blocks of 50,000 IAU shares—which, as of January 
13, 2018 were collectively worth about $643,000—GLD redeems in blocks 
of 100,000 GLD shares—which, as of the same date, were worth about 
$12,696,000.36  
Similarly, with IAU, redemption may be suspended only, “(1) during 
any period in which regular trading on NYSE Arca is suspended or restricted, 
or the exchange is closed, or (2) during any emergency as a result of which 
delivery, disposal or evaluation of gold is not reasonably practicable.”37 In 
contrast, with GLD, redemptions may be suspended under circumstances 
corresponding to (1) and (2), but also when the “[s]ponsor determines [it] to 
be necessary for the protection of the Shareholders.”38 
 
 30. See, e.g., Direxion Shares ETF Trust, Statement of Additional Information 87, 90 (Feb. 28, 
2018) (specifying how, for certain bear ETFs, the creation units will only be sold for cash and how the 
redemption proceeds will consist solely of cash), http://direxioninvestments.onlineprospectus.net 
/DirexionInvestments//DFEN/index.html?open=Statement%20of%20Additional%20Information.  
 31. U.S. Oil Fund 2006 Registration Statement, supra note 26, at 33. 
 32. Id. 
 33. iShares Gold Tr., Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of 1933 (Form S-3) at 19 
(Nov. 21, 2017) [hereinafter IAU 2017 Prospectus]. One of the authors (Hu) holds shares in the iShares 
Gold Trust (“IAU”). 
 34. Id.  
 35. In the past, one of the authors (Hu) has held shares in SPDR Gold Trust (“GLD”).  
 36. See IAU 2017 Prospectus, supra note 33; SPDR Gold Tr., Registration Statement on Form S-
3 Under the Securities Act of 1933 (Form S-3) 3 (May 8, 2017) [hereinafter GLD 2017 Prospectus]. 
 37. IAU 2017 Prospectus, supra note 33, at 20. 
 38. GLD 2017 Prospectus, supra note 36, at 9. 
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Perhaps the most striking difference between the operation of the IAU 
and GLD arbitrage mechanism was an unexpected and evanescent one. On 
March 4, 2016, and for a short period thereafter, IAU’s arbitrage mechanism 
was literally not fully operative at the same time that GLD’s mechanism was 
functioning normally. That day, IAU announced that it had to temporarily 
suspend the creation of new shares until it could register additional shares 
with the SEC under the Securities Act of 1933 (“1933 Act”).39 
B.  PATTERNS IN REAL WORLD PERFORMANCE 
The available evidence suggests that the ETF arbitrage mechanism 
tends to perform reasonably well.40 However, there appear to be two general 
exceptions. 
First, the arbitrage mechanisms of ETFs involving less plain vanilla 
assets or strategies generally appear to be less effective. Second, in times of 
market stress, major breakdowns can occur even with respect to the arbitrage 
mechanisms of large ETFs offering straightforward long exposure to highly 
liquid domestic equities. Moreover, among such plain vanilla ETFs, the 
differences in the performance of the arbitrage mechanisms can be large and 
baffling. 
In terms of overall arbitrage mechanism performance, ETFs generally 
do fairly well. Antti Petajisto undertook an empirical study of deviations 
between share prices and the respective NAVs of 1,670 ETFs in the period 
from January 2007 to December 2014.41 Petajisto found that although the 
average deviation between trading price and NAV was only 6 basis points, 
the volatility of the deviation was 49 basis points, meaning that, with 95% 
probability, a fund is trading between -96 basis points and +96 basis points 
of its NAV, or within a 192 basis point band.42 
Certain kinds of ETFs exhibited higher deviations. These included 
 
 39. See Press Release, BlackRock, Issuance of New IAU (Gold Trust) Shares Temporarily 
Suspended; Existing Shares to Trade Normally for Retail and Institutional Investors on NYSE Arca and 
Other Venues (Mar. 4, 2016), https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20160304005402/en/Issuance-
IAU-Gold-Trust-Shares-Temporarily-Suspended. 
 40. There are a number of theoretical and practical complexities associated with the NAV (and the 
related matter of intraday indicative values), including the fact that the NAV can depart from the intrinsic 
value of the shares. See, e.g., infra Section V.B. One of these complexities is discussed in this Section 
I.B because of its importance to understanding the performance of certain ETFs on August 24, 2015. 
Specifically, we discuss how, in early trading that day, the S&P 500 Index (using the prescribed 
methodology) likely reflected values of certain constituent stocks that were in excess of their actual 
market values. 
 41. Antti Petajisto, Inefficiencies in the Pricing of Exchange-Traded Funds, FIN. ANALYSTS J., 
First Quarter 2017, at 24, 26, 33. 
 42. Id. 
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ETFs invested in less liquid U.S.-traded securities (such as municipal and 
high-yield bonds), international equities, and international bonds, with 
volatilities as high as 144 basis points, meaning a 95% confidence interval 
of almost 600 basis points.43 
Markus Broman analyzed data with respect to a sample of 164 
physically replicated ETFs traded in the United States that offer passive 
exposure only to U.S. equity indices for the period January 2006 to 
December 2012.44 In looking at, among other things, differences between 
trading prices and the NAV, his basic conclusion was that “ETFs are 
generally efficiently priced.”45 However, he did find that there was 
considerable variation among ETFs; that large ETFs did better than mid-
sized ETFs; and that mid-sized ETFs did better than small ETFs. 
ETF industry findings are broadly consistent with such patterns. For 
instance, in a letter to the SEC, BlackRock, the world’s largest asset 
manager,46 briefly discussed its review of the premiums and discounts of 
nine ETFs from January 1, 2008 through July 21, 2015.47 
It reported an average premium and discount of 0.01% and a standard 
deviation of 0.14% for SPY, the largest S&P 500 index fund. Funds holding 
municipal bonds and high-yield debt, and emerging market bonds had higher 
average premiums/discounts and standard deviations. 
Second, when the market fails to operate as it ordinarily does, however, 
the arbitrage mechanism can perform much worse. Early evidence of the 
arbitrage mechanism’s fragility came during the so-called “flash crash” of 
May 6, 2010. That day, beginning shortly after 2:30 p.m., U.S. equity and 
futures markets fell over 5% within a few minutes. The rapid decline was 
followed by a similarly rapid recovery. This decline and rebound of prices 
in major market indexes and individual stocks was unprecedented in its 
 
 43. Id. at 33. 
 44. Markus S. Broman, Liquidity, Style Investing and Excess Comovement of Exchange-Traded 
Fund Returns, 30 J. FIN. MKTS. 27, 35 (2016). 
 45. Id. at 37. 
 46. See Largest ETFs: Top 100 ETFs by Assets, ETFDB.COM, https://web.archive.org/web 
/20150810122335/http://etfdb.com/compare/market-cap (last visited Aug. 28, 2018) (noting that assets 
under management were based on figures available on August 10, 2015); TOWERS WATSON, THE 500 
LARGEST ASSET MANAGERS: THE P&I/TOWERS WATSON GLOBAL 500 RESEARCH AND RANKING, YEAR 
END 2014, at 3 (2015), https://www.towerswatson.com/en-US/Insights/IC-Types/Survey-Research-
Results/2015/11/The-worlds-500-largest-asset-managers-year-end-2014. 
 47. BlackRock, Inc., Comment on Exchange-Traded Products, Release No. 75165; File No. S7-
11-15 at 12–13, 27 Ex.5 (Aug. 11, 2015), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-at/literature 
/publication/sec-request-for-comment-exchange-traded-products-081115.pdf [hereinafter BlackRock, 
Aug. 11, 2015 Comment Letter]. 
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speed and scope.48 
ETFs were disproportionately affected during the May 6, 2010 flash 
crash. A total of 7,878 securities traded in the period from 2:40 p.m. to 3:00 
p.m. Only 326 securities of individual companies experienced a price move 
of 60% or greater from the 2:40 p.m. price. In contrast, 227 of the 838 ETFs 
that traded in this period experienced such an extraordinary move.49 It is 
highly implausible that these massive ETF stock price movements reflected 
real changes in the ETFs’ NAVs, since the prices of the ETFs’ portfolio 
assets were moving much less than the trading prices of the ETFs 
themselves. 
Indeed, BlackRock stated unequivocally that during the 2010 flash 
crash, “the arbitrage mechanism of many ETFs failed dramatically for 
approximately 20 minutes,” in that “ETF share prices fell dramatically 
compared to the current prices of the underlying holdings.”50 To illustrate 
this, BlackRock provided a graphic showing the intraday premium and 
discount performance of its own iShares Core S&P 500 ETF (“IVV”) 
relative to its intraday estimated fair value, a figure updated every fifteen 
seconds to reflect the most recent current prices in the underlying 
securities.51 In BlackRock’s view, this twenty-minute failure “meant the 
secondary market liquidity on exchanges available to ETF holders 
effectively failed for this period of time.”52 
More direct evidence of problems in times of market stress became 
available on another day of difficult trading: August 24, 2015. Trading was 
tumultuous that day. The Shanghai Composite Index had fallen 8.5%, and 
declines in European shares followed.53 
The U.S. market open did not go smoothly. Most stocks listed on the 
New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) did not open immediately at 9:30 a.m. 
on the NYSE (though they were immediately open for trading at other 
exchanges and off-exchange venues).54 At 9:35 a.m., the S&P 500 Index 
 
 48. U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N & SEC, PRELIMINARY FINDINGS REGARDING 
THE MARKET EVENTS OF MAY 6, 2010, at 2 (2010). 
 49. Id. at 29–30.  
 50. BENJAMIN GOLUB ET AL., BLACKROCK VIEWPOINT, EXCHANGE TRADED PRODUCTS: 
OVERVIEW, BENEFITS AND MYTHS 3, 20 (2013) https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-pt/literature 
/whitepaper/viewpoint-etps-overview-benefits-myths-062013.pdf. 
 51. Id. at 20 fig. 3.7.2. 
 52. Id. at 20. 
 53. Corrie Driebusch, Markets Reel in Global Sell-Off—Wild Ride Leaves Investors Gasping, 
WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 2015, at A1. 
 54. SEC STAFF OF THE OFFICE OF ANALYTICS AND RESEARCH, DIVISION OF TRADING AND 
MARKETS, RESEARCH NOTE: EQUITY MARKET VOLATILITY ON AUGUST 24, 2015, at 15 (2015), 
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(“SPX”) reached its daily low of about 5% below its previous close, under 
the methodology prescribed by the S&P Dow Jones LLP (“S&P DJI”).55 In 
contrast, all NASDAQ-100 (“NDX”) constituents (none of which were listed 
on the NYSE) did open at 9:30 a.m.56 However, NDX opened at 
approximately an 8% decline and had declined nearly 10% by 9:32 a.m.57 
Some major ETFs did far worse than the securities they held in their 
portfolios. Immediately after the 9:30 a.m. open, the trading price of IVV 
fell to its daily low of 20% below its previous close, even though its NAV 
had dropped only about 5%.58 IVV was the second-largest ETF in the United 
States, a plain vanilla S&P 500 ETF advised by BlackRock. IVV appeared 
to continue trading at a substantial discount to its NAV until 9:43 a.m.59 
During the trading day, 19.2% of non-leveraged ETFs experienced 
extreme price declines of 20% or more, while only 4.7% of shares of 
corporations experienced such declines.60 The Vanguard Consumer Staples 
 
https://www.sec.gov/marketstructure/research/equity_market_volatility.pdf [hereinafter SEC DECEMBER 
2015 NOTE]. 
 55. See id. at 3–4, 15. 
 56. This 9:35 a.m. 5% figure is not a precise measure of the true decline in the value of the S&P 
500 Index (“SPX”) constituent stocks. This is because the S&P Dow Jones LLP (“S&P DJI”) 
methodology for calculating the SPX generally uses the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”) closing 
price for the previous trading day for NYSE-listed constituents that had not opened on the NYSE itself 
(irrespective of whether trades were occurring elsewhere). At 9:35 a.m., only 38% of NYSE-listed stocks 
had opened on the NYSE. SEC DECEMBER 2015 NOTE, supra note 54, at 3. Such SPX use of the previous 
day NYSE closing prices likely had the effect of SPX understating the extent of the decline in early 
trading. Thus, until 9:42 a.m., SPX remained substantially higher than it would have been had the 
constituent stocks calculated with reference to consolidated real-time trade prices. Id. at 3–4. 
 57. Id. at 16. 
 58. The 15% difference flows from comparing the 20% drop at the daily low of iShares Core S&P 
500 ETF (“IVV”) (which occurred immediately after 9:30 a.m.), with the approximately 5% daily low of 
the SPX (which occurred at 9:35 a.m.). As an arithmetic matter, the actual difference between the IVV 
and SPX at 9:30 a.m. was greater than 15% (for example, since the daily low of SPX occurred at 9:35 
a.m., the 9:30 a.m. SPX was necessarily higher). On the other hand, the methodology S&P DJI prescribes 
for calculating SPX in early trading uses stale prices with respect to NYSE-listed stocks that had not 
opened for trading. See supra note 56 (discussing how SPX remained substantially higher than the prices 
of the NAV of the constituent stocks calculated with reference to consolidated real-time trade prices). As 
a result, the 15% difference represents a rough approximation of the difference between the trading price 
of IVV and its NAV (based on consolidated real-time trade prices of S&P 500 constituent stocks). An 
early media report suggested that at the open, the trading price of IVV fell 26%, even though its NAV 
fell only 6%—a 20% difference. See Chris Dieterich, ETF Focus: Market Plunge Provides Harsh Lessons 
for Investors, BARRON’S (Aug. 29, 2015), http://www.barrons.com/articles/market-plunge-provides-
harsh-lessons-for-etf-investors-1440826630. 
 59. As to this finding, the SEC used various measures proxying for the SPX. SEC DECEMBER 2015 
NOTE, supra note 54, at 5. 
 60. The statistics cited above for non-leveraged ETFs (as we define the term) are the statistics 
reported for non-leveraged ETPs by the SEC. See SEC DECEMBER 2015 NOTE, supra note 54, at 2, 80. 
We believe this is a good approximation even though the term ETPs can also include vehicles that we 
would not classify at ETFs, because the great bulk of ETPs were clearly ETFs. Id. at 9. See also infra 
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ETF (“VDC”) fell 32% at the open, while the corresponding index fell only 
9%. In the first trading hour, one ETF fell as much as 46%. Ironically, the 
name of this ETF was the PowerShares S&P 500 Low Volatility ETF 
(“SPLV”).61 At 9:31 a.m., the PowerShares QQQ Trust, Series 1 (“QQQ”), 
an ETF designed to track the NDX, reached its daily low of 17% below the 
previous close, even though its NAV dropped only about 9%—a difference 
of about 8%.62 QQQ continued to trade at a substantial discount to its NAV 
until 9:37 a.m.63 
Certain ETFs suffered nothing short of a breakdown in the arbitrage 
mechanism in early trading.64 Arbitrage ceased temporarily on many ETFs 
because of a lack of information on gaps between the trading price and the 
NAV, anomalous single stock pricing, uncertainty around hedging because 
of fear of trades being cancelled, and delayed opens in many individual 
stocks.65 
Two other issues from August 24, 2015 implicate the basic “nearly 
frictionless” investment premise of the ETF. First, substantial friction 
manifested itself not only in terms of gaps between trading prices and NAVs, 
but also in terms of the ability to instantaneously acquire, and exit from, the 
desired exposures. That day, only eight constituents of the S&P 500 and two 
constituents of the NDX suffered trading halts under the “Limit Up-Limit 
Down” system of the National Market System Plan to Address Extraordinary 
Market Volatility.66 In contrast, 327 ETFs, representing 20% of all ETFs, 
suffered such trading halts. 
Second, the friction experienced by any one ETF proved highly 
 
Section IV.A (on distinctions between ETFs (as we define the term), ETNs, and ETPs). The SEC nowhere 
indicated that it had excluded inverse products from its calculations, even though it is likely that the SEC 
did so since the report nowhere discusses any product as having increased in value concurrent with 
decreases in stock prices. 
 61. Chris Dieterich, The Great ETF Debacle Explained, BARRON’S (Sept. 5, 2015), 
http://www.barrons.com/articles/the-great-etf-debacle-explained-1441434195. 
 62. We calculated the 9% estimate for 9:31 a.m. by averaging the 8% 9:30 a.m. drop and the 10% 
9:32 a.m. drop. SEC DECEMBER 2015 NOTE, supra note 54, at 5, 16. 
 63. Id. at 5. 
 64. This is not to suggest that the NAV is always identical to the intrinsic value of an ETF’s assets. 
See, e.g., Charles Schwab, supra note 29; infra Section V.B. Cf. supra note 40 (discussing various 
complexities associated with NAV). See also supra notes 56 and 58 (discussing the S&P DJI 
methodology to calculate SPX resulted in many previous-day closing prices being used with respect to 
NYSE stocks that had not opened for trading on the NYSE, even though the stocks were trading in other 
venues). 
 65. Barbara Novick et al., BLACKROCK, US EQUITY MARKET STRUCTURE: LESSONS FROM 
AUGUST 24, at 2, 5 (2015), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-au/literature/whitepaper/viewpoint-
us-equity-market-structure-october-2015.pdf [hereinafter NOVICK, MARKET STRUCTURE].   
 66. SEC DECEMBER 2015 NOTE, supra note 54, at 4. 
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unpredictable, even as between seemingly identical ETFs subject to identical 
market structure rules. SPY and IVV were, respectively, the largest and 
second-largest ETFs in the United States. Both were plain vanilla ETFs, 
offering passive exposure to the performance of the S&P 500 Index, an index 
composed of 500 selected stocks from a cross section of industries that are 
among the most liquid in the world. Both ETFs were run by extremely large 
asset managers with deep, well-established expertise: SPY by State Street, 
the third-largest asset manager in the world, and IVV by BlackRock, the 
largest.67 
Despite such similarities, identical market structure rules, and identical 
market conditions, the trading price frictions associated with the two ETFs 
varied considerably in the early minutes of market open. SPY’s trading price 
only departed somewhat from its NAV, but began tracking relatively closely 
at 9:38 a.m. And throughout this period, SPY traded at a premium to its 
NAV.68 “[I]mmediately after 9:30 am,” IVV declined much more than its 
NAV and SPY and reached a discount of about 15%.69 And IVV did not start 
closely tracking its NAV until 9:43 a.m. 
The impact on investors of a breakdown in the arbitrage mechanism of 
the sort that occurred with some ETFs is difficult to exaggerate. Consider an 
investor who held shares in IVV for one year and then sold his shares at IVV 
immediately after the open on August 24, 2015 when IVV reached its daily 
low. When that investor bought IVV (at what was likely the then-prevailing 
NAV), the investor was essentially counting on obtaining the performance 
of the stocks in the SPX, less the impact of the ETF’s annual operating 
expenses. The reported expense ratio was 0.07%.70 On Friday, August 22, 
2014, the SPX opened at 1992.60, and at 9:35 a.m. on Monday, August 24, 
2015, the SPX was about 1872,71 a percentage drop of about 6%. When the 
investor sold near the open on August 24, 2015, he was expecting to have 
lost about 6% on his investment, that is, the change in the SPX and 0.07% 
due to the annual operating expenses. 
 
 67. See supra note 46 (discussing the rankings). 
 68. SEC DECEMBER 2015 NOTE, supra note 54, at 15. 
 69. Id. at 16. 
 70. This uses the ongoing expenses that investors pay each year as a percentage of the value of 
investments (all of which was accounted for by management fees). iShares Tr., Registration Statement 
Under the Securities Act of 1933 and/or Registration Statement Under the Investment Company Act of 
1940 (Form N-1A) S-1 (Jul. 24, 2015) [hereinafter IVV 2015 Prospectus]. 
 71. This is based on comparing (1) the SPX price at the open on August 22, 2014 (1992.60) with 
(2) the SPX price at the close on August 21, 2015 (1970.89), then including a haircut of 5%. See S&P 
500 Historical Data, INVESTING.COM, https://www.investing.com/indices/us-spx-500-historical-data 
(last visited Aug. 28, 2018); SEC DECEMBER 2015 NOTE, supra note 54, at 15 (SPX “reached its daily 
low of a little more than 5% at 9:35 [a.m.]”). 
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Instead of losing about 6% of his assets, however, this investor would 
have lost about 21%.72 This means that the performance of IVV’s arbitrage 
mechanism was more than two times more important than the performance 
of SPX. And the effect of this “drag”—this trading price friction—caused by 
this 15% arbitrage mechanism gap is about 200 times the drag caused by the 
0.07% in annual expenses. (Of course, an investor who bought IVV 
immediately after the open on August 24, 2015 at the 15% discount to NAV 
and later sold IVV at or close to the NAV would have benefited from a real 
bargain.73) 
The arbitrage mechanism problems experienced by these plain vanilla 
ETFs on August 24, 2015 were bad, but they pale in comparison to those 
experienced by another ETF on Monday, February 5, 2018. That day, the 
SPX fell 4.1%, its largest drop in about six years,74 and, not surprisingly, 
investors who were using ETFs and other products to bet on continued low 
volatility suffered. The ProShares Short VIX Short-Term Futures ETF 
(“SVXY”), an ETF with $1.89 billion in assets as of the Friday close,75 was 
one such product. It pursued daily investment results corresponding to the 
simple, unleveraged, inverse (that is, -1X) of the performance of the S&P 
500 VIX Short-Term Futures Index.76 
Between the Friday close and the Monday close, the NAV of SVXY 
shares fell from $103.7288 to $3.9635—a fall of over 96%.77 For at least 
some SVXY investors, a near-total loss in the NAV in one day must have 
been surprising. However, the harsh reality is that, as to this NAV drop, such 
 
 72. This is based on comparing (1) the opening price of IVV on August 22, 2014 (200.67) with 
(2) the IVV price at the close on August 21, 2015 (198.79), then including a haircut of 20%. See iShares 
Core S&P 500 ETF (IVV): Historical Data, YAHOO! FINANCE, https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/IVV 
/history?period1=1408683600&period2=1440392400&interval=1d&filter=history&frequency=1d (last 
visited Aug. 28, 2018) [hereinafter iShares Core S&P 500 ETF (IVV): Historical Data]; SEC DECEMBER 
2015 NOTE, supra note 54, at 16 (“[I]mmediately after 9:30 [a.m.], IVV reached a daily low of a more 
than 20% below its previous day’s close . . . .”). 
 73. Technically, for ETF investors buying or selling ETFs in the secondary market, it is the 
variability between the NAV and the share price that can cause problems. That is, if the investor buys at 
a 15% discount to NAV and happens to sell at a 15% discount, there is no harm to the investor from such 
deviations from the NAV. 
 74. Fred Imbert, Dow Plunges 1,175 Points in Wild Trading Session, S&P 500 Goes Negative for 
2018, CNBC (Feb. 5, 2018, 5:06 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/04/us-stocks-interest-rates-
futures.html. 
 75. See Short VIX Short-Term Futures ETF: NAV History, PROSHARES, 
http://www.proshares.com/funds/svxy.html (spreadsheet available under “NAV History”) (last visited 
July 31, 2018) [hereinafter ProShares SVXY NAV Spreadsheet] (spreadsheet available under “NAV 
History”).  
 76. See id. Cf. infra note 230 (announcement of change in the investment objective on February 
26, 2018). 
 77. See ProShares SVXY NAV Spreadsheet, supra note 75.  
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SVXY investors had little to complain about. As ProShares stated, this “was 
consistent with its objective and reflected the changes in the level of its 
underlying index.”78 Luckily, some investors did not have to find solace in 
this symmetry. The Harvard University endowment, for example, dodged the 
bullet entirely, having just disposed of its SVXY holdings the previous 
quarter.79 
However, the performance of SVXY’s arbitrage mechanism that day is 
something that, presumably, was very surprising even to the most highly 
sophisticated investors. At the Monday close, the SVXY’s trading price was 
$71.8280—a figure 18 times that of SVXY’s NAV of $3.9635. Even by the 
standards of this arcane ETF, this deviation between the trading price and 
the NAV was an extraordinary outlier. For the twelve-month period ending 
February 16, 2018, SVXY’s median premium and discount from NAV was 
0.02%.81 
II.  THE EXISTING REGULATORY STATE OF AFFAIRS: 
SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS 
A.  OVERVIEW, WITH A FOCUS ON PATHOLOGIES IN ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCESS 
The existing regulation of ETFs was never consciously designed to 
meet the unique challenges these funds pose. American law contains no 
dedicated body of ETF regulation and not even a workable, comprehensive 
conception of what an ETF is. Instead, the regulation of ETFs has been 
cobbled together ad hoc from the statutes that regulate other kinds of 
investment vehicles, including ordinary mutual funds, commodity pools, and 
regular operating companies. These statutes were written long before the 
ETF’s emergence, and none of them regulates with an ETF’s distinctive 
characteristics in mind. 
ETFs are dodecahedrons that have been crammed into a series of round, 
 
 78. Gunjan Benarji, Short Volatility ETN to Liquidate, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 2018, at B14. 
 79. Michael McDonald & Luke Kawa, Harvard’s Endowment Cut ProShares Volatility Fund 
Before Rout, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 9, 2018, 1:44 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-
09/harvard-s-endowment-cut-proshares-volatility-fund-before-rout. 
 80. See iShares Core S&P 500 ETF (IVV): Historical Data, supra note 72. 
 81. See ProShares Short VIX Short-Term Futures ETF: Premium/Discount, ETF.COM, 
http://www.etf.com/SVXY (last visited Aug. 28, 2018). ProShares’s own figures show that in the fourth 
quarter of 2017, the gap between at-the-close trading prices and NAVs was within 49.9% about two-
thirds of the trading days. See Short VIX Short-Term Futures ETF: Premium/Discount Analysis Tool, 
PROSHARES, http://www.proshares.com/tools/premium_discount?ticker=svxy (last visited Aug. 28, 
2018).  
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square, and triangular cubbyholes, and the fit has always been awkward. In 
this regard, ETFs are typical of financial innovations more generally, which 
regulators often cannot easily integrate into regulations designed for older 
financial products.82 
The attempt to squeeze ETFs into existing cubbyholes has produced 
two types of problems in ETF regulation: first, pathologies in administrative 
process and second, failures to properly map regulation to the unique 
characteristics of the ETF phenomenon. The two problems are closely 
related. Nevertheless, we will largely deal with matters of administrative 
process in this Part II (with a focus on the introduction of new ETFs) and 
matters of mapping in Part III (in the context of disclosure requirements). 
In terms of administrative process, there is first, an excess of 
fragmentation and second, an excess of discretion. Table 1 below illustrates 
these two basic problems. 
ETF regulation is fragmented, because functionally similar ETFs are 
subject to different statutory regimes. ETFs all rely on an arbitrage 
mechanism, and this commonality tends to drive the significant features of 
all ETFs. Despite the importance of the arbitrage mechanism, regulation 
tends to ignore this commonality and instead divides ETFs based on the 
category of assets in which they invest. Depending on what an ETF invests 
in, it might be regulated as an investment company (that is, a mutual fund), 
a commodity pool, or a regular operating company, with very different 
consequences for each classification. Differences in assets yield differences 
in the regulation of the ETFs, for reasons that mostly do not make sense. 
In addition to being fragmented, ETF regulation is also highly 
discretionary. Although some ETF regulation is codified in the form of stock 
exchange listing rules, the core of ETF regulation is an ad hoc process of 
individualized review that the SEC generally requires for every new ETF. 
 
 82. The cubbyhole problem arises in many contexts with respect to the regulation of ETFs and 
appears in, for example, the Introduction, Sections II.A, II.B, II.D, III.A, IV.A, IV.C, and V.A This 
cubbyhole problem in modern financial innovation and associated informational issues for regulators as 
well as possible solutions were first advanced in the context of financial innovation and the capital 
adequacy cubbyholes used by international bank regulators in by Henry T. C. Hu. See Hu, Regulatory 
Paradigm, supra note 6, at 335–39, 392–412. See also Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives, supra note 12, at 
1463, 1495–1508 (addressing the informational disadvantages regulators face as they integrate new 
financial products into regulatory structures developed for existing financial products); Henry T. C. Hu, 
New Financial Products, the Modern Process of Financial Innovation, and the Puzzle of Shareholder 
Welfare, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1273, 1292–1300, 1311–12 (1991) (financial innovation and the “equity” and 
“debt” cubbyholes used by corporate law). Such works have influenced scholarship as to the design and 
administration of tax laws in the face of financial innovation. See, e.g., Jeff Strnad, Taxing New Financial 
Products: A Conceptual Framework, 46 STAN. L. REV. 569, 570 n.2, 591 n.57, 605 n.110 (1994). 
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Generally speaking, before a new ETF can be introduced, the SEC has the 
authority to assess it individually and demand—with no guidelines and no 
need for consistency or transparency—that the ETF agree to comply with 
any condition or requirement that the SEC sees fit. This extended review 
process—which differs for different kinds of ETFs and varies even across 
different divisions within the SEC—has no discernible principles and no 
discernible limits. It is opaque and difficult to understand, and it has the 
effect of grandfathering old ETF advisers into more permissive rules, such 
that older advisors can often introduce new funds on easier regulatory terms 
than newer advisors. 
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B.  FRAGMENTATION 
The best way to understand the fragmentation of ETF regulation is to 
see it visually. Table 1 shows the sources of regulation for different types of 
ETFs. The rows in Table 1 show that the ETF universe can be divided into 
three different categories according to how they are classified: investment 
companies (“Investment Company ETFs”); commodity pools (“Commodity 
Pool ETFs”); or ordinary operating companies (“Operating Company 
ETFs”). 
The reason regulation divides the ETF universe up in this way is that 
instead of focusing on all ETFs’ common reliance on the arbitrage 
mechanism, which is what should provide the center post for ETF regulation, 
current regulation focuses on the different kinds of assets that ETFs invest 
in. ETFs that are functionally similar in the way they operate and relate to 
investors are treated differently because of the differences in the assets they 
invest in. 
By far the most common of the three categories of ETF is the 
Investment Company ETF.83 Investment Company ETFs are subject mainly 
to regulation by the Investment Company Act of 1940 (“ICA”), which is the 
principal regulatory statute for ordinary mutual funds and other investment 
companies.84 As we have noted, ETFs tend to be assigned to different 
regulatory categories based on the assets they invest in, and Investment 
Company ETFs are defined by their being invested in what are legally 
categorized as “securities.” The ICA says, roughly, that any company that is 
in the business of trading in securities or that devotes more than 40% of its 
assets to securities is an investment company to be regulated by the Act.85 
Thus, because most of the large index-based ETFs, such as SPY, invest in 
securities, they are regulated by the ICA, and they qualify under our rubric 
as Investment Company ETFs. The ICA includes several different categories 
of investment companies, and most ETFs qualify as “open-end management 
investment companies”—the same category that includes ordinary open-end 
mutual funds.86 A few ETFs—most of which were started in the early days 
of the ETF industry—are classified as “unit investment trusts” (“UITs”).87 
 
 83. Antoniewicz & Heinrichs, supra note 22, at 10 fig.4 (indicating the ETFs regulated as 
investment companies are more common than ETFs regulated as commodity pools or ordinary 
companies). 
 84. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 (2012). For an introduction to the ICA and its purposes, see John Morley, 
Why Do Investment Funds Have Special Securities Regulation?, in THE ELGAR HANDBOOK OF MUTUAL 
FUND REGULATION (William Birdthistle & John Morley eds., forthcoming 2018). 
 85. Id. § 80a-3(a). 
 86. Antoniewicz & Heinrichs, supra note 22, at 11. 
 87. Id. Unit investment trusts (“UITs”) and open-end management investment companies differ in 
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Investment Company ETFs are subject to a number of regulations under 
the ICA, which are administered by the SEC. Unlike the other securities 
regulation statutes, the ICA does not just regulate disclosure—it also 
regulates substance. It limits how much money a fund can borrow, for 
example, and regulates the way they redeem their shares.88 Note that 
although many funds regulated by the ICA are technically also subject to the 
1933 Act and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“1934 Act”), the ICA 
largely supplants the requirements of these two other statutes, mandating its 
own distinct forms of disclosure, which we will detail in Part III.  
The next type of ETF is what we call a Commodity Pool ETF. Like an 
Investment Company ETF, a Commodity Pool ETF is defined by its assets, 
namely commodity futures, which are contracts for the future delivery of 
anything that counts as a “commodity” under the Commodity Exchange Act. 
Examples of Commodity Pool ETFs include USO,89 which invests in 
contracts for the future delivery of oil, and the recently proposed ForceShares 
Daily 4X US Market Futures Long Fund,90 which hopes to invest in contracts 
to pay the future return on the S&P 500 index.91 
Because a Commodity Pool ETF invests in commodity futures, rather 
than securities, its main regulatory statute is not the ICA, but the Commodity 
Exchange Act.92 The adviser of a Commodity Pool ETF must thus register 
as a commodity pool adviser with the Commodity Futures Trading 
 
a few ways. A UIT, for example, is prohibited from having a board of directors, whereas an open-end 
management investment company is required to have one. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-4(2) (2012) (defining a UIT 
as an investment company that, inter alia, “does not have a board of directors”); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-16 
(2012) (requiring a board of directors for other investment companies). For the most part, however, the 
differences between UITs and open-end management investment companies are not important for our 
purposes, and we leave aside discussion of UIT-specific regulatory matters. 
 88. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(f) (2012) (regulating borrowing); Id. § 80a-22(e) (regulating the 
frequency of redemptions). 
 89. U.S. Oil Fund, LP, Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of 1933 (Form S-1) passim 
(Jan. 19, 2007).  
 90. Self-Regulatory Organizations; NYSE Arca, Inc.; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change 
Relating to the Listing and Trading of Shares of the ForceShares Daily 4X US Market Futures Long Fund 
and ForceShares Daily 4X US Market Futures Short Fund Under Commentary .02 to NYSE Arca Equities 
Rule 8.200, Exchange Act Release No. 79201, 81 Fed. Reg. 76,977 (Oct. 31, 2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nysearca/2016/34-79201.pdf [hereinafter Notice of Filing of Proposed 
Rule Change Relating to the Listing and Trading of Shares of the ForceShares Daily 4X US Market 
Futures Long Fund and ForceShares Daily 4X US Market Futures Short Fund Under Commentary .02 to 
NYSE Arca Equities Rule 8.200]. 
 91. Section 1 of the Commodity Exchange Act defines the word “commodity” to include any good 
or article. 7 U.S.C. § 1(a)(9) (2012). Note that although futures contracts on equity securities tend to be 
defined as securities, rather than commodities, futures contracts on indexes of equity securities are 
commodities. Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933, for example, defines the term “security” to 
include a future on a security but not a future on an index of securities. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012). 
 92. 7 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
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Commission, the federal agency that administers the Commodity Exchange 
Act, and comply with the Commodity Exchange Act’s disclosure 
requirements.93 The Commodity Exchange Act is not a Commodity Pool 
ETF’s only source of regulation, however, because a Commodity Pool ETF 
must also comply with the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act. Since the common 
stock that a Commodity Pool ETF issues to the public is a security, a 
Commodity Pool ETF must comply with the same securities regulations that 
apply to every other company that publicly issues securities. Indeed, as we 
shall discuss, for investors in a Commodity Pool ETF, the key source of 
information comes from the requirements of the 1933 and 1934 Acts, not 
from the Commodity Exchange Act. In addition, as we shall see, Commodity 
Pool ETFs face special regulation under stock exchange listing rules. 
The final category of ETF is what we call an Operating Company ETF, 
not because such an ETF is actually an ordinary operating company like 
Apple or General Motors, but because of the way this category is regulated. 
Like other kinds of ETFs, an Operating Company ETF is defined by its 
assets, and it tends to invest in things other than securities and commodity 
futures. Examples include ETFs that invest in gold bullion, such as IAU or 
GLD, or the ETF that was proposed by the Winklevoss twins of Facebook 
fame that would have invested in bitcoins.94 Operating Company ETFs are 
distinctive because they do not invest in securities or commodity futures and 
therefore are not subject to any special statutory regulation other than the 
1933 Act and 1934 Act regimes that apply to all public operating companies. 
Even though these ETFs are collective investment vehicles and their reliance 
on the arbitrage mechanism profoundly affects the trading of their shares, 
Operating Company ETFs are basically no different under federal law from 
Apple and General Motors. Though, we will see in a moment that Operating 
Company ETFs face some special regulation under stock exchange listing 
rules, and this gives the SEC significant authority over them. But by statute, 
at least, Operating Company ETFs are run-of-the-mill public companies. 
ETFs thus fall into several different regulatory regimes.95 Statutes are 
not the only source of ETF regulation, however. Indeed, much more 
 
 93. Id. §§ 6k, 6n. 
 94. The SEC disapproved a proposed rule change pertaining to the Winklevoss bitcoin ETF on 
July 26, 2018 despite having previously granted a petition for review after the staff initially denied the 
stock exchange’s application for a rule change to permit the fund’s listing. BATS BZX Exch., Inc., 
Exchange Act Release No. 83723, 2018 WL 3596768 (July 26, 2018); BATS BZX Exch., Inc., Exchange 
Act Release No. 80511, 2017 WL 1491756 (Apr. 24, 2017) (order granting petition for review and 
scheduling filing of statements). Cf. infra note 237 (on status of proposed VanEck SolidX Bitcoin ETF 
and of nine other proposed bitcoin ETFs). 
 95. The first ETF began operating in 1993. Antoniewicz & Heinrichs, supra note 22, at 6. 
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important than statutes are the rules imposed by stock exchanges. The great 
bulk of ETFs in the United States tend to list on the NYSE Arca, Cboe BATS 
Exchange,96 and NASDAQ Intermarket stock exchanges. These exchanges 
have each developed detailed listing rules to govern the operations of the 
ETFs they list, and these rules have become a major source of ETF 
regulation. 
The exchange listing rules came into being as part of the broader 
program of exchange-based private regulation envisioned by the 1934 Act. 
The 1934 Act empowers stock exchanges to develop rules to govern the 
operations, disclosure, and trading of the companies whose securities listed 
on the exchanges, and the rules governing ETFs flow out of this authority.97 
The rules are not entirely the products of the exchanges, however. The 1934 
Act requires an exchange to obtain the approval of the SEC before the 
exchange can create or change a rule, and this veto right functionally gives 
the SEC the power to dictate what the rules will say. The SEC can not only 
reject an exchange’s proposed new rules; but also, it can force changes in an 
exchange’s existing rules by refusing to cooperate with the exchange on 
other matters. Thus, although the listing rules for ETFs vary across 
exchanges, they should all be understood as part of a single program of 
regulation directed, in essence, by the SEC. Indeed, at times the SEC has 
granted what it calls “class relief,” expressly setting out a set of policies 
applicable to all exchanges seeking to list ETFs of a given type.98 
Despite the SEC’s central role in developing stock exchange listing 
rules, the rules set up for ETFs lack any coherent focus. None of NYSE Arca, 
NASDAQ Intermarket, and Cboe BATS Exchange have a single set of rules 
to regulate ETFs. Instead, just like the statutes that regulate ETFs, stock 
exchange listing rules tend to divide up ETFs by the kinds of assets they 
hold. Indeed, the exchanges divide up ETFs into an even finer set of 
categories than statutes do. NYSE Arca, for example, not only separates 
ETFs that invest in securities from other kinds of ETFs, but also breaks down 
 
 96. BATS was recently acquired and is now a subsidiary of Cboe. John Detrixhe & Annie Massa, 
CBOE Agrees to Buy Market Operator Bats for $3.2 Billion, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 26, 2016) 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-26/cboe-says-it-plans-to-buy-market-operator-bats-
for-3-2-billion.  
 97. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (2012). 
 98. See, e.g., Combination Exchange-Traded Funds, SEC No-Action Letter, 2007 WL 2011063 
(June 27, 2007) (expanding class relief to ETFs that hold both equity and fixed-income securities); Class 
Relief for Fixed-Income Exchange-Traded Funds, SEC No-Action Letter, 2007 WL 1498768 (Apr. 9, 
2007) (expanding class relief for index-based fixed-income ETFs); Class Relief for Exchange-Traded 
Index Funds, SEC No-Action Letter, 2006 WL 3455230 (Oct. 24, 2006) (expanding class relief for index-
based ETFs that cannot meet one or more of the conditions in the 2001 class letter); Am. Stock Exch., 
SEC No-Action Letter, 2001 WL 940280 (Aug. 17, 2001). 
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ETFs that invest into securities into further subcategories based on whether 
they invest in debt or equity.99 The NYSE Arca also pulls apart Operating 
Company ETFs into separate categories based on whether they invest in 
currency or tangible assets.100 
There is a key difference between these stock exchange listing rules and 
the statutes that regulate ETFs, however, which is that the stock exchange 
listing rules often address the unique problems of the ETF arbitrage 
mechanism.101 One common theme in the exchange listing rules, for 
example, is the diversification and liquidity of a fund’s portfolio.102 Another 
common theme is the transparency with which the portfolio is disclosed.103 
Despite these common themes, however, the details of the rules can vary. 
The NYSE Arca, for example, imposes different liquidity requirements on 
the portfolios of index-based Investment Company ETFs and actively-
managed Investment Company ETFs.104 
The net effect of this fragmentation across different regulatory statutes, 
rules, and exchanges is enormous, often resulting in unfair and incoherent 
differences in the legal obligations of otherwise similar ETFs. Contrast, for 
example, the regulatory obligations of the Van Eck Vectors Junior Gold 
Miners ETF, which invests in the stock of small gold mining companies, 
with GLD, which holds gold bullion. Both funds describe themselves as 
ETFs, and both rely on versions of the arbitrage mechanism to maintain the 
connection between their share prices and their NAVs. But because the Van 
Eck ETF holds securities, it is subject to the ICA and its many burdensome 
requirements, including, for example, the obligations to hire a chief 
compliance officer; to undergo regular inspections by the SEC; to comply 
with limits on borrowing and capital structure; to satisfy mechanical 
 
 99. RULES OF NYSE ARCA, supra note 19, at r. 5.2-E(j)(3), cmts. 1, 2 (discussing ETFs investing 
in equities in the first comment and ETFs investing in debt in the second comment).  
 100. Id. at r. 8.202-E, 8.201-E (discussing currency and tangible assets, respectively). 
 101. For a general summary of stock exchange rules, see Kenneth Fang & Jane Heinrichs, 
Understanding the Regulation of Exchange-Traded Funds Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
INV. CO. INSTITUTE 7–10 (2017), https://www.ici.org/pdf/ppr_17_etf_listing_standards.pdf. 
 102. E.g., CBOE BZX EXCHANGE, INC., RULES OF CBOE BZX EXCHANGE, INC. r. 14.11(c)(3)(A) 
(2018) (requiring minimum liquidity and diversification for components of an index used by an equity 
ETF) [hereinafter RULES OF CBOE BZX EXCHANGE]; RULES OF THE NYSE ARCA, supra note 19, at r. 
5.2-E(j)(3) (same). 
 103. RULES OF CBOE BZX EXCHANGE, supra note 102, at r. 14.11(c)(3)(C) (requiring disclosure of 
intraday indicative value every 15 seconds); RULES OF NYSE ARCA, supra note 19, at r. 5.2-E(j)(3) cmt. 
.04(a) (requiring daily disclosure on a public web site of the portfolio holdings that will form the basis of 
a fund’s calculation of NAV). 
 104. RULES OF CBOE BZX EXCHANGE, supra note 102, at r. 14.11(c)(3)(A) (requiring minimum 
liquidity and diversification for components of an index used by an equity ETF); RULES OF NYSE ARCA, 
supra note 19, at r. 5.2-E(j)(3) (same). 
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requirements for redemptions and securities sales; and to set up a board of 
directors and shareholder voting. In contrast, GLD faces none of these 
requirements, because GLD does not invest in securities. 
These differences in regulatory obligations might make sense if they 
were connected to the differences in the two funds’ assets. To the extent that 
bars of gold and the common stock of gold mining companies pose different 
risks to investors, then of course the law should account for those differences, 
but that is not what the law is doing. Instead, the law draws distinctions based 
on ancient categories that have little correlation with modern investor needs. 
Though bars of gold and stock in gold mining companies are surely different, 
it is impossible to say what those differences have to do with, say, the need 
for a chief compliance officer, the value of regular inspections by the SEC, 
or the myriad of other ICA requirements. And if the need for a chief 
compliance officer or regular inspections has anything to do with the 
differences between gold bars and stock in gold mining companies, it is only 
by accident and not because Congress or any other rational policy designer 
foresaw it. 
C.  DISCRETION 
After fragmentation, the second major feature of the ETF administrative 
process is discretion. Although an ETF is subject to a host of statutes and 
rules, most of the regulation of ETFs comes from a process of ad hoc, 
individualized, discretionary review at the SEC. This individualized review 
process allows the SEC to impose requirements and conditions on every new 
ETF adviser. Many of these requirements and conditions have never been 
publicly announced or written down, and they have varied significantly over 
time, even for funds that are otherwise virtually identical. The SEC has a 
tremendous amount of discretion to impose novel requirements on any new 
ETF or ETF sponsor. 
The details are somewhat complicated, but generally speaking, the SEC 
imposes this discretionary review on each new ETF in a slightly different 
way, depending on the nature of the ETF’s assets. For an Investment 
Company ETF, the source of the SEC’s discretionary review is the SEC’s 
statutory power to grant exemptions from certain provisions of the ICA. The 
ICA was drafted more than forty years before the first ETF came into being, 
so the ICA imposes a number of requirements that unintentionally prohibit 
the arbitrage mechanism at the heart of an ETF. For example, sections 
2(a)(32) and 5(a)(1) of the ICA say that in an “open-end management 
investment company”—the category of investment company that includes 
ordinary mutual funds as well as most ETFs—shares of common stock must 
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be redeemable at net asset value.105 The SEC has interpreted this requirement 
to mean that every share must be individually redeemable by every 
shareholder.106 This is a problem for ETFs, because ETFs generally only 
permit shares to be redeemed in large blocks and only by a small number of 
designated APs. Most shareholders thus cannot redeem directly, and even 
those who can are unable to redeem their shares one at a time. Hence, the 
arbitrage mechanism violates the ICA. Similarly, section 22 of the ICA 
regulates the distribution of shares of an open-end management investment 
company,107 and the trading of ETF shares on a stock exchange may violate 
those regulations. In addition, ETFs tend to violate a number of other 
provisions of the ICA.108 
The SEC’s solution to this problem has been to grant special 
exemptions to the Investment Company ETFs that apply for them. The 
SEC’s authority for these exemptions comes from section 6(c) of the ICA, 
which says: 
The Commission, by rules and regulations upon its own motion, or by 
order upon application, may conditionally or unconditionally exempt any 
person, security, or transaction, or any class or classes of persons, 
securities, or transactions, from any provision or provisions of this title or 
of any rule or regulation thereunder, if and to the extent that such 
exemption is necessary or appropriate in the public interest and consistent 
with the protection of investors and the purposes fairly intended by the 
policy and provisions of this title.109  
In exchange for granting an exemption, however, the SEC imposes a 
number of requirements and conditions. Applicants often negotiate these 
conditions with the SEC privately and then memorialize the conditions in 
written applications that applicants later upload to the SEC’s website, where 
many of the applications become publicly available.110 Sponsors that refuse 
 
 105. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2(a)(32), 5(a)(1) (2012).  
 106. The SEC’s position is implicit in the requests that ETF sponsors make to be exempted from 
sections 5(a)(1) and 2(a)(32) of the ICA. See, e.g., Index IQ ETF Trust, Investment Company Act Release 
No. 33163 (July 19, 2018) (notice) (“Because shares will not be individually redeemable, applicants 
request an exemption from section 5(a)(1) and section 2(a)(32) of the Act that would permit the Funds to 
register as open-end management investment companies and issue shares that are redeemable in Creation 
Units.”). 
 107. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22. 
 108. ICA section 22(e) requires redemptions to be affected within seven days of demand. Id. § 80a-
22(e). ETFs that invest in securities overseas are sometimes unable to satisfy this requirement because 
they cannot settle trades within seven days. Additionally, ICA section 17(a) limits transactions between 
a fund and its large shareholders (who, for technical reasons, may include authorized participants in an 
ETF). Id. § 80a-17(a). 
 109. Id. § 80a-6(c). 
 110. As a typical example, the SEC recently approved an application for exemption by the Northern 
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to accept the SEC’s conditions may have their applications denied.111 
This process of review is thus a major source of regulation for 
Investment Company ETFs. The SEC essentially uses it to invent new 
regulations, ad hoc, for each new fund sponsor. The ability to invent new 
regulations is valuable for all kinds of reasons—it is a power any regulator 
would love—but it is especially useful for ETFs, because statutory law has 
so little to say about the unique features of ETFs. The SEC thus leans heavily 
on the exemptive process to formulate legal requirements that address an 
ETF’s distinctive threats and risks. 
One of the limitations of this ICA exemptive process, however, is that 
it does not reach Commodity Pool or Operating Company ETFs. Since only 
funds that trade in securities are subject to the ICA, only funds that trade in 
securities have to ask the SEC for exemptions from the ICA. The SEC thus 
cannot reach Commodity Pool or Operating Company ETFs through the ICA 
exemptive process, leaving these funds potentially free from the conditions 
and requirements that ICA exemptive orders apply to Investment Company 
ETFs. 
Recognizing this problem, the SEC has found another source of 
authority to individually review Commodity Pool and Operating Company 
ETFs: stock exchange listing standards. Under the listing standards of the 
exchanges that list ETFs, every new Commodity Pool or Operating 
Company ETF has to be individually approved by the SEC before it can be 
listed on the exchange. The SEC achieves this outcome by leveraging a 
provision in the 1934 Act that requires all changes in stock exchange listing 
standards to be reviewed and approved by the SEC.112 Thus, in order to give 
it a chance to review and impose conditions on every new Commodity Pool 
 
Lights Fund Trust for a series of actively managed ETFs. Section 8 of the amended application contained 
a section titled “Express Conditions to this Application,” which listed eighteen different conditions the 
trust agreed to comply with in exchange for an exemption. The conditions included, among other things, 
a commitment to maintain a web site with daily information on the fund’s NAV and portfolio, a 
commitment not to call the fund a “mutual fund,” and various commitments designed to limit the 
influence of large traders who might hold the fund’s shares. N. Lights Fund Tr. & Toews Corp., 
Application for Exemption and Other Relief Filed Under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (Form 
40-APP) 29–32 (June 26, 2017). 
 111. See, e.g., Order Disapproving a Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Listing and Trading of 
Shares of the SolidX Bitcoin Trust Under NYSE Arca Equities Rule 8.201, Exchange Release No. 80319, 
82 Fed. Reg. 16,247 (Apr. 3, 2017) [hereinafter SolidX Bitcoin Tr.]; Order Disapproving a Proposed Rule 
Change to BZX Rule 14.11(e)(4) to List and Trade Shares Issued by the Winklevoss Bitcoin Trust, 
Exchange Release No. 80206, 82 Fed. Reg. 14,076 (Mar. 16, 2017) [hereinafter Winklevoss Bitcoin Tr.]; 
Precidian ETFs Tr., Investment Company Act Release No. 31336, 110 SEC Docket 1226 (Nov. 14, 2014) 
(order permitting withdrawal of application) [hereinafter Precidian ETFs Tr.]. For the current status of 
the Winklevoss, SolidX, and nine other proposed bitcoin ETFs, see supra note 94 and infra note 237. 
 112. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (2012).  
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and Operating Company ETF, the SEC has required the exchanges to treat 
the listing of each one of these funds as a change in their listing standards, 
even if the fund complies with all of the requirements in an exchange’s 
listing standards.113 Once the exchange applies for a special exemption to list 
a new Commodity Pool or Operating Company ETF, the SEC gets to decide 
whether to permit this technical change, and may impose additional 
requirements and conditions in exchange for its permission.114 
It is worth nothing that Commodity Pool and Operating Company ETFs 
are not the only ETFs that have to ask the SEC for changes in stock exchange 
listing rules. Sometimes Investment Company ETFs have to apply as well. 
The stock exchanges have listing standards for Investment Company ETFs, 
just as they do for other types of ETFs, and in recent years the SEC has 
permitted the exchanges to make these standards “generic,” so that any 
Investment Company ETF that complies with the standards can list without 
any special approval for a rule change from the SEC.115 Some Investment 
Company ETFs, however, do not satisfy the generic standards. These 
Investment Company ETFs thus have to ask the SEC for a rule change, much 
as Commodity Pool and Generic ETFs do. For an Investment Company ETF 
that complies with a stock exchange’s written listings standards, the SEC’s 
discretionary review thus focuses primarily on the fund’s application for an 
Investment Company Act exemption, rather than its listing on a stock 
exchange. If, however, an Investment Company ETF for some reason does 
not comply with an exchange’s listing rules, the SEC can demand the right 
to review and approve any necessary changes in the listing rules. When the 
 
 113. Fang & Heinrichs, supra note 101, at 7–10. 
 114. When a stock exchange applies for a rule change to list a new fund, the SEC issues a public 
notice, permitting both the fund and anyone else who might be interested to comment on the SEC’s 
decision. See, e.g., Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Listing and Trading of 
Shares of the ForceShares Daily 4X US Market Futures Long Fund and ForceShares Daily 4X US Market 
Futures Short Fund Under Commentary .02 to NYSE Arca Equities Rule 8.200, supra note 90.  
 115. The SEC permitted automatic exchange listings for index-based Investment Company ETFs in 
1998 and did the same for actively managed Investment Company ETFs in 2016. Amendment to Rule 
Filing Requirements for Self-Regulatory Organizations Regarding New Derivative Securities Products, 
63 Fed. Reg. 70,952 (Dec. 22, 1998) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 and 249). See, e.g., Self-
Regulatory Organizations: The NASDAQ Stock Market LLC; Order Granting Approval of a Proposed 
Rule Change To Amend NASDAQ Rule 5735 To Adopt Generic Listing Standards For Managed Fund 
Shares, Exchange Act Release No. 78918, 2016 WL 5340200 (Sept. 23, 2016); Self-Regulatory 
Organizations: NYSE Arca, Inc.: Order Granting Approval of Proposed Rule Change, as Modified by 
Amendment No. 7 Thereto, Amending NYSE Arca Equities Rule 8.600 To Adopt Generic Listing 
Standards For Managed Fund Shares, Exchange Release No. 78397, 2016 WL 3151792 (July 22, 2016); 
Self-Regulatory Organizations: BATS Exchange, Inc.; Order Approving a Proposed Rule Change, as 
Modified by Amendment No. 6, To Amend BATS Rule 14.11(I) To Adopt Generic Listing Standards for 
Managed Fund Shares, Exchange Release No. 78396, 2016 WL 3970922 (July 22, 2016). 
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SEC is not inclined to approve, it issues a notice and invites comments.116 
The key fact about these two review processes—the ICA exemption and 
stock exchange listing rule change approval—is that they each give the SEC 
enormous discretion. The statutes that govern these two processes place 
almost no limits on what the SEC can do. For Investment Company ETFs, 
there is no statutory requirement that the SEC ever grant an application for 
exemption, no matter how meritorious the application might be. The SEC 
can refuse to grant an exemption from the ICA for any reason or no reason 
at all. And if the SEC does choose to grant an exemption, the SEC faces only 
the vaguest and most general of constraints. Section 6(c) of the ICA says that 
if the SEC wishes to give an exemption, it must determine merely that the 
exemption is “necessary or appropriate in the public interest and consistent 
with the protection of investors and the purposes fairly intended by the policy 
and provisions of this subchapter.”117 
For Commodity Pool and Operating Company ETFs, the SEC’s legal 
authority to review stock exchange listings is similarly broad. The 
requirements for a rule change application by a stock exchange appear in 
section 19(b) and rule 19b-4 of the 1934 Act.118 Section 19(b)(2)(C)(i) says 
only that the SEC must approve a change in stock exchange rules if the 
change “is consistent with the requirements” of the 1934 Act.119 But the 1934 
Act does not provide any detailed requirements for stock exchange listing 
rules. At most, it provides only a set of vague exhortations that urge the SEC 
to make good policy.120 The SEC thus has the effective authority to approve 
or disapprove a Commodity Pool or Operating Company ETF for almost any 
reason. 
In theory, the SEC could choose to narrow its discretion by adopting 
formal, written rules that limit how it will carry its discretion out. Section 
6(c) of the ICA, for example, says that the SEC could choose to grant 
exemptions “by rule or regulation,” rather than by individual application, but 
 
 116. Yet another potential source of discretionary review for all types of funds is the 1934 Act. 
ETFs of all types often violate certain provisions of the 1934 Act and rules promulgated thereunder, such 
as those governing credit on ETF shares, customer confirmation disclosures, and market manipulation. 
Fang & Heinrichs, supra note 101, at 10. For Investment Company ETFs, the SEC has limited some of 
its discretionary review authority by issuing class relief that covers all funds that meet certain 
requirements. See, e.g., WisdomTree Tr., SEC No-Action Letter, 2008 WL 2792544 (May 9, 2008). See 
also AdvisorShares Tr., SEC No-Action Letter, 2011 WL 2423998 (June 16, 2011) (class relief for ETFs 
of ETFs). 
 117. 15 U.S.C. § 80-6(c) (2012).  
 118. 1934 Act § 19(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (2012). See also 17 C.F.R. § 240.19b-4 (2013).  
 119. 1934 Act § 19(b)(2)(C)(i), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (2012). 
 120. 1934 Act §§ 3(f), 6(b)(5), 11A(a)(1)(C)(iii), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c(f), 78f(b)(5), 78k-1(a)(1)(C)(iii) 
(2012).  
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to date, the SEC has yet to adopt any official administrative rules that apply 
uniquely to ETFs.121 Though the SEC proposed a set of rules in 2008, it never 
adopted them.122 As noted in the Introduction, on June 28, 2018, the SEC 
proposed changes that would relate to one category of ETFs. The proposal is 
briefly summarized in the Appendix. 
Of course, the SEC’s review of new ETFs has become somewhat 
standardized over time. Successful applications for review are available for 
public inspection on the SEC’s website, so the ETF industry has learned 
something about what the SEC requires. Most applications tend to be fairly 
routine, and the lawyers who draft them often begin by copying and pasting 
the applications of advisers already in business. A standard application 
contains a lengthy description of the sponsor’s plans and details for how it 
intends to operate its funds. These plans operate as restrictions on the sponsor 
later on, since the terms of the SEC’s exemptive order will inevitably require 
the sponsor to operate consistent with the plans described in its 
application.123 In addition to this general description of a sponsor’s plans, the 
application will also contain a set of “express conditions,” which typically 
require, among many other things, that a fund be listed on a national stock 
exchange, that the fund not advertise itself as an ordinary mutual fund, and 
that the fund list the daily contents of its redemption/creation basket on its 
website.124 
Despite the increasing standardization of conditions for ETFs that are 
allowed to list, the SEC nevertheless continues to make liberal use of its 
broad authority to refuse ETF listings. The SEC recently refused or 
substantially delayed the listings of a number of ETFs, including at least 
eleven proposed bitcoin-focused ETFs, a 4X leveraged S&P 500 ETF 
proposed by a company called ForceShares, and an actively managed ETF 
that would have kept portions of its portfolios secret.125 
The details of how the SEC achieves and exercises all of this discretion 
 
 121. 15 U.S.C. § 80-6(c) (2012). 
 122. Exchange-Traded Funds, Securities Act Release No. 33-8901, 73 Fed. Reg. 14,618 (Mar. 18, 
2008). 
 123. Wells Fargo Exch.-Traded Funds Tr. et al., Investment Company Act Release No. 32869, 2017 
WL 4803650 (Oct. 24, 2017) (issuing an exemption “on the basis of the information set forth in the 
application”). 
 124. See, e.g., CBOE Vest Fin. LLC, Amended Application for an Order Under Section 6(c) of the 
Investment Company Act of 1940 (Form 40-APP/A) 27–29 (Oct. 19, 2017); Sigma Inv. Advisors, LLC, 
Fourth Amended and Restated Application for an Order Under 6(c) of the Investment Company Act of 
1940 (Form 40-APP/A) 71 (June 13, 2013). 
 125. Precidian ETFs Tr., supra note 111. As to the eleven proposed bitcoin ETFs, see supra note 
94 and infra note 237. 
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can be a bit hard to follow, but their effect is important enough that they force 
us to contemplate a key question: Is all of this discretion a good idea? The 
main advantage is flexibility: the SEC can individually tailor the law to each 
new fund by designing the law ad hoc. If a fund pops up for the purpose of 
investing in some unusual category of assets like, say, bitcoin, the SEC can 
decide on a case-by-case basis what to permit and which conditions to 
impose. Regulation can be as flexible as the financial innovation that 
warrants it. And, of course, this individualized review nimbly avoids the 
legal and political burdens of the Administrative Procedure Act. Since the 
SEC can refuse an ETF’s application for any reason or no reason at all, there 
is no risk that skeptical judges on the D.C. Circuit will find the action 
“arbitrary and capricious,”126 unsupported by the requisite costs-benefit 
analysis, or otherwise troublesome. 
But against these advantages we must weigh the brute fact that the 
individualized review process is not only cumbersome and complex, but also 
verges on the lawless. It allows the SEC to do more or less whatever it wants, 
for almost any reason. The regulation of ETFs—which are among the 
dynamic innovations in modern finance—is a kind of throwback to the very 
earliest state-level securities laws of the 1910s. Early state-level securities 
regulation operated as a system of “merit review,” in which government 
officials self-consciously screened securities offerings for their quality and 
promise. Rather than merely verifying compliance with a set of regulations, 
officials chose the securities that they deemed worthy and declared the rest 
illegal.127 
This amount of SEC discretion produces serious problems. One is 
opacity. Although the SEC doubtless has internal policies for exercising its 
discretion, it is difficult to know what exactly those policies are because most 
of them are devised beyond the scope of public view. The SEC does not 
usually announce the policies it uses in reviewing an ETF’s application for 
exemption, and although successful applications are available for public 
review on the SEC’s web site, interviews suggest that ETF advisers may face 
individualized questioning and negotiations that never appear in the public 
record. ETF advisers often meet with SEC staff and present data and 
PowerPoint slides to address the staff’s concerns, but none of the details of 
 
 126. See generally Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012) (“The reviewing 
court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . 
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”). 
 127. See generally Daniel J. Morrissey, The Road Not Taken: Rethinking Securities Regulation and 
the Case for Merit Review, 44 U. RICHMOND L. REV. 647 (2009) (arguing in favor of re-adopting merit 
review). 
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these conversations make it into the brief and standardized final exemption 
applications that appear on the SEC’s website. If the SEC does make an 
objection to a feature of an ETF’s business plan, the adviser usually removes 
it without leaving any public record to show that the feature was ever 
disputed.128 Likewise, when the SEC goes further and denies an exemptive 
application instead of merely requesting changes, this also tends to leave no 
public record, because staff members usually deliver the bad news in an 
unrecorded phone call or personal meeting, prompting the applicant to 
withdraw its application before the SEC can render an official public 
decision.129 Thus, the contents of a failed application can usually only be 
guessed at or deduced through back-channel gossip with SEC staff and 
practicing lawyers. A related problem is that when lawyers parse the 
previously successful applications of existing ETF sponsors, they often find 
it impossible to distinguish between characteristics that are unique to a 
particular ETF and characteristics that the SEC intends to demand of all 
ETFs. 
The opacity of the review process can baffle even seasoned industry 
players. In response to a recent request by the SEC for public comments on 
ETF regulation, what was then called the BATS stock exchange, a primary 
venue for ETF trading, complained specifically about the opacity of the 
review process. They noted that even though BATS had helped dozens of 
ETFs through the process of SEC review, BATS still often had little idea 
what the SEC would do in any given case.130 
Indeed, differences among individual SEC staff members and between 
Divisions can dictate the outcomes at the SEC. BATS complained that the 
requirements varied depending on which individual SEC staff member 
received a fund’s application.131 Further, different Divisions of the SEC 
 
 128. Sometimes the feature might be discovered by comparing successive drafts of an application 
on the SEC’s web site, but some proposals never make it into any draft at all. 
 129. E.g., Precidian ETFs Tr., supra note 111 (permitting withdrawal of application after an 
applicant apparently failed to receive the exemption).  
 130. BATS Global Markets, Inc., Comment Letter on Exchange-Traded Products; Exchange Act 
Release No. 75165, File No. 87-11-15, at 2 (Jan. 14, 2016), http://cdn.batstrading.com/resources 
/comment_letters/ETP-Comment-Letter-14-January-2016.pdf (“[T]he Commission staff has not 
published well-defined criteria related to its concerns associated with the approval of an ETP for listing.”). 
 131. Id. (“[A]pplication of [the SEC’s] general principles . . . can often be subjective and BATS has 
experienced the application of different specific standards of review between different staff members and 
as between different ETPs that are nearly identical, making it difficult if not impossible to anticipate the 
issues that Commission staff may raise with respect to any particular ETP filing.”). BATS further 
complained that since the listing of a new ETF technically takes the form of a change in the rules of the 
exchange, BATS found itself in the awkward position of “being an intermediary in what can best be 
described as a negotiation between the Commission staff” and a fund. Id. 
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clearly apply different policies on otherwise similar issues. Recall that ETFs 
can come into the SEC through two different channels—an ICA exemption 
or an exchange listing rule change. Crucially, these two channels flow 
through different Divisions of the SEC. Stock exchange listing standard 
changes go through the SEC’s Division of Trading and Markets, and 
applications for ICA exemptions go through the Division of Investment 
Management. As we will see in a moment when we consider a pair of funds 
that recently attempted to operate as commodity pools, the two Divisions 
applied very different standards, even to otherwise highly similar funds.132 
A further problem is the delay and expense. Though the review process 
can be fairly simple for funds that closely resemble already established 
funds, the process can be extremely burdensome for innovative funds. For 
an ETF that requires a change in stock exchange listing rules in order to go 
public—which includes every new Commodity and Operating Company 
ETF and any new Investment Company ETF that does not satisfy existing 
stock exchange rules—the process for obtaining approval often takes more 
than a year.133 
A final problem—perhaps the biggest problem of all—is that the SEC 
cannot update its policies without treating new fund advisers differently from 
old ones. In essence, the SEC has grandfathered older fund advisers into 
different—and usually more lenient—requirements than new funds. When 
the SEC reviews an ETF’s application for listing or exemption, the SEC only 
applies the policies it has in place at the time it does the review. If, however, 
the policies later change—if the SEC decides, for instance, to impose new 
conditions on a kind of ETF or get rid of old conditions—the SEC’s only 
way to implement the change is to apply it to new funds that the SEC reviews 
in the future. The SEC, in other words, has no way of changing the standards 
for older funds already in existence. Since the SEC has no written rules that 
apply to all ETFs, it has no way to change the rules for all ETFs. Whatever 
regulatory conditions appear in a fund’s initial application for exemption or 
stock exchange rule change go on to become the regulatory conditions that 
apply to the fund in perpetuity. 
Though in theory the SEC could change the conditions of a fund’s 
operation after the SEC has approved the fund’s application by changing the 
terms of a fund’s exemption, in practice such changes are rare—we have 
never heard of one—and they would be impossible to implement on a large 
scale. There are more than a thousand ETFs in existence, and the SEC’s only 
 
 132. See infra Section II.D. 
 133. Fang & Heinrichs, supra note 101, at 8–9.  
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way to change the standards for all of them would be to start an 
excruciatingly time-consuming process of individualized correspondence. 
The bottom line is that once an ETF survives individualized SEC review, the 
conditions of its operation are basically set in place forever unless the ETF 
later seeks and obtains a modification of such conditions.134 
This risk of inconsistency between old and new funds has not stopped 
the SEC from changing its policies, however. Sometimes, the SEC loosens 
its restrictions. Prior to 2013, the SEC placed a number of restrictions on 
fund sponsors that used their own indices (rather than paying licensing fees 
to index providers like S&P). Fearful that sponsors might manipulate the 
indices they constructed, the SEC imposed various conditions to ameliorate 
what it be perceived to be conflicts of interest. In 2013, however, the SEC 
stopped imposing these conditions, announcing this change by issuing orders 
that eliminated the conditions to three different self-indexing fund sponsors 
on the same day.135 Similarly, for many years the SEC refused to grant 
 
 134. The SEC does retain some capacity to change the terms for new funds by refusing to allow 
their registration statements to become effective. When a sponsor establishes its first fund, it generally 
organizes the fund as a Delaware statutory trust or Maryland Corporation and files a registration statement 
with the SEC on Form N-1A. The SEC staff can then review the registration statement and prevent it 
from becoming effective if it does not satisfy various legal requirements. When the sponsor later issues a 
new fund, it typically structures it as a new series of the existing Delaware statutory trust or Maryland 
corporation. BlackRock, for example, places most of its iShares-branded funds into a Delaware statutory 
trust or a Maryland corporation. One registration statement for a Delaware statutory trust included 
seventy-six iShares-branded funds; another registration statement for a Maryland corporation reflected 
thirty-seven such funds. iShares Tr., Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of 1933 and/or 
Under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (Form N-1A) 2–3 (Aug. 16, 2017) (listing seventy-six funds 
as series of the iShares Trust, a Delaware statutory trust); iShares, Inc., Registration Statement Under the 
Securities Act of 1933 and/or Under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (Form N-1A) 2–3 (Jan. 19, 
2018) (listing thirty-seven funds as series of iShares, Inc., a Maryland corporation). 
  By structuring a new fund as a series of an already existing trust, a sponsor avoids having to 
file a new registration statement on Form N-1A and can register the new fund by making a post-effective 
amendment to the existing Form N-1A under SEC Rule 485(a). 17 C.F.R. § 230.485(a) (2018). Rule 
485(c)(1), however, allows the SEC to issue a stop order refusing to let the post-effective amendment 
become effective. In early 2018, for example, the SEC staff threatened to use a stop order to prevent 
existing sponsors from registering cryptocurrency funds as new series of existing entities. See, e.g., Dalia 
Blass, Director, Division of Investment Management, SEC, Staff Letter: Engaging on Fund Innovation 
and Cryptocurrency-Related Holdings (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment 
/noaction/2018/cryptocurrency-011818.htm. As to the current status of bitcoin ETFs, see supra note 94 
and infra note 237.  
 135. Guggenheim Funds Inv. Advisors, LLC, Investment Company Act Release No. 30560, 106 
SEC Docket 2599 (June 14, 2013) (notice) and Guggenheim Funds Inv. Advisors, LLC et al., Investment 
Company Act Release No. 30598, 106 SEC Docket 3612 (July 10, 2013) (order); Sigma Inv. Advisors, 
LLC, Investment Company Act Release No. 30559, 106 SEC Docket 2588 (June 14, 2013) (notice) and 
Sigma Inv. Advisors, LLC, Investment Company Act Release No. 30597,106 SEC Docket 3612 (July 10, 
2013) (order); Transparent Value Tr., Investment Company Act Release No. 30558, 106 SEC Docket 
2576 (June 14, 2013) (notice) and Transparent Value Tr., Investment Company Act Release No. 30596, 
106 SEC Docket 3611 (July 10, 2013) (order).  
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exemptions for actively managed ETFs, allowing ETFs to operate only if 
they constructed their portfolios according to indices. The SEC loosened the 
policy in 2008, allowing actively managed funds under certain conditions.136 
When the SEC loosens its policies, existing advisers can apply for 
modifications to their exemptive letters, in the hope that they can attain some 
degree of fairness and uniformity.137 Things can be more complicated when 
the SEC tightens its policies. Stock exchanges and ETF advisers have 
complained that the SEC’s requirements for approving new ETFs have 
generally grown more stringent over time, forcing new ETFs to operate 
under harsher requirements than old ETFs.138  
A few key examples stand out. The first is the so-called “custom 
basket.” Since 2012, the SEC has required new ETF advisers to construct 
their creation and redemption baskets so that a basket consists of a pro rata 
cross section of the securities in the fund’s portfolio.139 Prior to 2012, the 
SEC granted exemptions that allowed an adviser to construct creation and 
redemption baskets using only a subset of the securities in a fund’s 
portfolio.140 The ability to construct customized baskets offers advantages 
for taxes and the functioning of the arbitrage mechanism. The advantages are 
especially pronounced in funds that hold illiquid assets, such as bond funds. 
 
 136. WisdomTree Tr., Investment Company Act Release No. 28147, 92 SEC Docket 1672 (Feb. 6, 
2008) (notice) [hereinafter WisdomTree Tr. (notice)] and WisdomTree Tr., Investment Company Act 
Release No. 28174, 92 SEC Docket 2090 (Feb. 27, 2008) (order) [hereinafter WisdomTree Tr. (order)]; 
Barclays Glob. Fund Advisors, Investment Company Act Release No. 28146, 92 SEC Docket 1668 (Feb. 
6, 2008) (notice) and Barclays Glob. Fund Advisors, Investment Company Act Release No. 28173, 92 
SEC Docket 2089 (Feb. 27, 2008) (order); Bear Stearns Asset Mgmt., Investment Company Act Release 
No. 28143, 92 SEC Docket 1659 (Feb. 5, 2008) (notice) and Bear Stearns Asset Mgmt., Investment 
Company Act Release No. 28172, 92 SEC Docket 2089 (Feb. 27, 2008) (order); PowerShares Capital 
Mgmt. LLC, Investment Company Act Release No. 28140, 92 SEC Docket 1648 (Feb. 1, 2008) (notice) 
and PowerShares Capital Mgmt. LLC, Investment Company Act Release No. 28171, 92 SEC Docket 
2088 (Feb. 27, 2008) (order). 
 137. For an explanation of the changes, see SEC Issues New Relief for Self-Indexing ETFs, MORGAN 
LEWIS (July 17, 2013), https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/im_lf_secissuesnewreliefselfindexingetfs 
_17july13 (urging self-indexing advisers to seek modified exemptions after the SEC began loosening 
restrictions for new self-indexing advisers). 
 138. E.g., BATS Global Markets, Inc., supra note 130, at 2. 
[I]nconsistent standards and treatment result in a competitive disadvantage to both issuers and 
exchanges as it relates to previously approved ETPs that are already listed and traded on another 
exchange because, in almost all instances, such previously approved ETPs were not subject to 
the same level of standards or restrictions applied by Commission staff to the newer ETP, 
restricting the ETPs ability to compete with nearly identical ETPs already in the market. 
Id. 
 139. Charles Schwab, supra note 29, at 4; Stacy L. Fuller et al., At the End of the Rainbow: A 
Custom Basket?, K&L GATES (Oct. 5, 2017), http://www.klgates.com/at-the-end-of-the-rainbow--a-
custom-basket-10-05-2017. 
 140. Id.  
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If a bond fund holds hundreds of different bonds and an AP has to buy small 
quantities of each of them in order to create new shares of the fund, the AP 
will be much less likely to create shares than if the AP can purchase some 
smaller number of different bonds in large quantities.141  
Another example involves derivatives. Between 2010 and 2012, the 
SEC refused to grant new exemption applications for funds that used 
derivatives—even as the SEC permitted existing funds to continue using 
derivatives unchecked.142 
A third example concerns the ability of an adviser to operate an ETF in 
combination with an ordinary mutual fund. The only adviser that has the 
SEC’s permission to do this is Vanguard. In essence, Vanguard constructs 
ETFs by simply causing its existing mutual funds to issue share classes that 
trade on exchanges and can be redeemed during the trading day in large 
blocks as ETF shares. The same fund issues both mutual fund shares and 
ETF shares. Vanguard actively marketed this practice as a unique advantage 
of Vanguard funds. Vanguard’s web site explained that because of their 
ability to combine with ordinary mutual funds, “Vanguard ETFs are different 
from other ETFs.”143 Vanguard touted a variety of economies of scale and 
tax advantages for investors because of this system.144 
When the SEC tightens its policies in this way, there is little that new 
advisers can do to level the playing field. Older advisers get the ability to 
continue operating under the older and more permissive policies, and they 
can even continue to create new funds under the exemptions granted under 
the old policies. 
The clearest example of this unfortunate dynamic concerns leveraged 
and leveraged inverse funds. Leveraged funds generally try to return some 
multiple of the return on a specified index on a given day, so that a 
shareholder who buys shares in a 2X S&P 500 index fund, for example, will 
receive two times the daily return of the S&P 500 index, whether positive or 
 
 141. Fuller, supra note 139. 
 142. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Staff Evaluating the Use of Derivatives by 
Funds (Mar. 25, 2010), www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-45.htm (announcing a moratorium on new 
exemptions for funds that “would make significant investments in derivatives”); Norm Champ, Director, 
Div. of Inv. Mgmt., SEC, Remarks to the ALI CLE 2012 Conference on Investment Adviser Regulation: 
Legal and Compliance Forum on Institutional Advisory Services (Dec. 6, 2012), https://www.sec.gov 
/news/speech/2012-spch120612nchtm (announcing the lifting of the moratorium) [hereinafter Champ, 
Remarks]. 
 143. Stand-One and Share Class ETFs, What’s the Difference?, VANGUARD 
https://advisors.vanguard.com/iwe/pdf/standAloneTrans.pdf (no longer available on website) (on file 
with the authors). 
 144. Id.  
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negative. Leveraged inverse funds do the same, only with a negative 
multiple. 
Prior to 2010, the SEC granted ICA exemptions to two leveraged and 
leveraged inverse fund advisers: ProShares and Direxion.145 In 2010, 
however, the SEC announced a temporary moratorium on further 
exemptions to leveraged and leveraged inverse advisers.146 The SEC 
announced this moratorium at the same time that it also announced the 
moratorium on exemptions for funds that used derivatives. Neither 
moratorium came with any explanation. The press release that announced 
the moratorium said merely that “we want to be sure our regulatory 
protections keep up with the increasing complexity of these instruments [that 
is, derivatives] and how they are used by fund managers.”147 The press 
release offered no details on what the complexities were or how regulatory 
protections might change to address them. 
Eventually, in 2012, the SEC lifted the moratorium for funds that used 
derivatives, but crucially, it kept the moratorium in place for leveraged and 
leveraged inverse funds. Hence, since 2010, the SEC has refused to approve 
any new exemptive orders for leveraged and leveraged inverse funds under 
the ICA. The SEC’s only explanation for maintaining the moratorium on 
these funds was a single, cryptic sentence given in a speech by the Director 
of the Division of Investment Management after the moratorium was lifted 
on derivatives: “Because of concerns regarding leveraged ETFs . . . we 
continue not to support new exemptive relief for such ETFs.”148 
The effect of this moratorium has been to consolidate the market for 
leveraged and leveraged inverse funds into a de jure duopoly. Though the 
SEC refused to grant exemptions to new advisers, it kept in place the existing 
 
 145. ProShares Tr., Investment Company Act Release No. 27609, 89 SEC Docket 2036 (Dec. 12, 
2006) (notice) and ProShares Tr., Investment Company Act Release No. 27666, 89 SEC Docket 2448 
(Jan. 18, 2007) (order); Rafferty Asset Mgmt., LLC, Investment Company Act Release No. 28379, 94 
SEC Docket 316 (Sept. 12, 2008) (notice) and Rafferty Asset Mgmt., LLC, Investment Company Act 
Release No. 28434, 94 SEC Docket 1008 (Oct. 6, 2008) (order). 
 146. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 142. The decision not to grant further 
exemptions for leveraged funds was announced at the same time as a decision not to grant further 
exemptions for funds that used derivatives. Id. In 2012, however, the SEC lifted the moratorium on funds 
that used derivatives even as it kept the moratorium in place for leveraged funds. Champ, Remarks, supra 
note 142. ForceShares noted the prohibition on leveraged ETFs in its correspondence with the SEC.  
ForceShares LLC, Re: Comment on Proposed Rule Change to List and Trade Shares of the ForceShares 
Daily 4X US Market Futures Long Fund and ForceShares Daily 4X US Market Futures Short Fund Under 
Commentary .02 to NYSE Arca Equities Rule 8.200, 4 (June 13, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/comments 
/sr-nysearca-2016-120/nysearca2016120-1801076-153684.pdf. 
 147. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 142. 
 148. Champ, Remarks, supra note 142. 
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exemptions for ProShares and Direxion. Thus, as of the end of 2017, there 
were 121 leveraged equity ETFs listed for trading in the United States, and 
every one of them was sponsored by either ProShares or Direxion.149 
This inconsistency between old and new advisers is made worse by a 
quirk of law that allows old advisers not only to continue operating old funds 
under old regulatory policies, but also to create new funds under old 
regulatory policies. Since 2000, the SEC’s exemptive orders under the ICA 
have covered not just the fund that was the subject of the initial order, but all 
new funds that the fund’s sponsor may create in the future, so long as the 
new funds comply with the terms of the original exemption.150 Having 
received an exemption for one fund, a sponsor can use the exemption to 
obtain future exemptive relief for an unlimited number of new funds so long 
as the new funds comply with the terms of the original exemption.151  
The ability to obtain future relief is useful because it guarantees older 
sponsors lighter regulation than newer sponsors. Many commentators agree 
that the SEC’s regulation of ETFs has grown stricter over time.152 This 
increasing strictness treats new fund sponsors unfairly, because sponsors 
tend to use the exemption process to make regulation into a kind of one-way 
ratchet. If ever the SEC’s treatment of new sponsors grows lighter, existing 
sponsors can apply for an update to their exemptions to make sure they get 
the benefit of the lighter rules. But if the SEC’s treatment grows harsher, the 
existing sponsors do nothing, silently enjoying the benefit of their lighter 
treatment without ever applying for a change. 
The value of old exemptions for creating new funds is glaringly evident 
in the experiences of ProShares and Direxion, the duopolistic leveraged fund 
advisers. While the SEC has ostensibly maintained a moratorium on the 
creation of new leveraged and leveraged inverse ETFs, ProShares and 
Direxion—which each received an exemption before the moratorium went 
in place—have been busily flooding the markets. Since the SEC’s 
moratorium on new leveraged fund advisers went into effect in 2010, 
 
 149. Leveraged ETF List, ETFDB, http://etfdb.com/type/equity/all/leveraged/#etfs&sort_name 
=assets_under_management&sort_order=desc&page=6 (last visited Aug. 29, 2018). 
 150. Exchange-Traded Funds, Securities Act Release No. 8901, 73 Fed. Reg. 14,618, at 8 fn.19 
(Mar. 11, 2008) (citing Barclays Glob. Fund Advisors, Investment Company Act Release No. 24394, 65 
Fed. Reg. 21,219 (Apr. 17, 2000) (notice) and Barclays Glob. Fund Advisors, Investment Company Act 
Release No. 24451, 72 SEC Docket 1082 (May 12, 2000) (order)). 
 151. See, e.g., N. Lights Fund Tr. and Toews Corp., supra note 110, at 29 (“Applicants are 
requesting relief with respect to future series of the Trust or of other open-end management investment 
companies that currently exist or that may be created in the future and that are actively-managed 
exchange-traded funds (‘ETFs’) . . . .”).  
 152. See supra note 138.  
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Direxion’s new offerings include, among many others, a fund that offers 
three times the daily returns on an index of homebuilding companies 
(“NAIL”) and a leveraged inverse fund that offers negative three times the 
daily returns on an index of oil and gas producers (“DRIP”).153 
The favoritism towards older advisers distorts the market not just for 
ETFs, but also for the advisers who run them. Older advisers are more 
attractive acquisition targets than newer advisers, because the age of an older 
adviser’s exemption makes the exemption a scarce and valuable resource.154 
Since an acquirer can use the old exemption to create an unlimited number 
of new funds that only need to comply with the terms of the original 
exemption, buying an older adviser can be like buying a beachhead for 
regulatory freedom.  
D.  AN EXAMPLE: THE FORCESHARES FUNDS 
Fragmentation and discretion are evident in every aspect of ETF 
regulation, but are especially easy to see in the recent experience of an 
aspiring ETF advisor known as ForceShares. In the spring of 2017, 
ForceShares proposed to create two new ETFs, one that would achieve four 
times the daily return of the S&P 500 index and another that would achieve 
four times the inverse of the daily return on the S&P 500 index. 
ForceShares’s proposed funds would have been the first “leveraged” ETFs 
to achieve a leverage ratio above three.155 
The most obvious way for ForceShares to operate these two funds 
would have been to invest the funds’ portfolios directly in the stock of S&P 
500 companies and then achieve their desired leverage ratios through short 
sales and other simple devices to create the 4X leverage ratio. This is how 
other leveraged S&P 500 ETFs work,156 and if ForceShares had operated its 
funds this way, its only innovation would have been to offer a slightly higher 
leverage ratio than its competitors—4X rather than 3X or 2X. 
Running the fund this way was not an option for ForceShares, however, 
because the SEC had already announced its moratorium in 2010 on new 
 
 153. Benzinga, Four New Leveraged ETFs Right for the Times, NASDAQ (Aug. 19, 2015, 1:20 PM), 
http://www.nasdaq.com/article/4-new-leveraged-etfs-right-for-the-times-cm510870.  
 154. Crystal Kim, A Secret Ingredient in the Invesco ETF Deal, BARRON’S, Oct. 2, 2017, at 15. 
 155. Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Listing and Trading of Shares of the 
ForceShares Daily 4X US Market Futures Long Fund and ForceShares Daily 4X US Market Futures 
Short Fund, supra note 90; Jeff Cox, Controversial ETFs that Would Have Delivered Four Times the 
Market Hit a Snag, CNBC (May 18, 2017, 11:35 AM), https://cnb.cx/2vggcns. We should emphasize that 
we do not take a position on whether the ForceShares ETFs should be offered to the public. 
 156. Antoniewicz & Heinrichs, supra note 22, at 6. 
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exemptions for leveraged and leveraged inverse ETF advisers.157 
ForceShares sought an end-run around this barrier by exploiting the 
fragmentation of ETF regulation. Since the SEC had a moratorium on 
leveraged and leveraged inverse funds created under the ICA, ForceShares 
established its funds as commodity pools outside of the ICA.158 By having 
the funds invest in futures contracts on the S&P 500, rather than the common 
stock of S&P 500 companies, ForceShares avoided owning securities in 
excess of the threshold that triggers the ICA—and thus sidestepped the ICA 
and the SEC’s moratorium on exemptions for leveraged and leveraged 
inverse funds under the ICA.159 By sidestepping the ICA, ForceShares also 
avoided the prospective application of ICA Rule 18f-4, which the SEC had 
then proposed for adoption and which would have limited derivative usage 
by all Investment Company ETFs, mutual funds, and other open-end funds 
registered under the ICA.160 
At first, ForceShares’ commodity pool strategy worked. Because the 
listing of a new Commodity Pool ETF technically amounts to a change in 
stock exchange listing standards, rather than a request for exemption from 
the ICA, the authority to review a new Commodity Pool ETF belonged to 
the SEC’s Divisions of Trading and Markets and Corporation Finance, rather 
than to its Division of Investment Management. Because the moratorium on 
new ICA exemptions for leveraged and leveraged inverse funds came from 
the Division of Investment Management, ForceShares neatly skirted the 
 
 157. Supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
 158. Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Listing and Trading of Shares of the 
ForceShares Daily 4X US Market Futures Long Fund and ForceShares Daily 4X US Market Futures 
Short Fund, supra note 90. 
 159. Although futures contracts on equity securities technically qualify as securities, rather than 
commodity futures, under the securities laws, ForceShares cleverly avoided this problem by investing in 
futures contracts on an index of equity securities—not contracts on the individual underlying securities. 
This worked because section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 (“1933 Act”) defines the term 
“security” to include a future on a security but not a future on an index of securities. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) 
(2012). 
  ForceShares also neatly avoided restrictions on leverage in registered investment companies. 
The listing rules of the NYSE Arca exchange (the exchange where ForceShares proposed to list) prohibit 
an index-based ETF from offering an inverse leverage ratio in excess of 300% if the fund is registered as 
an investment company. RULES OF NYSE ARCA, supra note 19, at r. 5.2(j)(3) cmt. .04. This would have 
been a problem for ForceShares, because ForceShares’s inverse fund aspired to a leverage ratio of 400%. 
ForceShares avoided the 300% restriction, however, because the restriction only applied to an investment 
company and not a commodity pool. (Note that ForceShares was proposing to list under NYSE Arca Rule 
8.200.) 
 160. Use of Derivatives by Registered Investment Companies and Business Development 
Companies, Investment Company Act Release No. 31933, 112 SEC Docket 6625 (Dec. 11, 2015). In its 
correspondence with the SEC, ForceShares cleverly pointed out that in the published Rule 18f-4 proposal, 
the SEC expressly invited any investment company that would violate the rule to register instead as a 
commodity pool. ForceShares LLC, supra note 146, at 3. 
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portion of the SEC staff that was hostile to leveraged and leveraged inverse 
ETFs. The staff of the Divisions of Trading and Markets and Corporation 
Finance thus issued an order approving the NYSE Arca’s rule change 
permitting ForceShares to list.161 ForceShares had permission to go 
public.162 
A few weeks later, however, ForceShares faced a reversal of fortunes. 
Overruling the SEC staff members who had approved ForceShares’ stock 
exchange listing, the SEC’s Commissioners issued an order staying the stock 
exchange standards change, pending the Commissioners’ further review.163 
The Commissioners never explained their logic, but presumably they were 
concerned about the same problems that originally motivated the Division of 
Investment Management to impose its moratorium on leveraged and 
leveraged inverse funds. As of this writing, ForceShares remains in this legal 
limbo. 
The experience of ForceShares thus illustrates two key faults in the ETF 
administrative process. Most obviously, it shows the tremendous 
fragmentation within the process for introducing new ETFs. ForceShares’s 
decision to operate its funds as commodity pools, rather than investment 
companies, exploited divisions not only in statutes, but also in discretionary 
policies, stock exchange listing standards, and the internal bureaucracy of 
the SEC. ForceShares also shows the risks of the SEC’s reliance on 
discretion. The SEC’s discretion was not applied consistently even in the 
case of ForceShares itself, and the treatment of Forceshares was at odds with 
the SEC’s treatment of other advisers. Even as ForceShares was prohibited 
from taking its leveraged funds public, the two established leveraged fund 
advisers—ProShares and Direxion—continued to create new leveraged 
funds with little restriction. 
 
 161. Order Approving a Proposed Rule Change to List and Trade Shares of the ForceShares Daily 
4X US Market Futures Long Fund and ForceShares Daily 4X US Market Futures Short Fund under 
Commentary .02 to NYSE Arca Equities Rule 8.200, Exchange Act Release No. 80579, 2017 WL 
2535412 (May 2, 2017). 
 162. The Division of Trading and Markets caused the SEC to issue a release requesting comments, 
with the effect that ForceShares’s application was set to automatically become effective. Notice of Filing 
of Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Listing and Trading of Shares of the ForceShares Daily 4X US 
Market Futures Long Fund and ForceShares Daily 4X US Market Futures Short Fund, supra note 90.  
 163. Cox, supra note 155. 
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III.  THE EXISTING REGULATORY STATE OF AFFAIRS: 
DISCLOSURE ASPECTS 
A.  OVERVIEW, WITH A FOCUS ON FAILURES TO RESPOND TO UNIQUE 
CHARACTERISTICS OF ETFS 
Like the regulation of substantive matters, the regulation of disclosure 
in ETFs suffers from a “cubbyhole” problem. Current disclosure 
requirements for ETFs apply longstanding regulatory regimes intended for 
older, very different, financial products. Investment Company ETFs are thus 
subject to an ICA regime designed for mutual funds. Commodity Pool ETFs 
and Operating Company ETFs are largely subject to the 1933 Act and 1934 
Act disclosure regime applicable to ordinary public companies. 
But the market microstructures for mutual fund shares and public 
company shares lack any device analogous to the ETF’s arbitrage 
mechanism. For ETFs, the arbitrage mechanism is key to the core investment 
premise, to the integrity of trading prices, and to the regulatory challenges 
ETFs pose. Neither the mutual fund cubbyhole nor the ordinary public 
company cubbyhole inherently accommodate the ETF’s arbitrage 
mechanism. 
The failures of the existing disclosure regime are best seen with 
Investment Company ETFs. These ETFs account for the bulk of the industry 
and are the only ETFs for which the SEC has attempted to develop any kind 
of ETF-specific disclosure requirements.164 In particular, we focus on the 
predominant form of Investment Company ETF (the open-end management 
company) and leave aside unit investment trusts. 
For such Investment Company ETFs, the existing disclosure 
requirements fail to recognize either the significance of the arbitrage 
mechanism or the implications of the model-based nature of the arbitrage 
mechanism. Such requirements pay little attention to the past performance 
of the mechanism. We discuss disclosures of a quantitative nature in Section 
III.B and of a qualitative nature in Section III.C. We largely defer the 
 
 164. This is true even with respect to the most recent SEC effort to strengthen disclosure 
requirements relating to ETFs and mutual funds, an effort centering on Forms N-PORT (to be regularly 
submitted beginning either by April 30, 2019 or April 30, 2020, depending on the size of the fund group) 
and N-CEN (to be regularly submitted as of June 1, 2018). Investment Company Reporting 
Modernization, Securities Act Release No. 10442, 82 Fed. Reg. 58,731 (Dec. 14, 2017) (delaying dates 
for submitting reports to April 20, 2019 and April 20, 2010) [hereinafter N-PORT Delay]; Investment 
Company Reporting Modernization, Securities Act Release No. 10231, 81 Fed. Reg. 81,870 (Oct. 13, 
2016) (relating to Forms N-PORT and N-CEN) [hereinafter Investment Company Reporting 
Modernization]. See also infra note 283. 
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analysis of how the current disclosure regime fails to properly respond to 
model-related complexities to Part V, in the context of discussing our 
proposed disclosure system. 
The basic architecture of an Investment Company ETF’s disclosure 
requirements is somewhat convoluted, consisting of rules-based mandates 
relating to the disclosure documents of ETFs in general and conditions 
incorporated in the exemptive order for that ETF relating to that ETF’s 
website. Investment Company ETFs look to the Form N-1A adopted under 
the ICA for the form and content of key disclosure documents.165 One set of 
public disclosure requirements flows from registration statement provisions 
of the 1933 Act’s section 5 and the ICA’s section 8(b). Here, the three most 
important documents are the (statutory) prospectus, Summary Prospectus, 
and the Statement of Additional Information (“SAI”). The statutory 
prospectus is intended only to “provide essential information” about the 
fund.166 The Summary Prospectus is an even shorter document—containing 
what one would assume to be super-essential information—three or four 
pages consisting of the summary section of the statutory prospectus.167 ETFs 
are given the option of providing the Summary Prospectus in place of the 
prospectus and typically elect to do so. The SAI, a document available on 
request, provides information that is not essential but which “some users” 
may find useful.168 Few investors request copies of the prospectus or the SAI. 
Both the prospectus and SAI must be updated annually, and most fund 
groups routinely send copies of the new prospectus or the new Summary 
Prospectus each time it is updated.169 
As a result of ICA section 30(e), shareholders also receive annual 
reports and semi-annual reports.170 Besides the reports transmitted to 
shareholders, the fund must provide periodic reports, which are publicly 
available, to the SEC of their holdings and certain other matters.171 
 
 165. Form N-1A, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N (Aug. 2017), https://www.sec.gov/files/formn-
1a.pdf [hereinafter Form N-1A]. 
 166. Id. at v (discussing C(2)(a)). 
 167. The option of using a Summary Prospectus to meet prospectus delivery requirements became 
available in 2009. See Enhanced Disclosure and New Prospectus Delivery Option for Registered Open-
End Management Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8998, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,546, 4,573–
74 (Jan. 26, 2009). 
 168. Form N-1A, supra note 165, at v (discussing C(2)(b)). 
 169. Michael Glazer, Prospectus Disclosure and Delivery Requirements, in 1 MUTUAL FUNDS AND 
EXCHANGE TRADED FUNDS REGULATION § 4.5.2(B) (Clifford E. Kirsch ed., 3d ed. 2011 & Supp. 10 
2016). 
 170. See Form N-1A, supra note 165, at 39–42, items 27(b)–(d) (annual and semi-annual report 
requirements). Id. at 39–45. 
 171. Specifically, they are reports on Form N-Q and Form N-CSR. Form N-Q, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. 
COMM’N (Aug. 2005), https://www.sec.gov/files/formn-q.pdf; Form N-CSR, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. 
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An Investment Company ETF is also subject to requirements pertaining 
to its publicly accessible website under the exemptive order specific to that 
ETF. Apart from requiring that the Prospectus and SAI be included on the 
websites, these orders vary from ETF to ETF but appear to focus on a small 
number of items of a quantitative nature largely consistent in nature with the 
quantitative items mandated by general Investment Company ETF 
disclosure rules.172 
In short, for most Investment Company ETF investors, the two key 
documents are the prospectus (or, for the harried, the Summary Prospectus) 
and the annual report, both of which must be provided annually. An ETF’s 
website provides certain limited amounts of information of a quantitative 
nature. 
Commodity Pool ETFs and Operating Company ETFs do not invest in 
“securities” to the requisite degree and are thus not subject to the normal ICA 
requirements pertaining to disclosure documents. Instead, these ETFs are 
largely subject to the 1933 Act registration statement and 1934 Act periodic 
disclosure requirements applicable to ordinary public companies.173 Thus 
these ETFs, unlike Investment Company ETFs, meet prospectus 
requirements that flow from the Form S-3 Registration Statement and must 
file Form 10-Qs on a quarterly basis, Form 10-Ks on an annual basis, and 
Form 8-Ks on the occurrence of certain key events. The disclosures required 
of these ETFs are of the familiar variety seen in the 1933 Act and 1934 Act 
rules for ordinary public companies. 
The arbitrage mechanism-related disclosures of non-Investment 
 
COMM’N (July 2018), https://www.sec.gov/files/formn-csr.pdf. Form N-Q is being superseded. See supra 
note 164 (discussing the adoption of Forms N-CEN and N-PORT). 
 172. See, e.g., Fidelity Commonwealth Tr., Amended Application for an Order Under Section 6(c) 
of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (Form 40-APP/A) 19 (June 27, 2016) [hereinafter Fidelity 
Notice]; Fidelity Commonwealth Tr., Order Under Sections 6(c), 12(d)(1)(J), and 17(b) of the Investment 
Company Act of 1940, Investment Company Act Release No. 32191 (July 26, 2016); Barclays Global 
Fund Advisors, Notice of Application, Investment Company Act Release No. 28146, at 11 (Feb. 6, 2008) 
[hereinafter Barclays Notice]; Barclays Global Fund Advisors iShares Tr., Order Under Sections 6(c) and 
17(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, Investment Company Act Release No. 28173 (Feb. 27, 
2008); Claymore Exch.-Traded Fund Tr., Notice of Application, Investment Company Act Release No. 
27469, 71 Fed. Reg. 51,869, 51,872 (Aug. 31, 2006) [hereinafter Claymore Notice], Claymore Exch.-
Traded Fund Tr., Investment Company Act Release No. 27483 (Sept. 18, 2006). 
 173. There are some minor variations. For instance, United States Oil Fund, LP is generally subject 
to the SEC’s 1933 Act and 1934 Act disclosure system, but its prospectus includes a one-page “Risk 
Disclosure Statement” mandated by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. See U.S. Oil Fund, 
LP, Prospectus (Form 424B3) (Feb. 28, 2017) [hereinafter U.S. Oil 2017 Prospectus]. Also, this ETF has 
filed Form 8-Ks attaching the monthly account statements presented in the form of a Statement of Income 
(Loss) and a Statement of Changes in Net Asset Value as required pursuant to Rule 4.22 under the 
Commodities Exchange Act. See, e.g., U.S. Oil Fund, LP, Current Report (Form 8-K) (May 25, 2017).  
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Company ETFs depart from those of Investment Company ETFs, and such 
disclosures are not consistent with each other. Non-Investment Company 
ETF disclosure documents are not subject to the ICA-based regime’s 
requirement to disclose certain information on the past performance of the 
arbitrage mechanism. For example, the United States Oil Fund (“USO”) , a 
Commodity Pool ETF, instead provides in the prospectus certain alternative 
measures of past performance.174 IAU and GLD, both Operating Company 
ETFs, do provide certain information on the performance of their arbitrage 
mechanisms on their websites.175 All three ETFs discuss risks flowing from 
the withdrawals of APs.176 However, on the whole, all three ETFs, including 
the Blackrock-advised IAU, are less expansive in discussing the conditions 
necessary for arbitrage mechanism effectiveness than the Blackrock-advised 
IVV, an Investment Company ETF, whose disclosures will be discussed 
below. 
B.  THE ARBITRAGE MECHANISM: DISCLOSURES OF A QUANTITATIVE 
NATURE 
An effective arbitrage mechanism is essential to the integrity of the 
trading prices of an ETF and to the core investment premise of the ETF. 
Rooted in a mutual fund mindset, ICA disclosure requirements fail to 
recognize the significance of the arbitrage mechanism to ETF investors. 
In this Section III.B, we illustrate the disconnect between the current 
disclosure regime and the central feature of ETFs by examining requirements 
pertaining to the historical performance of the arbitrage mechanism that are 
of a quantitative nature. Such quantitative disclosures are not only 
inadequate, but also exacerbate an existing problem of investor complacency 
regarding the basic investment premise of the ETF. 
The main aspects of the ICA disclosure regime of a quantitative nature 
relate to the historical returns experienced by investors, shareholder 
transaction costs, and annual operating expenses. For historical returns, 
 
 174. See U.S. Oil 2017 Prospectus, supra note 173, at 24.  
 175. As to such IAU and GLD web disclosures, see iShares Gold Trust (IAU), ISHARES.COM, 
https://www.ishares.com/us/products/239561/ishares-gold-trust-fund#premiumDiscountDialog (last 
visited Aug. 29, 2018) and SPDR Gold Shares (GLD), STATE STREET GLOBAL ADVISORS SPDR 
https://us.spdrs.com/en/etf/spdr-gold-shares-GLD# (last visited Aug. 29, 2018). GLD, in addition, 
provides a graph in its Form 10-K that reflects the share price and NAV versus the gold price over the 
period November 18, 2004 to September 30, 2017. SPDR Gold Trust, Annual Report (Form 10-K) 38 
(Nov. 28, 2017). In the interests of disclosure, one of the authors (Hu) holds shares in IAU and, in the 
past, has held shares in GLD. 
 176. See IAU 2017 Prospectus, supra note 33, at 8–9; GLD 2017 Prospectus, supra note 36, at 9; 
U.S. Oil 2017 Prospectus, supra note 173, at 10. 
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changes in the NAV are the metric. Shareholder transaction costs focus on 
“contractual” costs such as the sales load and the redemption fee. The annual 
operating expenses include on-going costs such as management fees. 
Thus, for example, the Summary Prospectus requires that a fund 
provide a bar chart showing the fund’s annual total returns (that is, changes 
in the NAV) for each of the last ten calendar years (or for the life of the fund 
if less than ten years), along with corresponding numerical information.177 
Similarly, the annual report must include a NAV-based performance graph. 
In addition to the bar charts in the Summary Prospectus, the annual report 
requires a line graph that reflects the impact of shareholder transaction 
expenses.178 The annual operating expenses are summarized in the form of 
what is commonly referred to as the “expense ratio” in the Summary 
Prospectus179 and are reflected a different way in the annual and semi-annual 
reports.180 
This NAV-centered metric of past performance and this information on 
shareholder transaction expenses like loads and redemption fees and on 
annual operating expenses do speak to the concerns of an investor in a mutual 
fund. In a mutual fund, investors always buy and sell shares directly with the 
fund at prices exactly equal to the NAV, apart from contractually-specified 
shareholder transaction expenses. And the expense ratio does represent the 
on-going “drag”—friction—on the investment performance. 
This NAV-centered performance metric does not speak to the concerns 
of an ETF investor. Unlike a mutual fund investor, an ETF investor does not 
buy and redeem at the NAV. With ETFs, apart from APs, investors must buy 
and sell shares in the secondary market and thus are subject to trading price 
frictions, such as those associated with bid-ask spreads and ineffective 
arbitrage mechanisms. Mutual fund investors are not faced with such trading 
price frictions—mutual fund shares do not trade. We have already seen that 
for the unfortunate investor in IVV who sold on August 24, 2015, the 
performance of the arbitrage mechanism was two times more significant than 
the performance of the NAV.181 
 
 177. Form N-1A, supra note 165, at 7–8, item 4(b)(2). 
 178. Id. at 41, item 27(b)(7)(ii). 
 179. Id. at 2–5, item 3. 
 180. Id. at 42–43, item 27(d)(1). 
 181. One of the three exemptive orders examined with respect to disclosure contemplate 
performance information in the prospectus and annual report to not only be on the basis of NAV, but also 
in terms of the share price, while the other two exemptive orders do not add the general prospectus and 
annual report performance disclosure requirements. Compare Barclays Notice, supra note 172, at 11 
(disclosure of cumulative total return and average annual total return “based on NAV and Bid/Ask 
Price”), with Fidelity Notice, supra note 172, at 19 and Claymore Notice, supra note 172, at 51,872. 
  
894 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:839 
 
There are similar mutual fund mindset problems associated with the 
disclosures of shareholder transaction and annual operating expenses. 
Contractually specified sales loads and redemption fees simply do not arise 
in the ETF context.  
For ETF investors, what may effectively be the biggest shareholder 
transaction costs are: (1) the possibility of paying too high a premium over 
NAV at purchase; (2) the possibility of selling at too large a discount to 
NAV; and (3) the impact of bid-ask spreads on purchase or sale of ETF 
shares. But these trading-price frictions are, as we shall see, not subject to 
correspondingly fulsome disclosure requirements under either the general 
ICA disclosure rules or under ETF-specific exemptive orders. 
Similarly, the ICA is fulsome on its disclosure requirements with 
respect to the expense ratio. But, as we have seen with that IVV investor, the 
15% trading-price friction caused by the arbitrage mechanism was about 
200-fold the friction caused by the 0.07% in annual operating expenses.182 
Differences in ETF expense ratios are material to shareholder costs, and 
the mandated disclosures in this regard are as well. One major reason why 
investors may choose IVV, the second-largest S&P 500 ETF, over SPY, the 
largest ETF is its expense ratio. IVV’s expense ratio, at 0.04% is 55% lower 
than SPY’s 0.0945%, with the result that, among other things, IVV’s “30-
Day SEC Yield” as of March 31, 2018 was 1.84% versus SPY’s 1.80%.183 
However, no mandated disclosures apply with respect to bid-ask 
spreads, despite the fact that spreads are also material to ETF shareholder 
costs, especially for active traders. Thus, SPY emphasizes that it is the largest 
S&P 500 ETF, in part, because of the consistently tight spreads between the 
bid and ask price, which translates into reduced trading costs for investors.184 
SPY has published a graph showing its spreads relative to IVV and the 
Vanguard S&P 500 ETF and states that it is “the only ETF traded at a penny-
wide spread for 8 consecutive years, illustrating its unmatched resilience in 
varying market conditions.”185  
In contrast to the omission of bid-ask spreads, the ICA regime does at 
 
 182. See supra Section I.B. (discussing the performance of IVV’s arbitrage mechanism on August 
24, 2015). 
 183. See iShares Core S&P 500 ETF: Fact Sheet as of 6/30/2018, ISHARES, 
https://www.ishares.com/us/literature/fact-sheet/ivv-ishares-core-s-p-500-etf-fund-fact-sheet-en-us.pdf 
(last visited Aug. 29, 2018); SPDR S&P 500 ETF, STATE STREET GLOBAL ADVISORS SPDR, 
https://us.spdrs.com/en/etf/spdr-sp-500-etf-SPY (last visited Aug. 29, 2018). 
 184. James E. Ross, ETF Insights: 3 Charts That Capture SPY’s Liquidity, SPDR BLOG (Jan. 22, 
2018), https://global.spdrs.com/blog/post/2018/jan/3-charts-that-capture-spys-liquidity.html. 
 185. Id. 
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least require some disclosures about the past performance of an ETF’s 
arbitrage mechanism. However, such rules are so inadequate that even the 
catastrophic breakdowns on August 24, 2015 were not required to be 
disclosed. Indeed, the SEC-prescribed methodology served to mask their 
occurrence.186 
The ICA regime’s periodic reporting rules require one type of 
quantitative disclosure regarding the performance of an ETF’s arbitrage 
mechanism. Form N-1A requires that an ETF must provide, with respect to 
the most recently completed calendar year, and later quarters, either in the 
prospectus or on the ETF’s website “a table showing the number of days the 
[price at the close of trading] of the [f]und shares was greater than the 
[f]und’s net asset value and the number of days it was less than the [f]und’s 
net asset value (i.e., premium or discount)”.187 The corresponding 
formulations in the exemptive orders vary in specificity and content, but 
none appear to require more than what is contemplated by Form N-1A.188  
This requirement turned out to demand very little. Consider what the 
2016 prospectus of IVV, issued after the August 24, 2015 debacle, disclosed 
by way of SEC mandate on the performance of the arbitrage mechanism for 
2015 and the first two calendar quarters of 2016:189 The table appeared as 
follows: 
Premium/Discount Range     Number of Days      Percentage of Total Days 
Between 0.5% and -0.5%              377                               100.00% 
This information is accompanied by the requisite standard SEC warning 
that past performance cannot be used to predict future results. 
 
 186. It should be emphasized at the onset that the IVV disclosure documents referred to in our 
analysis below were well-written documents that complied fully with SEC requirements. Our analysis of 
informational gaps relates to the inadequacies of the existing SEC disclosure regime and is not meant to 
imply any improper act or omission by IVV or any other ETF. 
 187. Form N-1A, supra note 165, at 14, item 11(g)(2). There is substantially the same requirement, 
but with data up to five years, for the annual report (again, with a website option). Id. at 41, item 
27(b)(7)(iv). 
 188. The verbal formulations vary in specificity and content. Compare Fidelity Notice, supra note 
172, at 19 (having the website disclose the prior business day’s price and NAV at closing and a calculation 
of the premium and discount), with Barclays Notice, supra note 172, at 11 (requiring that the website, 
prospectus, and annual report include the prior business day’s premium and discount at closing; and a 
chart showing the frequency distribution, within appropriate ranges, of such premiums and discounts for 
each of the four previous calendar quarters) and Claymore Notice, supra note 172, at 11 (requiring that 
the website include updated daily information at the close and “information about the premiums and 
discounts at which the Fund Shares have traded”). 
 189. iShares Tr., Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of 1933 and/or Under the 
Investment Company Act of 1940 (Form N-1A) 26 (Jul. 27, 2016) [hereinafter IVV 2016 Prospectus].  
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The fund, in other words, disclosed that 100% of the time, its trading 
price was within half a percent of the NAV—even though at one point the 
fund’s trading price dropped fully 20% more than the fund’s NAV. 
The reason the table ignores the massive divergence between the 
trading price and NAV on the morning of August 24 is that the table requires 
disclosure only of the gap between the trading price and the NAV at the close 
of trading. On August 24, the gap was largest early in the day, and it had 
dwindled to the 0.5% to -0.5% range by the close, hence the perfect 377 days 
out of 377 days record in the table. 
Intraday performance of the arbitrage mechanism is not relevant under 
this methodology. Only performance at an instant in time—the close of 
trading—matters. 
This SEC methodology masks intraday, catastrophic breakdowns from 
view and, in so doing, can sometimes result in glossing over the actual 
realities of arbitrage mechanism performance. Thus, an investor who 
diligently reads the 2016 IVV prospectus is presented with a table that is 
completely accurate with respect to such instants in time, but which in fact 
offers an unrealistically sunny view as to actual experience of most investors. 
After all, most trading in an ETF occurs during the course of the trading day, 
not at the close. 
Indeed, performance at the close may especially poorly reflect the 
actual experience of well-counseled investors. Investors who heed the advice 
of major ETF sponsors would affirmatively avoid trading at the close. 
Vanguard advises ETF investors to “avoid trading at either the market open 
or close;” at the close, an ETF may have wider bid-ask spreads and prices 
may be more volatile.190 Similarly, BlackRock advises ETF investors to 
“[c]onsider trading after the first, and before the last, 20 minutes of the 
trading day” as markets can be more volatile and there may be less liquidity 
at such times.191 
This SEC approach may exacerbate what is likely an existing problem 
of investor complacency about the ETF’s basic investment premise. In 2013, 
a financial advisor who had put all of his clients’ money in ETFs stated, “I 
don’t think most people have any clue that the prices they’re paying or 
selling at can veer significantly from NAV.”192 Even professional 
 
 190. JOEL M. DICKSON & JAMES J. ROWLEY, JR., “BEST PRACTICES” FOR ETF TRADING: SEVEN 
RULES OF THE ROAD, VANGUARD 1, 6 (2014), https://www.vanguard.com/pdf/ISGETF.pdf. 
 191. BLACKROCK, GUIDE TO BUYING AND SELLING ETFS 1 (2017), https://www.ishares.com/us 
/literature/brochure/guide-to-buying-and-selling-etfs-en-us.pdf.  
 192. Christopher Condon & Margaret Collins, ‘Seduced’ ETF Investors Caught by Surprise as 
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commentary intended to help investors on ETF investing does not appear to 
pay sufficient attention to arbitrage mechanism breakdowns. A thoughtful 
2017 Wall Street Journal article on how, unlike in mutual funds, one needed 
to look beyond expense ratios when investing in ETFs did not mention the 
arbitrage mechanism issue.193 Another article, originally published in 
October 2015, specifically recommended IVV as “the best core fund” for a 
portfolio, one of the reasons being that it had a “very low tracking error.”194 
On October 8, 2016, the SEC adopted sweeping changes to investment 
company reporting requirements that will become effective over the period 
between mid-2018 and early 2020.195 The attempt is ambitious, laudable, and 
much-needed. However, it includes no changes to the just-discussed measure 
of arbitrage mechanism performance. 
C.  THE ARBITRAGE MECHANISM: DISCLOSURES OF A QUALITATIVE 
NATURE 
The key item of disclosure of a qualitative nature relating to past 
performance of an Investment Company ETF is found in the MDFP required 
in the annual report. The MDFP is intended as the ICA-disclosure regime’s 
analogue to the managerial discussions of past performance required by the 
MD&A requirements found in 1933 Act and 1934 Act documents.196 From 
the standpoint of disclosures pertaining to the arbitrage mechanism, there are 
two basic problems with the MDFP. 
First, as with the quantitative disclosures of past performance just 
discussed, the MDFP has a mutual fund mindset. The MDFP appears to 
conceive of “performance” in terms of changes in the NAV. The MDFP is 
required to “[d]iscuss the factors that materially affected the [f]und’s 
 
Prices Diverge, FUTURES MAG. (July 1, 2013) http://www.futuresmag.com/Wjw (quoting David Blain, 
a financial adviser who manages $75 million). 
 193. Simon Constable, Four Reasons to Avoid the Lowest-Cost ETFs Unlike the Case for Mutual 
Funds, the Expense Ratio Isn’t the End and Be-All, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 2017, at R5. 
 194. Kent Thune, 7 Best iShares ETFs for Building Your Portfolio, INVESTORPLACE (Nov. 16, 
2017, 6:03 AM), http://bit.ly/2mwSUYn. According to the InvestorPlace website, “[t]his article was 
originally published on Oct. 29, 2015, but we’re republishing it so our readers will continue to benefit 
from these still-solid iShares ETFs.” 
 195. See Investment Company Reporting Modernization, supra note 164; N-PORT Delay, supra 
note 164. Cf. supra note 164 and accompanying text (on certain information as to APs being required on 
Form N-CEN beginning June 1, 2018 with respect to Investment Company ETFs). 
 196. See, e.g., Disclosure and Analysis of Mutual Fund Performance Information; Portfolio 
Manager Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 6850, 55 Fed. Reg. 1,460, 1,462 (Jan. 8, 1990) (proposed 
rule) [hereinafter MDFP Proposing Release]; Disclosure of Mutual Fund Performance and Portfolio 
Managers, Securities Act Release No. 6998, 58 Fed. Reg. 19,050, 8–12 (May 4, 1993) [hereinafter MDFP 
Adopting Release]. 
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performance” in the previous year, “by the [f]und’s investment advisor.”197 
Throughout the prospectus disclosure requirements, “performance” is 
conceived of as changes in the fund’s NAV, as adjusted for shareholder 
transaction costs and annual operating expenses. There is little indication that 
“performance” is meant to include the performance of the arbitrage 
mechanism. 
ETFs do not construe the MDFP as requiring any discussion of the 
performance of the arbitrage mechanism. Neither the IVV annual report nor 
the IVV prospectus filed after the events of August 24, 2015 mentioned these 
events at all.198 Similarly, neither the SPLV nor the VDC, which also 
experienced similar arbitrage mechanism failures, referred to August 24, 
2015 in their annual reports or prospectuses.199 
Second, more fundamentally, even if “performance” is interpreted more 
broadly, the usefulness of the MDFP as a guide to investors would still be 
limited. The reason is that, in the proposing release for the MDFP, the SEC 
explicitly rejected MD&A’s approach of requiring forward-looking 
information, such as a discussion of known trends, events, and uncertainties 
reasonably likely to have a material impact.200 The SEC stated that the 
MDFP “is designed to assist investors in evaluating the past performance of 
the fund.”201 In the adopting release, the SEC confirmed this by summarizing 
MDFP as follows: “the item requires funds to explain what happened during 
the previous fiscal year and why it happened.”202 This requirement 
contemplates discussion only of those factors that had affected the fund’s 
performance in the previous year, with no discussion of factors that may 
affect future performance.203 
The investor must look elsewhere to infer the advisor’s views as to the 
prospective performance of the mechanism. This is unlikely to be fruitful. In 
the “Risk/Return Summary” portion of the Summary Prospectus, the ETF is 
to “summarize the principal risks of investing in the [f]und, including the 
 
 197. Form N-1A, supra note 165, at 41, item 27(b)(7)(i). 
 198. See ISHARES, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT 6–7 (Mar. 31, 2016) (Management’s Discussion of Fund 
Performance); IVV 2016 Prospectus, supra note 189. 
 199. See POWERSHARES, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT TO SHAREHOLDERS (Oct. 31, 2015); PowerShares 
Exchange-Traded Fund Tr. II, Registration Statement: PowerShares S&P 500 Low Volatility Portfolio 
(Form N-1A) (Feb. 29, 2016); VANGUARD U.S. SECTOR INDEX FUNDS, ANNUAL REPORT (Aug. 31, 
2015); Vanguard World Fund, Registration Statement: Vanguard Consumer Staples Index Fund (Form 
N-1A) (Dec. 22, 2015). 
 200. MDFP Proposing Release, supra note 196, at 1,462. 
 201. Id. (emphasis added). 
 202. MDFP Adopting Release, supra note 196, at 10.  
 203. Form N-1A, supra note 165, at 40, item 27(b)(7). 
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risks to which the [f]und’s portfolio as a whole is subject and the 
circumstances reasonably likely to affect adversely the [f]und’s net asset 
value, yield, and total return.”204 
Discussion of the risks associated with the fund’s investment strategies 
not among the fund’s “principal strategies” can be relegated to the Statement 
of Additional Information.205 
No rules specifically address how risks associated with the arbitrage 
mechanism should be handled. The only requirement in this respect comes 
in the “Purchase and Sale of Fund Shares” section of the prospectus, where 
the ETF is merely to mention that the trading price of the ETF shares may 
be higher or lower than the NAV.206 These summaries of risk do not 
contemplate discussions of specific factual events, such as the debacle of 
August 24, 2015, or the implications for the arbitrage mechanism’s 
effectiveness. Instead, for something like the arbitrage mechanism, these 
summaries only require brief discussions of its purpose and identification of 
the circumstances under which its effectiveness will be undermined.207 
Changes in an ETF advisor’s views on the arbitrage mechanism are not 
required to be identified by the SEC disclosure requirements. In fact, an ETF 
advisor’s views are constantly evolving as the results of real world “testing” 
of their original hypotheses and assumptions occur and as changes in market 
conditions, trading rules, or other aspects of the business and regulatory 
environment force even previously valid theoretical models to be modified. 
BlackRock’s modeling with respect to the arbitrage mechanism did change 
after August 24, 2015.208 But, given the MDFP’s approach, IVV was not 
required to disclose such modeling developments (although it did make some 
changes to its description of the associated risks).209 The MDFP’s approach 
deprives investors of such expert views. 
We return to these issues in Section V.C, where we suggest a more 
MD&A-like approach with respect to the arbitrage mechanism, including 
associated model-related complexities. 
 
 204. Id. at 6–7, item 4(b)(1). See also id. at 11, item 9(c). 
 205. Id. at 19, item 16(b).  
 206. Id. at 10, item 6.  
 207. See, e.g., IVV 2015 Prospectus, supra note 70 at S-3, 5. 
 208. See infra Section V.C. 
 209. Most notably, it added a sentence to the effect that APs may be less willing to create or redeem 
fund shares if there is, among other things, the lack of an active market for the underlying investments, 
which may contribute to the shares trading at a premium or discount. IVV 2016 Prospectus, supra note 
189, at 6. 
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IV.  OUR PROPOSED REGULATORY FRAMEWORK: 
SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS 
To solve the problems in existing ETF regulation, we encourage the 
SEC to create a single unified body of regulation that covers all ETFs and 
shifts a greater share of regulation away from discretionary review and 
toward written rules. This systematic approach to ETFs as a whole, rooted in 
the structural elements common to all ETFs, would largely displace the 
hodge-podge of regulatory regimes that vary widely across both different 
categories of ETFs and different ETFs within each category. 
In Section IV.A, we set out the general rationales for a single framework 
as well as methods for implementing such a framework. To a significant 
extent, this analysis applies with respect to both the substantive and 
disclosure aspects of our proposal. As to the disclosure side, there are 
additional rationales for a single framework and additional implementation 
pathways and considerations. These disclosure-specific matters will be 
deferred to Part V. 
In Sections IV.B and IV.C, we focus on the two key functional elements 
of our single framework’s substantive side. 
We note that the SEC is now trying, and has tried in the past, to adopt 
new rules for Investment Company ETFs (but not other kinds of ETFs). The 
SEC proposed a set of rules in 2008, but the rules were never finalized amidst 
the demands of the global financial crisis.210 The SEC also asked for general 
comments on ETFs in 2015, presumably with the intention of developing 
rules later on.211 And on June 28, 2018, the SEC proposed certain changes 
relating to Investment Company ETFs, which changes are summarized in the 
Appendix.  
A.  THE GENERAL RATIONALES FOR A SINGLE FRAMEWORK FOR ALL 
ETFS 
We contemplate a single framework for all ETFs. The treatment of 
Investment Company ETFs, Commodity Pool ETFs, and Operating 
Company ETFs would be unified. 
The SEC would need to begin by adopting a definition that establishes 
the scope of the regulatory framework by clearly identifying what an ETF is. 
 
 210. Exchange-Traded Funds, Securities Act Release No. 8901, 73 Fed. Reg. 14,618 (Mar. 11, 
2008). 
 211. Request for Comment on Exchange-Traded Products, Exchange Release No. 75165, 80 Fed. 
Reg. 34,729 (June 17, 2015). 
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As we have seen, the regulation that applies to ETFs currently does not rely 
on a comprehensive conception of an ETF, and there is no single body of 
regulation that could even make use of such a definition. One consequence 
is that ETFs invested in different assets are subject to different regulation. 
We would define an ETF—and thus circumscribe the universe of 
entities that would be subject to the new ETF rules—by focusing on the 
arbitrage mechanism. Specifically, we would define an ETF as a pooled 
investment vehicle that is publicly traded (on a stock exchange or otherwise) 
and that permits an investor to create and redeem shares in exchange for 
assets or a combination of assets and cash at values equal to the entity’s net 
asset value.212 
The principal advantage of defining an ETF so broadly is that for the 
first time it would bring Commodity Pool and Operating Company ETFs 
under the same regulatory umbrella as Investment Company ETFs. Our 
definition would identify an ETF on the basis of structure—including public 
trading and the processing of creations and redemptions of shares at NAV—
rather than on the basis of assets. Our aspiration to cover Commodity Pool 
and Operating Company ETFs in addition to Investment Company ETFs 
represents a major innovation over the SEC’s past and present rulemaking 
efforts in this area. The SEC’s 2008 proposal, Form N-CEN disclosure 
requirements relating to APs effective June 1, 2018, the forthcoming (2019) 
SEC requirements relating to certain liquidity risk requirements, and the June 
2018 SEC Proposal, for example, all relate only to Investment Company 
ETFs.213 
Equalizing the treatment of Investment Company and other kinds of 
ETFs is important to level the playing field and end the gamesmanship that 
allows Commodity Pool and Operating Company ETFs to avoid the 
restrictions on Investment Company ETFs and vice versa. It was the 
temptation for gamesmanship that led ForceShares, for example, to try to 
organize its funds as commodity pools in order to avoid the Division of 
 
 212. We adapt this formulation from stock exchange listing standards. E.g., RULES OF CBOE BZX 
EXCHANGE, supra note 102, at r. 14.11(c)(1) (defining an “Index Fund Share” for index-based exchange-
traded funds); RULES OF NYSE ARCA, supra note 19, at r. 8.200 (regulating “trust-issued receipts” that 
trade on an exchange and permit shareholders to redeem shares). Although there is no universal definition 
of an ETF in stock exchange listing standards, the various rules developed to apply to individual types of 
ETFs have been forced to identify the basic outlines of what an ETF is. 2015 SEC Request for Comments, 
supra note 21, at 34, 730–31.  
 213. Exchange-Traded Funds, supra note 210, at 5 n.4 (noting the exclusion of Commodity Pool 
ETFs); infra note 224 (discussing forthcoming 2019 liquidity-related requirements excluding Commodity 
Pool ETFs and Operating Company ETFs); infra note 283 and accompanying text (noting how Form N-
CEN does not cover Commodity Pool ETFs and Operating Company ETFs). 
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Investment Management’s informal moratorium on approving new 
exemptions for leveraged Investment Company ETFs.214 By organizing as a 
commodity pool rather than an investment company, ForceShares entered 
the SEC through a different division and obtained different and better 
treatment—until the Commissioners intervened. It is likely that any 
substantive restrictions the SEC places on new Investment Company ETFs 
by rule or informal policy could potentially be avoided by sponsors savvy 
enough to organize their funds as commodity pools.  
 Therefore, we think that the SEC should self-consciously try to 
harmonize the treatment of Investment Company ETFs with other kinds of 
ETFs. It should treat all kinds of ETFs as a single regulatory space and 
develop a comprehensive approach that thoughtfully addresses all of them. 
To be clear, this does not necessarily mean that the SEC should treat all kinds 
of ETFs the same. The SEC might reasonably decide after careful study that 
different kinds of assets or different kinds of arbitrage mechanisms warrant 
different regulatory treatment. The SEC might choose to impose different 
requirements about portfolio transparency on an ETF that invests in oil 
futures and an ETF that invests in corporate bonds. But even if the SEC does 
choose to regulate different ETFs differently, it ought to do so self-
consciously, as part of a single cohesive strategy that intentionally identifies 
differences and justifies each of them. If the SEC chooses, for instance, to 
permit custom redemption baskets for Investment Company ETFs, but not 
Commodity Pool ETFs, it should do so as part of a carefully thought-out 
strategy that pays due attention to both the similarities and differences 
between these vehicles.  
 Such a unified strategy—even one that permits differences—would 
stand in contrast to the haphazard, ad hoc jumble of policies that prevails 
today. At present, both the similarities and the differences between 
Investment Company and non-Investment Company ETFs are the product of 
accident and history, rather than a cogent strategy. The SEC sometimes treats 
Investment Company and non-Investment Company ETFs similarly and 
sometimes treats them differently, but never does it design the similarities 
and differences as part of synoptic, unifying vision. The haphazard nature of 
the SEC’s approach was evident, for instance, in the experience of 
ForceShares, where the SEC first permitted a Commodity Pool ETF to 
circumvent the policies on Investment Company ETFs without realizing 
what had happened, then reversing itself a few days later without explaining 
why.215 
 
 214. Supra Section II.D. 
 215. Supra Section II.D. 
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 One way to harmonize the treatment of different ETFs is to adopt a 
single body of administrative rules. The SEC could adopt a set of formal 
rules under the Administrative Procedure Act and apply them to all ETFs. 
The SEC could accomplish this by combining its rulemaking authority under 
section 6(c) of the ICA (which covers exemptions to Investment Company 
ETFs) with its rulemaking authority under section 19(b) of the 1934 Act 
(which covers approval of stock exchange listing rule changes) to adopt a 
single rule that defines its scope broadly enough to cover everything.  
 Another, less ambitious way to harmonize ETF regulation would be to 
develop an informal policy to be applied when reviewing stock exchange 
listing rule change applications for Commodity Pool and Ordinary Company 
ETFs. The SEC’s Division of Trading and Markets reviews these 
applications every time a new Commodity Pool or Ordinary Company ETF 
attempts to list. It might use this process to self-consciously harmonize its 
demands for Commodity Pool and Ordinary Company ETFs with any formal 
rules the SEC adopts for Investment Company ETFs. If the Commission 
decides not to approve leveraged Investment Company ETFs for ICA 
exemptions, for instance, it could announce a similar policy for reviewing 
stock exchange listing rule changes by Commodity Pool and Ordinary 
Company ETFs. This informal approach to harmonizing the treatment of 
different ETFs holds the appeal of possibly being more flexible than a more 
formal approach that addresses all kinds of ETFs in a single administrative 
rule and might make it easier to address differences and novel challenges as 
they arise.  
One major challenge in harmonizing the treatment of Investment 
Company and other kinds of ETFs will be to consider which elements of the 
ICA to extend to non-Investment Company ETFs. The ICA and its 
implementing rules contain a host of regulations, none of which touch the 
ETF arbitrage mechanism, and the SEC should think about which of these to 
extend to non-Investment Company ETFs. Since 2003, for instance, the SEC 
has required every registered investment company to employ a Chief 
Compliance Officer and to give him or her responsibility for overseeing the 
legal compliance efforts of the fund and its adviser.216 There is no good 
reason why Commodity Pool and Operating Company ETFs should not face 
this same requirement. Whatever differences these ETFs have with 
Investment Company ETFs, they surely do not concern the need for solid 
regulatory compliance. Section 17 of the ICA also has important rules on 
self-dealing and custody of assets, which might also apply in some fashion 
 
 216. 17 C.F.R. § 270.38a-1 (2004); Id. § 275.206(4)-7. 
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to Commodity Pool and Operating Company ETFs.217 Self-dealing and 
custody pose problems in any investment fund that is dominated by an 
external advisor, a category which includes Commodity Pool and Operating 
Company ETFs.218 
In recommending harmonized treatment, we are aware that the cleavage 
between securities and commodities regulation runs much deeper than ETFs 
and that the argument in favor of harmonization has been made much more 
broadly than we make it now.219 We note, however, that because the SEC 
has placed itself in the position of individually reviewing every new 
Commodity Pool ETF, the SEC has an exceptional opportunity to harmonize 
this space. Because none of the relevant statutes in either securities or 
commodities regulation has anything at all to say about the distinctive 
features of ETFs, everything the SEC does in this space is invented by 
administrative regulation. Moreover, in its capacity as reviewer of stock 
exchange listing rule changes, the SEC is clearly the primary regulator of 
Commodity Pool ETFs, even if these vehicles are also formally regulated by 
the Commodities Exchange Act.  
Ironically, one advantage of defining an ETF in terms of pooled 
investments with the creation/redemption arbitrage mechanism is the 
narrowness of this approach. This approach avoids extending our regulatory 
system to products commonly referred to as exchange-traded notes 
(“ETNs”)—at least as an initial matter. ETNs are in nature different from 
ETFs. First and foremost, ETNs are debt instruments and do not offer 
ownership interests in pooled investments. ETF investors have no credit 
exposure to the ETF sponsor while the fortunes of ETN investors depend 
ultimately on the ability of the ETN issuers to meet their contractual 
obligations. Second, the creation process associated with the arbitrage 
mechanism for ETNs works differently from the process associated with 
ETFs.220 
Currently, however, the SEC often conflates ETFs and ETNs into a 
single unit for analysis—both being categorized as an exchange-traded 
product (“ETP”). This can serve to undermine the development of sensible 
 
 217. 15 U.S.C. § 80a–17 (2012). For an example of how these rules might apply, see Exchange-
Traded Funds, supra note 210, at 41. 
 218. For an explanation of these issues, see generally Morley, Funds and Managers, supra note 10 
(explaining the conflicts that can arise when a fund is distinct from its advisor). 
 219. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Political Dynamics of Derivative Securities Regulation, 
14 YALE J. ON REG. 279 (1997). 
 220. For a more detailed discussion of differences between ETFs and ETNs, see, for example, Brian 
A. Johnson, Essays on Exchange Traded Notes (Summer 2016) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of California, Berkeley), at 5–8 (on file with author (Hu)). 
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policies and rules. As we saw in Section I.B, the SEC looked at the 
performance of all ETPs (both ETFs and ETNs) in assessing various 
arbitrage mechanism-related matters on August 24, 2015, even though the 
arbitrage mechanisms of ETFs and ETNs differ.  
Our proposed rules would apply to existing ETFs as well as ETFs 
created in the future. Since the SEC’s system of ad hoc, fund-by-fund review 
has allowed old fund sponsors to operate under different rules from newer 
fund sponsors, any new system of regulation will have to cope with the fact 
that its changes will be felt unequally. Old sponsors that presently operate 
under lax requirements might feel the new rules more acutely than newer 
sponsors that presently operate under more burdensome requirements. One 
solution to this problem might be to apply the rules prospectively, enforcing 
them only against new funds created after the rules are adopted, regardless 
of the age of the funds’ sponsors and their exemptions. Another solution 
would be to apply the rules on the same terms to all funds, including funds 
already in existence when rules are adopted. Perhaps the difference in 
burdens of compliance could be dealt with by phasing the rules in gradually, 
thereby giving older sponsors time to figure out how to comply. 
We acknowledge, however, the seriousness of the difficulty in applying 
the rules to existing funds. Some funds have attained such great size that 
liquidating them could potentially hurt current investors and the broader 
financial system, especially if there is no appropriate transition period. And 
given how delicate the arbitrage process can be sometimes, we fear that the 
announcement of a shutdown or major change in the way a fund does 
business could have unpredictable consequences for the trading prices of its 
shares. Should the Vanguard exemption be disallowed, absent some work-
round with the IRS, there could be some tax consequences for existing ETF 
investors. Thus, though we favor applying the rules uniformly to all funds, 
regardless of the date of creation, we acknowledge the potential need for 
greater sensitivity. 
We note the foregoing analysis, both with respect to the case for a single 
regulatory framework and pathways for implementation, generally applies 
not just to the regulation of substantive matters, but also to the regulation of 
disclosure matters. There are also disclosure-specific rationales and 
implementation considerations. We say more about such matters when we 
discuss our proposal for disclosure regulation in Part V. 
We turn now to the functional elements of our proposal for regulation 
of substantive matters. We start by focusing on the content of the rules and 
then turn to the scope and nature of SEC discretion. 
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B.  FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS: CONTENT OF THE RULES 
Our view that the new rules should apply to all ETFs rests on our 
conviction that the distinctive element of an ETF is its reliance on the 
arbitrage mechanism. The rules we propose thus focus on the arbitrage 
mechanism as the principal object of regulatory concern. 
The SEC should develop rules that specify minimum criteria to be 
satisfied. The criteria should relate to portfolio transparency, asset liquidity, 
and the number and activity of APs. We briefly refer to the portfolio 
transparency and liquidity issues here in the context of ETFs generally, 
leaving aside the possible complications associated with ETFs that are 
actively managed.  
Consistent with the SEC’s longstanding policy for granting exemptive 
orders to new Investment Company ETF applicants,221 the contents of a 
fund’s redemption basket should have to be disclosed on a fund’s website 
every trading day prior to the commencement of trading. Also consistent 
with the SEC’s longstanding policy, such a rule should permit ETFs to 
announce their baskets at the beginning of the day and keep them fixed 
throughout the day, even if the fund changes its portfolio.222 This permits an 
ETF to change its portfolio over the course of a day without allowing other 
traders to front-run the ETF’s trades. As will be discussed shortly, there are 
severe limitations to the accuracy of indicative intraday values currently 
being disseminated every fifteen seconds, and joint SEC-exchange-ETF 
industry efforts will be needed to address this and related problems.223 
The portfolio of an ETF must also satisfy certain liquidity requirements. 
Liquidity is important to ensure that the fund and the arbitrageurs who create 
and redeem its stock can transact in the underlying portfolio assets with 
sufficient speed and convenience so they can keep the fund’s stock in line 
with its NAV. The exchanges already have liquidity rules in place and, 
beginning June 1, 2019, the SEC will require most Investment Company 
ETFs to adopt a written program reasonably designed to assess and manage 
their liquidity risk.224 We believe that the SEC should continue further in this 
 
 221. See, e.g., WisdomTree Tr. (notice), supra note 136; WisdomTree Tr. (order), supra note 136.  
 222. WisdomTree Tr. (notice), supra note 136, at 7. 
 223. See, e.g., Van Eck Assocs. Corp., Investment Company Act Release No. 27283, 71 Fed. Reg. 
19,214, 19,215 (Apr. 7, 2006). Note that the SEC proposed similar rules in its 2008 proposal. Exchange-
Traded Funds, supra note 210, at 27–28. 
 224. See, e.g., RULES OF CBOE BZX EXCHANGE, supra note 102, at r. 14.11(liquidity requirements 
for fixed-income-linked Commodity Pool ETFs); RULES OF NYSE ARCA, supra note 19, at r. 5.2(j)(3) 
(liquidity requirement for index fund Investment Company ETFs funds). 
  Beginning on June 1, 2019 or December 1, 2019 (depending on certain ETF size 
considerations), ETFs that are Investment Company ETFs (other than “In-Kind ETFs” as defined by the 
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crucial area, including, among other things, extending the forthcoming 
requirements to Commodity Pool ETFs and Operating Company ETFs. 
Yet a fundamental question arises, irrespective of the particulars of such 
arbitrage mechanism-related criteria. Why should the SEC be involved at all 
as to the effectiveness of the arbitrage mechanism? Here, we believe that the 
SEC should openly adopt a policy of unapologetic, but measured, 
paternalism. The SEC should focus not merely on giving investors 
information, but also on limiting the availability of products that appear 
likely to have serious problems in their arbitrage mechanisms. 
The reason we believe in a modest degree of paternalism is that the 
pricing of an ETF’s shares does not necessarily reflect the risks of a poorly 
functioning arbitrage mechanism. If the arbitrage mechanism works as it 
should, then the stock price of an ETF will usually be approximately equal 
to the fund’s NAV. But a fund’s NAV is not a measure of a fund’s true 
expected value—it does not factor in risks related to fees, the potential for 
future breakdowns in the arbitrage mechanism, or anything else that is not 
an asset in a fund’s portfolio. This is because a fund’s NAV is merely a 
mechanical calculation that adds up the values of the assets in a fund’s 
portfolio.225 One reaches the NAV by simply totaling up the value of the 
stocks, bonds, gold bars, or other portfolio assets and then subtracting the 
amount owed on any liabilities. If a fund holds stock in the S&P 500, then 
the only thing that affects the fund’s stock price will be fluctuations in the 
value of the S&P 500. Thus, the distinctive risk in an ETF—that the arbitrage 
process might fail at some point in the future—has little bearing on the 
trading price of an ETF today. Two ETFs with the same NAV will tend to 
trade at the same price today, even if one of the funds has a flawed arbitrage 
process that it is likely to break down next week.226 
 
SEC) would be required by the SEC to adopt and implement said written liquidity risk management 
program. See Investment Company Institute Liquidity Risk Management Programs; Commission 
Guidance for In-Kind ETFs, Investment Company Act Release No. 33010, 83 Fed. Reg. 8,342, 8,343, 
8343 n.2 (Feb. 27, 2018) (“[F]unds” in the release “includes open-end management companies, including 
exchange traded funds . . . that do not qualify as In-Kind ETFs . . . and excludes money market funds.”). 
Cf. Investment Company Liquidity Risk Management Programs, Investment Company Act Release No. 
32315, 81 Fed. Reg. 82142, 82,216–17 (Nov. 18, 2016) (stating that the SEC is defining an ETF as an 
“open-end management investment company (or series or class thereof), the shares of which are listed 
and traded on a national securities exchange, and that has formed and operates under an exemptive order 
under the [ICA] granted by the Commission or in reliance on an exemptive rule adopted by the 
Commission.”). 
 225. For a complete explanation of this idea, see generally John Morley & Quinn Curtis, Taking 
Exit Rights Seriously: Why Governance and Fee Litigation Don’t Work in Mutual Funds, 120 YALE L.J. 
84 (2010). 
 226. Certain factors (unrelated to the arbitrage mechanism) could cause two ETFs with the same 
NAV to trade at somewhat different prices (or at different bid-ask spreads). For example, the shares of 
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As a result, an unsophisticated investor cannot rely on the stock market 
to price the risk of a malfunctioning arbitrage mechanism. In this regard, an 
ETF stands in contrast to an ordinary company. In an ordinary company, an 
unsophisticated investor does not need to understand and price every risk 
effectively, because sophisticated investors will drive the market price to an 
appropriate level on their own. An investor does not need to know 
personally, for example, about the risks that Apple faces to the supply chain 
for its iPhones, because even if the unsophisticated investor does not 
understand these risks, many sophisticated investors will, and these 
sophisticated investors will buy and sell Apple’s common stock on the basis 
of this risk until the price of the stock settles at an appropriate level. This is 
why federal securities law has developed the so-called “fraud on the market” 
doctrine: even if an investor is not aware of a piece of information, she may 
nevertheless be said to have relied on it, because the information will 
inevitably influence the price at which an investor can buy or sell. 
The unique, arbitrage mechanism-centered microstructure for the 
pricing of ETF shares creates a unique problem. The price of an ETF does 
not reflect every publicly disclosed risk that might affect the ETF’s value 
because certain kinds of risks are mechanically excluded from being 
reflected in the price. 
To be sure, the market may eventually punish the advisors of an ETF 
with a poorly performing arbitrage process, when fund investors redeem, 
leaving a smaller base of money in the fund to generate the advisor’s fees. In 
this sense, even ETFs are subject to a certain kind of market competition that 
eventually rewards the good and punishes the bad. But this kind of 
competition operates much more slowly and much less directly than the kind 
of competition we ordinarily see in securities markets. In ordinary securities 
markets, the discovery of a new risk affects prices almost instantaneously; in 
ETF markets, it might take months or years. If, for example, a computer 
software company announced a major flaw in its key product, the price of 
the stock would drop immediately. If, by contrast, an ETF announced a major 
flaw in its arbitrage mechanism that might manifest sometime in the future, 
the fund’s NAV—and thus its market price—would not be affected. This 
ETF might lose investors eventually, but the investors might take a very long 
 
an ETF needing to make a (taxable) distribution would be less attractive to most investors than the shares 
of an otherwise identical ETF that does not need to do so. Depending on the efficiency of the market in 
the shares of these two ETFs, the respective share prices might reflect this. See E-mails from Andrew J. 
(Buddy) Donohue, Director, SEC Div. of Inv. Mgmt. (2006–10), to Henry T. C. Hu, Allan Shivers Chair 
in the Law of Banking and Fin., Univ. of Tex. Law Sch. (Apr. 30, 2018, 4:51 PM CST. and July 27, 2018, 
2:40 PM CST) (on file with author (Hu)). 
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time to leave, and in the meantime many of them would overpay for an 
investment with unnecessary and unrewarding risks. 
In addition to the foregoing matters, the rules might also address a 
number of technical issues in the ICA, such as the ability of registered 
investment companies to invest in shares of Investment Company ETFs, the 
need for broker-dealers to deliver prospectuses when selling Investment 
Company ETF shares, and the delay that ETFs often experience in settling 
redemptions when their portfolios include foreign securities.227 
In addition to these written rules, the SEC should require regular review 
of funds and their arbitrage processes. The ICA currently subjects registered 
investment companies to regular examinations,228 but this requirement does 
not currently extend to Commodity Pool or Operating Company ETFs. 
Moreover, the examination requirement does not require or assume that the 
SEC will review the operation of a fund’s arbitrage process. The rules should 
thus require every fund to be subject to periodic examination and should 
require every fund to report and explain to the SEC any significant deviations 
between its NAV and its exchange-trading prices, including intraday 
deviations. The proposed public disclosure requirements set out in Part V 
should be helpful to the SEC with respect to such matters. 
C.  FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS: SCOPE AND NATURE OF SEC DISCRETION 
Even after enacting the written rules of general applicability that we 
propose, the SEC should have the capacity both to add and remove 
requirements for individual funds. The SEC already has this power, since it 
can craft requirements ad hoc for every fund, and the adoption of written 
rules should substantially reduce both the frequency and extent of the SEC’s 
use of this discretion. 
We believe such close substantive scrutiny should not flow from an 
ETF falling into identified product categories, but instead on the presence of 
any of three circumstances. Subjecting an ETF to such scrutiny based on it 
falling into a product category (for example, leveraged ETFs or bitcoin 
ETFs) is an example of a regulatory cubbyhole approach that has repeatedly 
proven inadequate in the face of modern process of financial innovation. 
Financial innovation will result in new product categories that would be 
untouched under such an approach, even if they pose greater regulatory 
 
 227. The SEC’s 2008 proposal addresses a number of these technical issues. E.g., Exchange-Traded 
Funds, supra note 210, at 44 (delays in delivering redemption proceeds), 49 (prospectus delivery 
requirement for broker dealers), 97 (investments by other investment companies in ETFs). 
 228. 15 U.S.C. § 80a–30(b) (2012). 
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concerns. A cubbyhole approach may also suffer from another kind of 
obsolescence: a product category we currently think deserves special 
scrutiny may not deserve such scrutiny with changing financial dynamics. 
That is, such fund-specific SEC intervention should occur in three 
circumstances: (1) when the SEC has significant doubts about the 
effectiveness of an arbitrage mechanism or related structural engineering 
(broadly defined), irrespective of whether the arbitrage mechanism satisfies 
the criteria in the written rules; (2) when the riskiness or complexity of a 
proposed ETF could not be adequately addressed by investor “suitability” 
rules imposed on financial intermediaries and associated investor education 
efforts; and (3) when a proposed ETF or, in truly exceptional circumstances, 
an existing ETF creates significant negative externalities for financial 
markets or the financial system. Such intervention would occur only 
sparingly, and discretion would be cabined by certain principles and 
enumerated factors. 
The first set of circumstances—those pertaining to the arbitrage 
mechanism and related structural engineering—would likely not apply to 
most types of ETFs. As discussed, the minimum transparency, liquidity, AP, 
and other requirements should be met by most proposed ETFs and should do 
an adequate job of ensuring a sufficiently effective arbitrage mechanism. 
However, a key feature of the ETF phenomenon is its role as a financial 
portal to an expanding universe of risk-return possibilities. Endless 
combinations of new asset classes, asset strategies, and forms of exposure 
are constantly arising through a robust innovation process. An eighteen-fold 
difference between an ETF’s trading price and its NAV, as occurred with the 
inverse volatility SVXY on February 5, 2018, is unimaginable with respect 
to an ETF offering straightforward passive exposure to the S&P 500. 
Innovations with respect to the arbitrage mechanism or related structural 
engineering may be necessary in ways not contemplated by the criteria 
established by the written rules. 
Also, as discussed in Part V, arbitrage mechanisms and related 
structural engineering for both plain vanilla and innovative ETFs can be 
expected to change with more and more financial R&D, the continuing flow 
of real world “testing” results, and with changes in trading practices, trading 
rules, and other aspects of the business and regulatory environment. The 
SEC’s general written criteria may not reflect such new financial learning or 
the changes necessitated by a changing business and regulatory environment. 
Another situation that may trigger SEC doubts about the effectiveness 
of an arbitrage mechanism and related structural engineering may involve 
the particular ETF sponsor. For instance, an ETF sponsor that does not have 
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demonstrable expertise with respect to arbitrage mechanisms or the 
underlying assets in which the ETF invests should trigger SEC review. 
The second set of circumstances relates to especially risky or complex 
ETFs that neither investor suitability rules nor investor education efforts 
effectively address. ETFs are the dominant collective investment vehicle for 
the riskiest and most arcane assets and strategies.229 In Section I.B, we 
discussed the ninety-six percent drop in the NAV of SVXY on Monday, 
February 5, 2018. The NAV move that Monday was very sharp in absolute 
terms, but was consistent with SVXY’s stated goal of delivering the simple, 
unleveraged, inverse of the performance of the S&P 500 VIX Short-Term 
Futures Index. On Tuesday, the NAV changes were even sharper, but were 
even more startling given the stated objective of the ETF. The index 
decreased twenty-six percent on Tuesday, and thus, had SVXY again 
performed as intended, its NAV should have gone up by about twenty-six 
percent. Instead, SVXY increased 187 percent—an increase that was seven-
fold higher than the expected increase.230 
FINRA and SEC rules do require investment professionals to place 
clients only in “suitable” investments. FINRA Rule 2111 requires, for 
example, that broker-dealers and associated persons must “have a reasonable 
basis to believe that a recommended transaction or investment strategy . . . 
is suitable for the customer . . . .”231 However, there have been problems. In 
2016, FINRA fined Oppenheimer & Co. Inc. for failing to reasonably 
supervise transactions in non-traditional ETFs, and in 2017, Morgan Stanley 
 
 229. A review of the ETF and mutual fund screener website of U.S. News & World Report showed 
forty-six mutual funds that were in the “trading-leveraged-equity” category, with total assets of $3.16 
billion. In contrast, there were 101 ETFs in the same category, with total assets of $17.68 billion. (This 
was based on a review on August 22, 2017 of Best Mutual Fund Rankings: Trading—Leveraged Equity, 
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, https://money.usnews.com/funds/mutual-funds/rankings/trading-
leveraged-equity.) Similarly, in the “trading-inverse-debt” category, there were only seven mutual funds, 
with total assets of $182 million versus nineteen ETFs with total assets of $3.46 billion. Id. 
 230. See ProShares SVXY NAV Spreadsheet, supra note 75. At the Tuesday close, the gap between 
trading price and the NAV was still sizable, but the gap was far narrower than the Monday close. The 
Tuesday closing price was $12.24 while the NAV was $11.3792. Both SEC Chairman Jay Clayton and 
SEC Commissioner Kara Stein have expressed concerns over the nature of some ETFs now available to 
average investors. See, e.g., Benjamin Bain & Matt Robinson, VIX Funds Face Fresh Scrutiny from U.S. 
Regulators, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 23, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-23/vix-
fund-blowups-spur-u-s-to-probe-if-misconduct-played-a-role. 
  Three weeks after the “Vix-mageddon” of February 5, 2018, ProShare Capital Management 
announced that ProShares Short VIX Short-Term Futures ETF (“SVXY”) would change its investment 
objective to seek results (before fees and expenses) that correspond only to one-half of the inverse (-0.5X) 
of the S&P 500 VIX Short-Term Futures Index. Press Release, ProShare, ProShare Capital Management 
LLC Plans to Reduce Target Exposure on Two ETFs (Feb. 26, 2018), http://www.proshares.com/news 
/proshare_capital_management_llc_plans_to_reduce_target_exposure_on_two_etfs.html. 
 231. FINRA, FINRA MANUAL, at r. 2111 (2014). 
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Smith Barney agreed to pay a penalty to settle SEC charges related to ETF 
investments it recommended to advisory clients.232 
The mere fact that an ETF is especially risky or complex would be 
insufficient to justify SEC intervention on investor protection grounds under 
our system. Instead, intervention would occur only in those circumstances 
where the SEC has reasons to believe that suitability requirements and 
investor education efforts have not been or will not prove sufficiently 
effective. 
We think this is the right way to address leveraged and leveraged 
inverse funds (apart from the possible applicability to certain of these funds 
of the arbitrage mechanism/structural engineering circumstance just 
discussed and the negative externalities circumstance to be discussed below). 
Recall that since 2010, the SEC has refused to grant new exemptions for 
leveraged ETF advisers, presumably, at least in part, on the belief that 
leveraged ETFs pose special risks to investors.233 Perhaps rather than 
imposing such a blanket moratorium based on product category, the SEC and 
FINRA should think more carefully about whether suitability requirements 
or investor education efforts are or can be effective enough in addressing 
these funds, especially when the funds are unusually risky or complex. 
FINRA has, for instance, stated that though “it is not FINRA’s position that 
all leveraged and inverse ETFs are unsuitable for all retail customers,” firms 
that recommend such products “must carefully consider their suitability for 
each customer.”234 
Our approach would address the de jure duopoly on leveraged and 
leveraged inverse ETFs enjoyed by the Direxion and ProShares advisory 
companies already discussed in Section II.C. Though one might reasonably 
debate whether leveraged and leveraged inverse funds (or certain subsets of 
such funds) should be allowed, no one can seriously argue that the public is 
well served by letting only two specific advisors create these types of funds. 
If certain leveraged and leveraged inverse funds should not be allowed, then 
letting these two advisors create these funds is doing harm. And if certain 
leveraged and leveraged inverse funds should be allowed, then investors 
ought to be able to reap the benefits of these funds through robust market 
 
 232. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 79794, 2017 WL 129913 
(Feb. 14, 2017) (order instituting administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings); Press Release, 
FINRA, FINRA Sanctions Oppenheimer & Co. $2.9 Million for Unsuitable Sales of Non-Traditional 
ETFs and Related Supervisory Failures (June 8, 2016), https://www.finra.org/newsroom/2016/finra-
sanctions-oppenheimer-co-29-million-unsuitable-sales-non-traditional-etfs. 
 233. Supra note 146–47 and accompanying text. 
 234. Non-Traditional ETFs FAQ, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/industry/non-traditional-etf-faq 
(last visited Aug. 29, 2018). 
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competition among advisors. The SEC could plausibly rationalize the 
regulation of these funds either by prohibiting all advisers from creating 
them or permitting all advisers to create them. Either approach would be 
better than the status quo. Our approach would treat all sponsors proposing 
new leveraged or leveraged inverse funds the same way. (With respect to 
existing leveraged or leveraged inverse funds, as discussed earlier, there may 
be the need for special dispensation.) 
ETFs involving bitcoins and other current privately-issued 
cryptocurrencies may trigger close review under both the risk and 
complexity circumstance and the arbitrage mechanism circumstance just 
discussed (as well as under the negative externalities circumstance to be 
discussed later in this Article). There is at least a possibility that bitcoins 
themselves (and thus bitcoin ETFs) may be fundamentally flawed from the 
standpoint of riskiness and complexity. For instance, do the nascent markets 
for bitcoins have elements of a Ponzi scheme or a tulip-like mania or, if they 
do not, are such markets nevertheless too susceptible to manipulation? While 
our approach to risky and complex ETFs contemplates how suitability rules 
and investor education may in certain circumstances be sufficient grounds 
for allowing the introduction of highly risky and complex ETFs, this pathway 
should be foreclosed to ETFs that are invested in assets that are 
fundamentally flawed. If bitcoins do not in fact suffer from such fundamental 
flaws and pass the risk and complexity test, there would still remain the 
question of whether bitcoins are amenable to the arbitrage mechanism of 
ETFs.  
The third set of circumstances in which the SEC could intervene would 
be when an ETF may have significant negative externalities for financial 
markets or the financial system as a whole. In the Introduction and 
Section V.C.2, we refer to externalities when an ETF grows too large relative 
to an asset class and when too many ETFs track the same equity index. 
One clear example involves the Van Eck Junior Gold Miners ETF. 
Because the ETF’s assets became too large relative to the market for junior 
gold mining stocks in the pertinent index, the ETF changed its threshold of 
allowable companies so as to allow the ETF to invest in larger producers not 
in the index.235 According to a gold stock-oriented mutual fund manager, in 
advance of this change, market participants “indiscriminately” sold their 
junior gold mining stocks, causing “fresh volatility” and “depreciated 
 
 235. Frank Holmes, Small-Cap Mining Stocks, Big-Time Opportunity, U.S. GLOBAL INVESTORS: 
FRANK TALK (June 19, 2017), http://www.usfunds.com/investor-library/frank-talk/small-cap-mining-
stocks-big-time-opportunity. We turn to another aspect of this ETF situation in infra Section IV.C. 
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prices.”236 This was because market participants anticipated that the change 
would cause the Van Eck ETF to down-weight or divest altogether a number 
of the smaller constituents.  
ETFs, such as those involving bitcoins, and inverse volatility strategies 
may trigger review not only under the arbitrage mechanism circumstance 
and riskiness and complexity circumstance discussed earlier, but also 
because of possible externality issues. Policy-makers worldwide have been 
worried about the possibility that bitcoins may contribute to systemic risk 
and how, in Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin’s words, “[w]e want to 
make sure that bad people cannot use these currencies to do bad things.”237 
The events of February 2018 have triggered public concerns over the 
possibility that inverse volatility strategies can disrupt the overall stock 
market.238 
More broadly, the behavior of ETFs invested in less liquid assets in 
February 2018 is contributing to the International Monetary Fund’s growing 
 
 236. Id. Frank Holmes co-manages, among others, the U.S. Global Investors Gold and Precious 
Metals Fund. See U.S. Global Investors Gold and Precious Metals Fund, MORNINGSTAR, 
http://financials.morningstar.com/fund/management.html?t=USERX&region=usa&culture=en_US (last 
visited Aug. 29, 2018). 
 237. Liz Moyer, Treasury Secretary Mnuchin Wants to Make Sure Bad People Cannot Use Bitcoin 
to Do Bad Things, CNBC (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/01/12/mnuchin-wants-to-make-
sure-bad-guys-cant-use-cryptocurrencies.html. See also Jeff Kluter, Can Bitcoin Threaten Market 
Stability?, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR (Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article 
/b17435bhd2bdgk/can-bitcoin-threaten-market-stability; Eric Lam, What the World’s Central Banks Are 
Saying About Bitcoin, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 28, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-
15/what-the-world-s-central-banks-are-saying-about-cryptocurrencies. 
  The SEC so far has not permitted the creation of a bitcoin ETF. On January 18, 2018, Dalia 
Blass, the Director of the Division of Investment Management, indicated that several questions had to be 
answered regarding cryptocurrencies before the SEC would let them be included in fund products. See 
Ari I. Weinberg, It’s Getting Harder to Bring an Exotic ETF to Market, WALL ST. J., Mar. 5, 2018, at 
R7. Cf. Avi Salzman, The End of the Road for Bitcoin ETFs?, BARRON’S (Jan. 10, 2018, 2:50 PM), 
https://www.barrons.com/articles/the-end-of-the-road-for-bitcoin-etfs-1515613827. On July 26, 2018, 
the SEC disapproved the proposed introduction of a bitcoin ETF by Cameron and Tyler Winklevoss. See 
supra note 94. On August 7, 2018, the SEC announced that it would delay its decision with respect to the 
proposed Van Eck SolidX Bitcoin ETF. See Cboe BZX Exch., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 83792 
(Aug. 7, 2018); Bitcoin Dealt a Blow After SEC Delays ETF Decision, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2018), 
https://www.ft.com/content/53311902-9ad1-11e8-ab77-f854c65a4465. On August 22, 2018, staff at the 
SEC rejected applications for nine separate bitcoin ETFs. At the time of this Article’s publication, 
however, the Commission was reviewing the staff’s decisions. See Rachel Evans & Lily Katz, Bitcoin 
ETFs Aren’t Coming Any Time Soon Thanks to the SEC, Bloomberg (Aug. 23, 2018), at 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-23/bitcoin-etfs-won-t-be-coming-any-time-soon-
thanks-to-the-sec. 
 238. See. e.g., Bob Pisani, How Small, Exotic Volatility Trades Had Outsized Influence on the 
Market’s Free Fall, CNBC (Feb. 7, 2018, 3:43 PM), https://cnb.cx/2FX0NLz (asserting that the activities 
of the SVXY and related products in early February 2018 raise a question about whether these products 
introduce a systemic risk). 
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unease over the potential impact of the fast growth of such ETFs on financial 
stability.239 In particular, the IMF appears to suggest that these ETFs, in 
combination with a greater emphasis on passive investment strategies, may 
contribute to a contagion that extends to other asset classes. The IMF stated 
as follows:  
As evidenced during the February [2018] episode of volatility in equity 
markets, the sensitivity of high-yield and emerging market bond ETFs to 
S&P 500 returns is higher than the sensitivity of their underlying indices to 
S&P 500 returns. This suggests that the rise in ETFs, particularly those 
investing in relatively illiquid assets, may increase contagion risk and 
possibly amplify price moves across asset markets during periods of stress. 
Greater investment in passive investment strategies, such as ETFs, may be 
related to the rise in cross-asset correlations during periods of stress, one of 
the main attributes of contagion. Benchmark-focused investors are more 
likely to be driven by common shocks than by the idiosyncratic 
fundamentals of assets they invest in.240 
Determining the presence of the three circumstances and assessing their 
regulatory implications requires a highly interdisciplinary approach. That is, 
matters such as the likely effectiveness of a proposed ETF’s arbitrage 
mechanism or a proposed ETF’s possible negative externalities must involve 
lawyers working closely with other experts such as those with real world 
experience in financial markets and Ph.D.’s in economics, finance, and data 
analytics. Historically, the SEC has been dominated by, and known for, its 
outstanding lawyers. The first professional economists of the modern era did 
not arrive at the SEC until the 1970s.241 
We believe that the modern SEC is up to these important, but 
challenging and unenviable tasks. It is perhaps emblematic that SEC 
Chairman Jay Clayton chose as Director of the Division of Trading and 
Markets someone who, Chairman Clayton emphasized, had “extensive 
markets experience” and “longstanding, active engagement with investors, 
financial services firms, exchanges, and the SEC.”242 Brett Redfearn came 
from J.P. Morgan, where he was Global Head of Market Structure for the 
 
 239. INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT APRIL 2018: A BUMPY 
ROAD AHEAD 19 (2018), https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/GFSR/Issues/2018/04/02/Global-
Financial-Stability-Report-April-2018. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Henry T. C. Hu, Systemic Risk and Financial Innovation: Toward a “Unified” Approach, in 
QUANTIFYING SYSTEMIC RISK 11, 23 (Joseph G. Haubrich & Andrew W. Lo eds., 2013), 
http://www.nber.org/chapters/c12053.pdf [hereinafter Hu, Unified Approach]. 
 242. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Names Brett Redfearn as Director of the 
Division of Trading and Markets (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2017-198. 
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Corporate & Investment Bank.243 The Division of Economic and Risk 
Analysis, the first new Division in thirty-seven years, was created in 2009 
with the overarching goal of providing sophisticated, interdisciplinary 
analysis across the entire spectrum of SEC activities.244 By the end of fiscal 
year 2017, this Division, the “think tank” home to most of the SEC’s Ph.D.’s, 
had grown to 157 full-time-equivalents, only slightly lower than the 182 full-
time-equivalents at the Division of Investment Management.245 
V.  OUR PROPOSED REGULATORY FRAMEWORK: DISCLOSURE 
ASPECTS 
Our disclosure proposal centers on three concepts. First, like the 
regulation of substantive matters, the regulation of disclosure should apply 
universally to all types of ETFs, even if they are not regulated as investment 
companies. The rationales for a single regulatory framework apply to 
disclosure much as they do to substance. In fact, there are some additional 
rationales for harmonizing regulation in the domain of disclosure, and certain 
considerations may make implementation easier on the disclosure side. 
Section V.A discusses such matters as well as one functional element of our 
disclosure proposal that is a natural corollary to a single framework: every 
ETF should identify itself as an ETF in its name. 
Second, every ETF should begin providing certain quantitative 
information on trading price frictions experienced by investors, whether the 
frictions arise from deviations from NAV or the simple matter of bid-ask 
spreads. Historical information on certain intraday and at-the-close 
deviations from NAV would be mandated, in traditional SEC disclosure 
documents and/or on the ETF’s website, depending on the nature of the 
information. Moreover, if extreme deviations from NAV occur at any point 
during a trading day, a next-day Form 8-K-type filing requirement and 
associated website disclosure would be triggered. Section V.B discusses the 
quantitative information elements to our proposal. 
 
 243. See Biography: Brett Redfearn, Director, Division of Trading and Markets, U.S. SEC. AND 
EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/biography/brett-redfearn (last visited Aug. 29, 2018). 
 244. For a discussion of the role of this Division at the SEC and with respect to issues involving 
financial innovation and systemic risk, see, e.g., Hu, Unified Approach, supra note 241, at 23–26; Fingers 
in the Dike: What Regulators Should Do Now, ECONOMIST (Feb. 13, 2010), https://www.economist.com 
/special-report/2010/02/11/fingers-in-the-dike (special report on financial risk). The original name for 
this Division was “Division of Risk, Strategy, and Financial Innovation.” Press Release, U.S. Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n, SEC Renames Division Focusing on Economic and Risk Analysis (June 6, 2013), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2013-2013-104htm. 
 245. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2019 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION 
AND ANNUAL PERFORMANCE PLAN 15 (2018), https://www.sec.gov/reports-and-publications/budget-
reports/secfy19congbudgjust. 
  
2018] A REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR ETFs 917 
 Third, an ETF should be required to provide qualitative information 
offering the sponsor’s expert views on arbitrage mechanism-related trading 
price frictions and bid-ask spread-related trading price frictions as well the 
sponsor’s assessments of associated trends, events, and uncertainties. Such 
discussions would be in the spirit of what is widely considered to be the 
central disclosure item for ordinary public companies—the management’s 
discussion and analysis, or MD&A. In the ETF context, we would narrow 
the scope of the required discussion to trading price frictions. Section V.C 
discusses the qualitative information elements of our proposal and includes 
additional benefit and cost considerations associated with such qualitative 
elements. 
A.  THE SINGLE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK: DISCLOSURE-SPECIFIC 
CONSIDERATIONS AND THE CORRELATIVE FUNCTIONAL ELEMENT OF ETF 
SELF-IDENTIFICATION 
Our proposal would extend to every ETF—whether Investment 
Company, Commodity Pool, or Operating Company—the same framework 
of mandatory disclosure for issues related to trading price frictions, including 
those related to the arbitrage mechanism. The basic reason is that the costs 
and benefits of disclosure related to trading price frictions do not depend on 
the assets an ETF invests in. Sections V.B and V.C, which set out the 
quantitative and qualitative elements of the proposal, offer more specific 
justifications and details about which disclosures we propose to require.  
Consider first the primary goal of SEC mandatory disclosure: that 
investors have the basic information essential to their decision-making.246 
Every ETF has both an arbitrage mechanism (and deviations from NAV) and 
bid-ask spreads and, irrespective of the assets an ETF invests in, such 
characteristics can materially affect the risks and returns experienced by 
investors. Investor decision-making in all ETFs could thus benefit from 
information related to trading price frictions. This is especially so as to 
arbitrage mechanism-related information. As Section III.B showed, many 
ETF investors are unaware of how significant arbitrage mechanism-related 
matters can prove even with plain vanilla ETFs. The contemplated disclosure 
would alert them. And investors who are aware would finally have useful 
information that can be costly, difficult, or impossible for them to obtain on 
their own. The harmonization of disclosure across categories of ETFs would 
facilitate investor comparisons of ETFs in different categories. 
 
 246. For a discussion of the longstanding goals of SEC-mandated disclosure in the context of 
ordinary companies, see, for example, Henry T. C. Hu, Efficient Markets and the Law: A Predictable 
Past and an Uncertain Future, 4 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 179, 180–81, 200 (2012). 
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A second longstanding goal of mandatory disclosure is at the level of 
managerial behavior: disclosure can reward managerial performance and 
deter managerial malfeasance. Under our disclosure proposal, many aspects 
of the past and prospective performance of an ETF’s arbitrage mechanism 
would be brought to the attention of the ETF’s investors for the first time. 
This would give the ETF sponsor greater incentives to try to improve the 
performance of the arbitrage mechanism, whether at the level of the arbitrage 
mechanism itself or at the level of the trading rules and other aspects of 
market structure. All ETFs, irrespective of assets invested in could benefit 
from appropriate managerial attention to such matters. 
A third, more modern, goal is at the level of financial markets and 
society at large. In the context of ordinary public companies, a robust 
informational predicate is essential to an efficient market which, among 
other things, could promote the proper allocation of resources across 
companies and industries. In the context of ETFs, a greater understanding of 
the highly idiosyncratic risks flowing from an ETF’s arbitrage mechanism 
could help investors make better informed allocations of portfolios across 
different kinds of investment vehicles. The additional information on the 
arbitrage mechanism and related market structure issues can also be helpful 
to both the SEC and the ETF industry in addressing trading rules and other 
market structure matters.  
The costs side of our proposal’s justification also does not turn on the 
assets an ETF holds. There is little reason to expect that the costs of 
compliance with our disclosure proposal would vary materially across the 
different legal categories of ETFs. Indeed, irrespective of the assets an ETF 
holds, the ETF sponsor is likely to be well-situated to provide the 
contemplated information. 
In sum, there are disclosure-specific rationales for a single regulatory 
framework for all ETFs that supplement the general rationales discussed in 
Part IV. Every investor in an ETF should be entitled to presume the same 
basic standards of regulatory protection. 
But for this to occur, investors need to know whether the entity whose 
shares they have bought is an ETF. One functional element of our disclosure 
proposal flows directly from this: every ETF should incorporate the term 
“Exchange Traded Fund” in its name. Currently, ETFs are not required to do 
so. USO’s prospectus, for example, describes the fund as an exchange-traded 
fund, but the fund does not label itself an ETF in its name.247 
 
 247. U.S. Oil 2017 Prospectus, supra note 173, at 1–2. 
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Requiring a fund to directly mention its ETF status in its name would 
alert investors to the fact that the fund’s shares represent an ownership stakes 
in a pooled investment vehicle and that the vehicle has an arbitrage 
mechanism that seeks to tether the trading price of shares to the value of an 
underlying portfolio. In addition, this requirement, when combined with the 
baseline substantive and disclosure standards we advocate for all ETFs, 
should help investors because they can rely on the presence of an associated 
portfolio of investor protections. 
 The SEC has the authority to create this new disclosure framework and 
require self-identification without requiring any statutory changes. 
Implementation of the disclosure side of our proposal is perhaps easier than 
the substantive side, because when it comes to disclosure, the SEC has even 
more levers to use. The SEC has comprehensive authority over Investment 
Company ETFs due to their coverage by the ICA. And the SEC also has 
authority over Commodity Pool and Operating Company ETFs. One reason 
is that these entities issue “securities” and therefore have to comply with 
many of the disclosure requirements under the 1933 and 1934 Acts. Another 
reason is that the SEC individually reviews the applications for changes in 
listing standards when these ETFs apply to list on stock exchanges. Ideally, 
such a new approach would be taken through applicable revisions in 
registration statement forms, periodic report forms (for example, the annual 
report for Investment Company ETFs and Form 10-K for other ETFs), and 
website disclosure requirements. An easier, more incremental alternative 
would to be to try to reflect such changes in an industry guide applicable to 
all ETFs.248 
B.  FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS: QUANTITATIVE INFORMATION ON TRADING 
PRICE FRICTIONS—TRADING DAY DEVIATIONS FROM NAV AND BID-ASK 
SPREADS 
As we have seen, IVV suffered extraordinary departures from NAV on 
August 24, 2015. It is a sad commentary on the state of ETF disclosure 
requirements that for the period that included August 24, 2015, IVV was able 
to properly report a perfect 100.00% score (for coming within a band of  
-0.5% discount to NAV and +0.5% premium to NAV) using the SEC-
mandated metric for the past performance of ETF arbitrage mechanisms.249 
This was solely due to the fact that the metric only looks at the difference 
between the trading price and the NAV at the close of trading. Had the SEC 
 
 248. Cf., e.g., Guides for Statistical Disclosure by Bank Holding Companies, Securities Act Release 
No. 5735, 41 Fed. Reg. 39,007 (Sept. 14, 1976). 
 249. See supra Section III.B. 
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metric reflected extremes in intraday performance, the metric would have 
shown at least one striking outlier of about 15%, stemming from the results 
immediately after the 9:30 a.m. open on August 24, 2015. While simplicity 
and other reasons explain the SEC’s decision to look only at the close and 
not intraday performance, the result was an emphatically reassuring picture 
being presented to investors. As a result, an investor may have a misleading 
sense as to the true risks and returns of the ETF. 
In addition, the shareholder transaction expenses—being conceived in 
terms of the friction caused by contractual loads and redemption fees found 
only in the mutual fund context—ignore the possibility of trading price-
frictions caused by contingent NAV premiums/discounts and ever-present 
bid-ask spreads incurred by ETF investors on purchase and sale. 
First, we propose that the ETF not only provide the existing historical 
information reflecting various size categories of at-the-close deviations, but 
also provide historical information on the frequency with which various size 
categories of intraday deviations occurred. Only the most basic information 
should be set out through tables or charts in both traditional SEC disclosure 
documents and on the public websites of ETFs. As will be discussed, more 
granular information, if determined to make sense to mandate on benefit-
cost grounds, cannot be captured by the graphs, tables, and other “depiction 
tools” on which traditional SEC disclosure documents must rely. Such “too 
complex to depict” information should, however, be made available on the 
ETF’s public website. 
Reporting of intraday deviations depends, of course, on the ETF having 
information on such deviations. An ETF should be able to provide such 
information notwithstanding the severe limitations to so-called “intraday 
indicative values” and the high costs of more accurate alternatives. Some 
background on both intraday indicative values and other kinds of 
information will show why ETFs should be able to provide information on 
intraday deviations. 
Exchange listing standards currently require ETFs to publicly 
disseminate during the trading day an intraday indicative value (“IIV”), 
“which is designed to provide investors with information on the value of the 
investments held” by the ETF.250 Typically, the IIV is calculated and 
disseminated at least every fifteen seconds during the trading day and 
disseminated over the Consolidated Tape or via an exchange data feed.251 
 
 250. 2015 SEC Request for Comments, supra note 21, at 34,733. 
 251. Id. 
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The IIV, however, is not necessarily a reliable proxy for intraday NAVs. 
Some ETFs are expressly allowed, for instance, to base the IIV on the current 
value of only certain assets in its portfolio, even if they may differ in 
composition of the overall portfolio.252 Some ETFs are expressly allowed to 
calculate IIVs based on the current value of some, but not all, assets in its 
portfolio.253 IIVs may sometimes rely on stale information, especially when 
certain assets are only traded overseas and the pertinent markets for those 
assets are closed. At a minimum, views diverge on the accuracy of the IIV. 
One major ETF sponsor has stated that the IIV “should closely approximate 
the net asset value (NAV) of an ETF throughout the trading day,”254 In 
contrast, the SEC stated flatly that the IIV “may or may not be equal to the 
per-share value” of an ETF’s underlying portfolio.255 
ETF advisers appear to rely on, and outside vendors to offer, 
alternatives that are believed to be more accurate.256 But accurate, real-time 
information can be extremely expensive for an ETF sponsor.257 
Our proposal for the ETF reporting of intraday deviations is practical 
because there is no need to rely either on crude IIVs or accurate, but costly, 
real-time information. Our proposal depends on the retrospective 
compilations of intraday deviations on a periodic basis. No real-time 
information is needed at all. Indeed, the historical information needed by an 
ETF sponsor to comply with our proposal would be completely stale from a 
trading standpoint and should be relatively inexpensive. 
Of course, even with perfectly complete and accurate information, 
calculating the NAV can still be difficult as a purely conceptual matter. In 
Section I.B, for example, we how discussed how material gaps existed 
between the SPX (as calculated using the prescribed S&P DJI methodology) 
and the actual, real-time, market value of the constituent stocks until 9:42 
a.m. on August 24, 2015. Sometimes, ETFs serve an important price 
discovery role.  
More generally, a variety of circumstances exist in which the valuation 
methodologies used to compute NAV result in imperfect estimates of the fair 
 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Finding ProShare Intraday Values (IOPVS/IIVS), PROSHARES, http://www.proshares.com 
/finding_proshares_intraday_values.html (last visited Aug. 29, 2018). 
 255. 2015 SEC Request for Comments, supra note 21, at 34,733. 
 256. See, e.g., Markit, Comment Letter on Exchange-Traded Products, at 2 (Aug. 17, 2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-11-15/s71115-17.pdf. 
 257. This is based on an interview one of the authors (Hu) had with a major ETF sponsor in May 
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value.258 In all ETF disclosures relating to arbitrage mechanism performance 
proposed by this Article, we contemplate that the ETF would be free to 
provide commentary correcting naïve, incomplete, or mistaken 
understandings of NAV computation methodologies, the NAV concept 
itself, and the way intraday deviations are calculated. 
Joint initiatives involving the SEC, ETF sponsors, stock exchanges, 
financial data providers, brokerages, and other market participants would be 
helpful in addressing some of the existing limitations of IIVs and in 
exploring more accurate, but cost-effective, alternatives for the purpose of 
the retrospective reporting of intraday deviations contemplated by this 
Article. Similarly, such joint efforts should try to resolve or, at least 
standardize, approaches to some of the complexities associated with NAV. 
Such initiatives with respect to IIVs, cost-effective alternatives, and NAVs 
should also involve efforts to better educate investors on the basics of these 
and related matters.  
The essential information relating to intraday and at-the-close 
deviations from NAV should be included in appropriate tables, charts, and 
the like in traditional hard-copy SEC disclosure documents and, to increase 
accessibility, on the ETF’s public website. There is a possibility, however, 
that more granular information may turn out to make sense when a careful 
cost-benefit analysis is done. 
However, the tables, graphs, and other “depiction tools” on which 
traditional SEC disclosure documents must rely may be incapable of 
capturing important aspects of this kind of information. This “depiction 
tools” roadblock and other issues create a “too complex to depict” problem 
for traditional SEC disclosure technology, as has manifested itself in other 
financial innovation-related contexts such as asset-backed securities and 
major banks heavily involved in complex derivatives.259 
Some of the proffered solutions to this too-complex-to-depict problem 
 
 258. See, e.g., GOLUB, supra note 50, at 14 (discussing circumstances such as when valuation 
methodologies used to compute NAV may suffer from price staleness associated with thinly traded 
securities, closed markets as can happen with international funds, and conventions); supra note 40 
(referring to the theoretical and practical complexities associated with the NAV and the related matters 
associated with intraday indicative values). 
 259. See, e.g., Hu, Disclosure Universes, supra note 12, at 575–83, 618–35, 639–50, 654–55 
(discussing three “modes of information,” the rationale for the “transfer mode,” and how the GLD ETF 
provides “pure information” as to its gold bars); Henry T. C. Hu, Too Complex to Depict? Innovation, 
“Pure Information,” and the SEC Disclosure Paradigm, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1601 (2012) (proposing a new 
conceptual framework for “information,” terminology such as “depiction tools,” and initial analysis of 
too complex to depict problems with, for example, asset-backed securities and too big to fail banks 
heavily involved in complex financial innovations). 
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center on a new mode of information, one involving the transfer of “pure 
information” to investors. Thus, in our ETF context, the “pure information” 
of certain kinds of raw data on intraday deviations could be captured in a 
form that would be amenable to investors and third parties seeking to engage 
in sophisticated data analytics and downloadable from the ETF’s website.  
Second, in the event there is an exceptional deviation that occurs at any 
time during the trading day, the ETF would need to publicly disclose this by 
the close of trading the next business day on a Form 8-K-style SEC filing 
and on the ETF’s public website. Both the SEC filing and the disclosure on 
the website are necessary. Normal Form 8-K’s alert investors in ordinary 
public companies to the occurrence of certain extraordinary events. This 
Form 8-K-style filing alerts investors in ETFs to the occurrence of an 
exceptional deviation. The placement of information on the ETF’s public 
website ensures wide and easy availability. A flat percentage trigger—say, 
5% or over—applicable to all ETFs has the virtue of uniformity, but may be 
impractical because some arcane ETFs may thus be required to file a 
numbingly large number of such reports. The ETF sponsor would be 
encouraged, but not required, to provide a very brief, highly preliminary, 
assessment of reasons why the exceptional deviation occurred, both in its 
SEC filing and on the ETF’s website. And, as discussed, the ETF sponsor 
would be free to explain why it may believe that such deviations from NAV 
relate more to weaknesses or misunderstandings relating to NAV 
computations, the NAV concept itself, or how intraday deviations are 
calculated than with problems associated with its arbitrage mechanism. 
Third, the data on the past performance of arbitrage mechanisms needs 
to be extended to ten years (or the life of the fund, if shorter). Currently, 
information is only required with respect to roughly one year or five years 
(in the annual report). As we have seen, past performance information with 
respect to changes in NAV are required for periods of ten years (or the life 
of the fund, if shorter). 
We see no reason to use a different period for the past performance of 
arbitrage mechanisms. Just as performance of a fund can significantly vary 
from year to year, performance of the arbitrage mechanism can do so as well. 
Consider the average deviation in the iShares MSCI Emerging Markets ETF 
(“EEM”) for the period from September 2004 through September 2014. The 
average deviation on a daily basis was just 0.05%, but there was considerable 
variation: in late 2008, the worst daily deviations were -6.20% and +12.07 
percent.260 If this late 2008 performance were excluded, the worst daily 
 
 260. This is based on a review of Figure 3.3 in ANANTH N. MADHAVAN, EXCHANGE-TRADED 
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deviations would be fractions of such numbers. 
Fourth, there should be information on the most extreme performance 
outliers on a historical basis. Currently, following the bar chart in the 
Summary Prospectus, the fund must disclose the fund’s highest and lowest 
return (in NAV terms) for a quarter during the past ten years (or the life of 
fund, if shorter) covered by the chart.261 Similarly, an ETF should be required 
to disclose the highest premium and lowest discount to NAV experienced at 
any time in the past ten years (or the life of the fund, if shorter). 
Such arbitrage mechanism performance information should be helpful 
with respect to the shareholder transaction-expenses issue. In addition, 
prominent cautionary language about the possibility of contingent premium 
and discount expenses should accompany graphical presentations and 
narrative discussions of shareholder transaction expenses. 
Fifth, the disclosures pertaining to shareholder transaction expenses 
should be accompanied by a warning about the possibility of “contingent” 
transaction costs flowing from NAV premiums and discounts. Trading price 
frictions always flow from bid-ask spreads. There should be quantitative 
disclosure of bid-ask spreads, such as mean bid-ask spreads and breakdowns 
of bid-ask spreads into size categories, perhaps with the use of tables, charts, 
or graphs. 
C.  FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS: QUALITATIVE INFORMATION—AN MD&A-
STYLE APPROACH TO THE ARBITRAGE MECHANISM AND RELATED 
MATTERS 
1.  The Proposal and Its Basic Logic 
For investors in an ETF, assessments on an on-going basis as to what is 
known and unknown about the prospective effectiveness of that ETF’s 
arbitrage mechanism are critical to ascertaining an ETF’s overall risk and 
return characteristics. Such assessments are difficult to make, depending not 
only on expertise with respect to that ETF’s particular arbitrage mechanism 
and related structural engineering (including the modeling) and knowledge 
about the characteristics of that ETF’s clientele, but also on detailed 
information, some proprietary in nature, on diverse matters such as trading 
practices and prices, APs, market makers, and the current and prospective 
regulatory environment. 
At its core, the mechanism is anchored in a model that predicts the 
 
FUNDS AND THE NEW DYNAMICS OF INVESTING 43 (2016). 
 261. Form N-1A, supra note 165, at 8, item 4(b)(2)(ii). 
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completely voluntary behavior on the part of current and prospective APs as 
well as other market participants in both normal circumstances and times of 
market stress. Every such model relies on certain key business and legal 
assumptions. On the business side, the arbitrage mechanism assumes, for 
instance, that throughout the trading day, an informationally rich 
environment will allow APs to identify gaps between trading prices and the 
NAV; that enough APs are both able and willing to enter into the necessary 
transactions at the correct times and in the correct amounts; and that APs 
have shorting or other hedging tools available to allow them to achieve 
“riskless” arbitrage profits. On the legal side, the arbitrage mechanism 
assumes, for instance, that throughout the trading day, no exchange trading 
rules or other regulatory constraints will limit either the trading of the assets 
in which the ETF is invested or an AP’s shorting and other hedging 
transactions, and that the transactions can be executed with a high degree of 
legal certainty. 
In the real world, one or more of these assumptions may not be satisfied. 
In times of market stress, an assumption of uninterrupted trading and the 
willingness and wherewithal of APs to engage in the necessary transactions 
can be heroic. Changes in the regulatory environment or in business 
practices, which may be especially likely during or after times of market 
stress, may render certain assumptions obsolete. Moreover, every theoretical 
model may suffer from model risk in the sense of being incomplete or wrong. 
The modelers may not realize, for instance, that certain additional 
assumptions are necessary in order for the mechanism to be effective. For 
the modelers, the real world “testing” that occurred on August 24, 2015 
proved informative. 
We believe that an ETF’s sponsor is uniquely situated to provide 
informed views an ongoing basis and would be able to do so without 
incurring undue costs. We also believe, critically, that most ETF shares are 
in the hands of investors who are sophisticated enough to appreciate the 
value of such views. 
To accomplish the appropriate level of disclosure for Investment 
Company ETFs, we propose that “performance” for the purposes of the 
annual MDFP be conceived to include performance of the arbitrage 
mechanism, and that the discussion of the performance of this mechanism 
and related structural engineering (including modeling matters) in the MDFP 
meet requirements that are in the general spirit of the MD&A, not the 
MDFP.262 For symmetry, with Commodity Pool and Operating Company 
 
 262. Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2018). 
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ETFs, such reviews should be specifically required to be part of the MD&A 
disclosures that are mandatory in the annual Form 10-K. 
The MD&A required in the Form 10-Q quarterly and Form 10-K annual 
reports263 of public companies is not only the central risk-related disclosure 
item,264 but also is widely considered the primary source of narrative 
disclosure that is reviewed, together with financial statements, for 
investment decision-making.265 In the words of the SEC, the MD&A seeks 
to “give the investor an opportunity to look at the company through the eyes 
of management.”266 Critically, corporations are not only required to provide 
historical information, but also offer management’s view as to the future. 
Speaking of MD&A requirements as a whole, the SEC stated that, “[the] 
requirements are intended to provide, in one section of a filing, material 
historical and prospective textual disclosure enabling investors and other 
users to assess the financial condition and results of operations of the 
registrant, with particular emphasis on the registrant’s prospects for the 
future.”267 
A company’s financial statements are historical in nature and show the 
company’s past performance. But the past is not necessarily prologue. The 
MD&A requirements help fill the gap. The MD&A requires disclosure of, 
for example, “known trends or any known demands, commitments, events 
or uncertainties” relating to any material change in the company’s liquidity 
and “known trends or uncertainties that have had or that the registrant 
reasonably expects will have a material . . . impact on net sales or revenues 
or income from continuing operations” with respect to risk-related matters, 
 
 263. FORM 10-Q, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, at 5, pt. I, item 2 (Apr. 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/files/form10-q.pdf; FORM 10-K, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, at 9, pt. II, item 7 
(Apr. 2017), https://www.sec.gov/files/form10-k.pdf. The MD&A is also required in registration 
statements. See, e.g., FORM S-1, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, at 5, pt. I, item 11(h) (Apr. 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/files/forms-1.pdf. 
 264. Hu, Disclosure Universes, supra note 12, at 593–96. 
 265. See, e.g., Orie E. Barron et al., MD&A Quality as Measured by the SEC and Analysts’ Earnings 
Forecasts, 16 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 75, 80 (1999) (“We focus on MD&A because a growing body of 
evidence suggests that the SEC and users of financial reports view MD&A as particularly important, 
despite the fact that MD&A is only a small part of each firm’s total disclosure.”); Carl W. Schneider, 
MD&A Disclosure, 22 REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 149, 150 (1989) (characterizing MD&A as 
requiring “all material information, historical or prospective, that has impacted or might foreseeably 
impact on the financial affairs of the registrant”). 
 266. Concept Release on Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and 
Operations, Securities Act Release No. 6711, 52 Fed. Reg. 13,715, 13,717 (Apr. 24, 1987). 
 267. Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operation, 
Certain Investment Company Disclosures, Securities Act Release No. 6835, 54 Fed. Reg. 22,427, 22,428 
(May 24, 1989) (footnote omitted). 
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corporations must disclose known trends or uncertainties of various kinds.268 
More generally, the Regulation S-K Instructions mandate that the MD&A 
“shall focus specifically on material events and uncertainties known to 
management that would cause reported financial information not to be 
necessarily indicative of future operating results or of future financial 
condition.”269 
This application of MD&A principles to the arbitrage mechanism and 
related structural engineering matters would consist of three basic 
components supplementing the MDFP in the Annual Report.  
First, there would be a summary overview of the past performance of 
the arbitrage mechanism, comprehending intraday performance, including a 
brief discussion of how the past performance corresponded to prior 
expectations of the ETF sponsor. 
This overview, which would for the first-time result in an integrated 
discussion of the past performance of the ETF’s arbitrage mechanism, would 
be helpful in several ways. First, this overview requirement would create soft 
incentives for ETF managers to create more effective arbitrage mechanisms. 
Some money managers may be more talented than others. For instance, some 
ETF sponsors may be “more adept at tracking a given benchmark” (as stated 
by BlackRock),270 and there is every reason to believe that some ETF 
sponsors may be better at the modeling and structuring of arbitrage 
mechanisms than others. Such an overview requirement would give ETF 
sponsors with strong capabilities a convenient pathway for at least indirectly 
comparing their past performance and their expectations with those of 
competitors. 
This overview would also alert ETF investors to possible differences 
among types of ETFs in terms of the effectiveness of the arbitrage 
mechanism. As we have seen in Section I.B, ETFs offering passive exposure 
to highly liquid domestic stocks tend to have more effective mechanisms 
than those investing in, say, high yield or municipal debt. Large ETFs might 
be better in this respect than small ETFs. 
This benefit may be especially large for investors interested in ETFs 
that invest in more illiquid assets, more arcane strategies, and leveraged or 
leveraged inverse exposures. This relates to the role ETFs play in serving as 
a financial portal for both retail and institutional investors in an ever-
 
 268. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 229.303(a)(1), (a)(3)(ii) (2018). 
 269. Id. § 229.303, instruction 3 to para. 303(a). 
 270. GOLUB, supra note 50, at 2. 
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expanding universe of risk-return possibilities. ETFs are the dominant 
collective investment vehicle for the riskiest strategies. Some of these arcane 
assets, strategies, and forms of exposure can pose unique difficulties for ETF 
arbitrage mechanisms. One ETF advisor, for instance, has noted such 
problems for bank loan ETFs, active ETFs, and leveraged and leveraged 
inverse ETFs.271 Sometimes, a narrow asset class may make it difficult for 
an ETF in that class to operate.  
Examples in the junior gold mining area, one involving an ETF intended 
to track an index and the other a 3X leveraged exposure, illustrate. As briefly 
discussed in Section IV.C in relation to another point, the Van Eck Junior 
Gold Miners ETF was intended to track an index of smaller gold mining 
stocks, the MVIS Global Junior Gold Miners Index. But the ETF grew so 
large ($5 billion) relative to the market capitalization of the index ($30 
billion), that it caused concerns over Canadian takeover laws and U.S. 
Internal Revenue Service diversification requirements.272 On March 31, 
2017, none of the ETF’s top six holdings were among the top six components 
of the index.273 
On April 13, 2017, the Direxion Daily Junior Gold Miners Index Bull 
3X Shares Leveraged Exchange Traded Fund suspended daily creation 
orders due to the “limited availability of certain investments or financial 
instruments used” to provide the requisite exposure to an index of junior gold 
mining stocks.274 This, Direxion stated, would cause the ETF’s shares to 
trade at a premium if demand exceeded supply during the period the creation 
units are limited. 
Finally, this overview could help address a concern important to all ETF 
investors: at least in times of market stress, arbitrage mechanisms can not 
only perform badly, but also in bizarre, unpredictable ways. Thus, had our 
proposed requirement for an overview of the arbitrage mechanism been in 
 
 271. BlackRock, Aug. 11, 2015 Comment Letter, supra note 47, at 7. 
 272. Sumit Roy, How an ETF Gets Too Big For Its Index, ETF.COM (Apr. 10, 2017), 
http://www.etf.com/sections/features-and-news/how-etf-gets-too-big-its-index. 
 273. See Ryan T. McIntyre, Method to Madness: Opportunity in a Volatile Time, TOCQUEVILLE 
FUNDS (Apr. 19, 2017), http://www.tocquevillefunds.com/insights/method-madness-opportunity-
volatile-time (showing the top 10 holdings of the ETF and the MVIS Global Junior Gold Miners Index 
as of March 31, 2017 in Exhibit 1). On April 13, 2017, MVIS Index Solutions announced changes to its 
index, widening the criteria for inclusion. Luzi-Ann Javier, Danielle Bochove & Aoyon Ashraf, ‘Curse 
of Success’ Leads the Most Popular Mining ETF to Widen Its Holdings, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 13, 2017), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-04-13/vaneck-s-junior-gold-miner-etf-seen-
rebalancing-as-assets-soar. 
 274. Press Release, Direxion, Direxion Suspends Creation Units for Daily Junior Gold Minders 
Index Bull 3X Shares (Apr. 13, 2017), http://www.direxioninvestments.com/wp-content/uploads/2017 
/04/Direxion-Suspends-Creation-Units-for-Daily-Junior-Gold-Miners-Index-Bull-3X-Shares.pdf. 
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place with respect to 2015, ETFs that suffered catastrophic failures in the 
arbitrage mechanism on August 24, 2015 would have been required to 
discuss these issues. As discussed in Section I.B, IVV and SPY, the two 
largest ETFs in the country, showed striking differences in deviations from 
NAV in early trading on August 24, 2015 even though they were both were 
invested in the same S&P 500 stocks in identical proportions. Informed ETF 
sponsor views on whether differences, if any, in the arbitrage mechanism, 
APs, clienteles, or other factors may help explain this puzzle would be highly 
useful, even to very sophisticated investors. 
Second, an ETF advisor would offer its views on material events and 
uncertainties known to it that would cause reported performance of the 
arbitrage mechanism not to be necessarily indicative of future results. 
Consider, for instance, the situation where an ETF sponsor is aware that an 
active AP has decided to cease its arbitrage activities or is now no longer in 
a financial position to do so. The median number of active APs for ETFs in 
2014 was four,275 so unless other APs step in, this could have a material 
impact on the effectiveness of the arbitrage mechanism. (If the AP who has 
ceased its arbitrage activities is, in fact, primarily acting on behalf of its 
clients, then the AP’s withdrawal would have limited impact. The clients 
could presumably simply act through the remaining APs.) In fact, active APs 
have sometimes stepped away, including Citigroup and Knight Trading, with 
the impact depending on, among other things, the size of the ETF, the nature 
of the assets it invests in, and the number of APs remaining.276 
Regulatory uncertainties could significantly affect the effectiveness of 
the arbitrage mechanism, in either direction. After the August 24, 2015 
debacle, BlackRock, State Street Global Advisors, and others urged the SEC 
to adopt changes in “limit-up/limit-down” trading rules—rules related to the 
certainty of execution and such other matters as the procedures that should 
be followed after certain trading halts.277 Absent such changes, the markets 
would be susceptible to another August 24 debacle “at any time.” Investors 
would benefit from ETF sponsor evaluation of the implications of a known 
regulatory change. In fact, changes in “limit-up/limit-down” trading rules 
and certain other aspects of the market structure have occurred, but at least 
 
 275. See Inv. Co. Inst., Comment Letter on Exchange-Traded Products (File No. S7-11-15) 16 (Aug. 
17, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-11-15/s71115-22.pdf.  
 276. Id. at 16–17 (discussion of withdrawal as APs by Knight Trading Group and Citigroup).  
 277. BlackRock et al., Comment Letter on SEC Action to Address Market Structure Issues Related 
to August 24, 2015, at 1–3 (Mar. 10, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/comments/265-29/26529-60.pdf 
(comment letter from eighteen equity market participants, representing “asset managers, ETF providers, 
industry analysts, institutional and retail broker-dealers, and professional market makers and liquidity 
providers”).  
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one major ETF sponsor believes that more remains to be done.278 
Third, the ETF advisor would discuss the circumstances in which the 
arbitrage mechanism can be expected to depart significantly from its past 
long-term performance and any significant changes in the advisor’s 
structural engineering, whether with respect to modeling or otherwise. The 
advisor should also seek to outline in broad terms what can be said in 
qualitative or quantitative terms about the impact of such circumstances or 
such engineering changes. Among the circumstances that should be 
discussed are high stress events involving changes in the liquidity or the 
prices of the assets in which the ETF is invested. 
The August 24, 2015 real world “tests” caused ETF advisors to change 
their models. No doubt, extreme stress helped concentrate the minds of ETF 
advisors wonderfully.279 But, in addition to that, real-world tests provide 
information on the validity of the modeling. This reflects a basic theme in 
modern financial innovation. There have been repeated instances involving 
the known and unknown limitations of theoretical models becoming 
manifest as real-world trading unfolds.280 
The events of August 24, 2015 taught ETF advisors that their arbitrage 
mechanisms were more fragile than they had thought and that additional 
assumptions were necessary for such mechanisms to be effective. For 
instance, BlackRock, IVV’s advisor, stated in a house publication two 
months after the debacle that: 
For many years, including most recently in our August 2015 letter to the 
SEC, we only included two categories – valuation clarity and access – that 
are necessary for an effective arbitrage mechanism. However, given the 
 
 278. See, e.g., PAUL HUGHES, SEC DIVISION OF ECONOMIC AND RISK ANALYSIS, WHITE PAPER 
SERIES, THE EFFECT OF AMENDMENT 10 OF THE “LIMIT UP-LIMIT DOWN” PILOT PLAN (2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/files/dera_wp_the_effect_of_amendment_10_of_the_luld_plan.pdf; Barbara 
Novick et al., BLACKROCK, 2018 CASE STUDY: ETF TRADING IN A HIGH-VELOCITY MARKET 6 (2018), 
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/whitepaper/viewpoint-case-study-etf-trading-high-
velocity-market-february-2018.pdf [hereinafter NOVICK, 2018 CASE STUDY]. 
 279. “Depend upon it, sir, when a man knows he is to be hanged in a fortnight, it concentrates his 
mind wonderfully.” JOHN BARTLETT, BARTLETT’S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 310 (Geoffrey O’Brien ed., 
18th. ed. 2014) (quoting Boswell, Life of Johnson, September 19, 1777). 
 280. See generally Hedge Fund Operations: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Banking and Fin. 
Serv., 105th Cong. 104–06, 279–82 (1998) (statement of Henry T. C. Hu) (comments on the 1998 collapse 
of Long Term Capital Management); Hearing to Review the Role of Credit Derivatives in the U.S. 
Economy: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Agric., 110th Cong. 41–46 (2008) (statement of Henry T. C. 
Hu) (comments on the modeling-error related demise of the AIG in 2008); Hu, Misunderstood 
Derivatives, supra note 12 (suggesting systematic reasons for modeling and other problems in modern 
financial innovation; and offering reasons for such problems); Hu, Disclosure Universes, supra note 12, 
at 618–36 (on modeling and other problems relating the “London Whale” debacle at JPMorgan Chase in 
2012). 
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events of August 24, we felt it was important to acknowledge that certainty 
of execution, which was lacking for certain periods on that day, is also 
essential.281 
2.  The Contemplated MD&A-Style Information: Additional Benefit and 
Cost Considerations 
An ETF sponsor is uniquely situated to provide forward-looking 
assessments of the effectiveness of its ETF’s arbitrage mechanism. One 
reason is that an ETF advisor is usually responsible for designing the full 
particulars of the arbitrage mechanism used for its ETF. The variations in the 
arbitrage mechanism reflect careful engineering, attuned to the trading, 
regulatory, and other characteristics of the assets in which the ETF invests, 
the asset strategies it follows, and the forms of exposure it offers. The person 
who designed the mechanism is likely to be familiar with it. 
Another reason why an ETF advisor tends to be well positioned to 
understand the effectiveness of the arbitrage mechanism is that advisors 
often become directly involved in seeking changes in trading rules or 
business practices that may directly affect the future performance of the 
arbitrage mechanism. After the flash crash of May 6, 2010, several 
regulatory reforms recommended by BlackRock and other market 
participants were implemented, including extending circuit breakers 
previously applied to individual stocks to a set of heavily traded ETFs.282 
Outside of the SEC itself, ETF advisors are best situated to assess the 
likelihood and impact of any such regulatory changes. 
A third reason an advisor is well situated to discuss the arbitrage 
mechanism’s performance is that the advisor often has facts that are not 
available to others. For instance, until Form N-CEN requirements came into 
effect on June 1, 2018, no information needed to be provided publicly on the 
identity of APs by any ETF, including the dollar value of the shares each AP 
created and redeemed with the fund.283 Today, although such Form N-CEN 
requirements with respect to APs apply to Investment Company ETFs, they 
do not apply to Commodity Pool ETFs or Operating Company ETFs. Even 
with such additional disclosure by Investment Company ETFs, only the fund 
has the expertise to make judgments as to the continued willingness or ability 
of existing APs to continue engaging in the arbitrage-based transactions or, 
 
 281. NOVICK, MARKET STRUCTURE, supra note 65, at 15 n.19. 
 282. GOLUB, supra note 50, at 21. 
 283. Investment Company Reporting Modernization, supra note 164, at 82,052 (describing item 
E.2 on Form N-CEN). Form N-CEN specifies that it applies to “registered investment companies.” Id. at 
82,024 (General Instructions, at “A” and “C(1)”). 
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if existing APs exit, the likelihood of new APs coming in.  
The advisors may also have information on professional trading firms 
other than APs who monitor and trade the ETF’s shares. Such firms’ 
behavior can be an important factor in determining trading price parity with 
the NAV. 
Naturally, the costs and benefits of adopting such a disclosure 
requirement must be considered, especially given the high bar that the D.C. 
Circuit has set for economic analysis in SEC rulemaking.284 The costs should 
be fairly low. The ETF advisor likely already has the information, and, if not, 
the ETF advisor, as a matter of internal controls and reputation, would have 
the incentive to develop such information for reasons independent of any 
disclosure requirements. Such disclosures need not involve the loss of 
proprietary information. This is evidenced by the detailed discussions of 
arbitrage mechanisms in the public August and October 2015 BlackRock 
documents referred to earlier. 
The most daunting “cost” may flow from the possibility of liability. 
Investment companies, including Investment Company ETFs, cannot avail 
themselves of the statutory safe harbor for forward-looking statements under 
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995.285 However, ETFs who 
provide well-grounded prospective information accompanied by appropriate 
cautionary language should be able to rely on the protections available with 
the judicially crafted “bespeaks caution” doctrine.286 In other contexts, ETFs 
have not hesitated to offer what is clearly forward-looking information. For 
instance, IVV reported in its 2015 prospectus that it expects its “sampling 
 
 284. The most notable such case is Businuess Roundtable v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 
647 F.3d 1144, 1146 (D.C. Cir. 2011), where the D.C. Circuit struck down the SEC’s proxy access rule 
notwithstanding the Dodd-Frank Act’s affirmation of the agency’s authority. The SEC is mindful of the 
D.C. Circuit’s standards. See, e.g., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, DIVISION OF RISK, STRATEGY, AND 
FINANCIAL INNOVATION & OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL, CURRENT GUIDANCE ON ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS IN SEC RULEMAKING (2012) (memorandum to Staff of the Rulewriting Divisions and Offices); 
Michael S. Piwowar, Commissioner, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks to the First Annual 
Conference on the Regulation of Financial Markets (May 16, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/news 
/speech/2014-spch051614msp. In his first speech as Chairman of the SEC, Jay Clayton emphasized that 
“disclosure and materiality have been at the heart of the SEC’s regulatory approach for over eighty years” 
and the need for comprehensive analysis of benefits and costs of disclosure requirements. Jay Clayton, 
Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at the Economic Club of New York (July 12, 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/remarks-economic-club-new-york. 
 285. See, e.g., 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(a), 77z-2(b)(2)(B) (2012). 
 286. For a discussion on how the judicial bespeaks caution doctrine can be useful to companies that 
are excluded from protection under the statutory safe harbor, see, for example, Morris DeFeo, Jr., Amanda 
Paracuellos & Kelly Howard, When a Company’s Forward-Looking Statements Find No Safe Harbor: 
Bespeaks Caution Doctrine Provides Alternative Protection, CROWELL & MORING LLP (2006) 
https://www.crowell.com/documents/DOCASSOCFKTYPE_ARTICLES_404.pdf. 
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indexing strategy” for tracking the S&P 500 will result in a divergence of the 
performance of the fund’s portfolio from the S&P 500 that, “over time, will 
not exceed 5%.”287 
This is precisely the kind of “firm-specific” information that federal 
disclosure law has always emphasized and, as we have discussed, the ETF 
advisor is uniquely situated to provide this information.288 Such firm-specific 
information would promote investor understanding of the true risks and 
returns associated with ETFs and thereby promote market efficiency. 
Importantly, ETF investors are in a good position to comprehend and 
understand the value of the kind of nuanced MD&A-style analysis we 
contemplate. The current ICA disclosure requirements flow in large part 
from the perception that investors in mutual funds are not sophisticated and 
either incapable or uninterested in the kinds of disclosures more 
characteristic of the SEC.289 The content of the ICA disclosure is 
circumscribed in ways inconsistent with standard 1933 Act and 1934 Act 
materials, as witnessed by the contrast between the MDFP and the MD&A. 
Most ETF shares (nearly 60%) are held by institutional investors, not retail 
investors, which is dramatically different from the situation with mutual 
funds.290 In addition, the typical retail investor in ETFs is better off and more 
 
 287. IVV 2015 Prospectus, supra note 70, at 1. 
 288. A few judges have gone so far as to seemingly suggest that only firm-specific information is 
required under federal securities law. Most notably, Judge Frank Easterbrook has written that “[i]ssuers 
of securities must reveal firm-specific information. Investors combine this with public information to 
derive estimates about the securities’ value. It is pointless and costly to compel firms to reprint 
information already in the public domain.” Wielgos v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 892 F.2d 509, 517 
(7th Cir. 1989). 
 289. The last comprehensive reform of Form N-1A occurred in January 2009. A basic motivation 
for such changes was, in the words of then-SEC Chairman Christopher Cox, because too many mutual 
fund investors were not reading the prospectuses “because they were too complicated and too hard to 
understand.” Christopher Cox, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement by SEC Chairman: 
Enhanced Disclosure for Mutual Fund Investors (Nov. 19, 2008), https://www.sec.gov/news 
/speech/2008/spch111908cc.htm. The SEC’s Division of Investment Management has characterized 
Form N-1A as “intended to create a disclosure regime tailored to the unique needs of mutual fund 
investors” and the Form’s general instructions emphasize that it is “intended to elicit information for an 
average or typical investor who may not be sophisticated in legal or financial matters.” See GUIDANCE 
REGARDING MUTUAL FUND ENHANCED DISCLOSURE, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N 6 (June 2014) 
https://www.sec.gov/investment/im-guidance-2014-08.pdf (emphasis added); Form N-1A, supra note 
165, at general instructions 3.C.1(b). While there are so-called “Plain English” requirements, there are no 
corresponding directives in 1933 Act registration statements and 1934 Act periodic reports that the 
disclosures be tailored to unsophisticated investors. 
 290. According to a study by Deutsche Bank, institutional investors held 58.5% of U.S. ETFs as of 
the end of 2016. See Joe Rennison, Institutional Investors Boost Ownership of ETFs, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 13, 
2017), https://www.ft.com/content/c70113ac-ab83-33ac-a624-d2d874533fb0. In contrast, with respect to 
equity, hybrid, and bond mutual funds, institutional ownership was only 7.8%, 4.1%, and 10.1%, 
respectively. ICI, 2017 FACT BOOK, supra note 3, at 229. 
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educated than retail investors in mutual funds and even retail investors in 
individual stocks. As of mid-2016, median household financial assets of ETF 
investors were nearly double that of mutual fund investors and somewhat 
higher than investors in individual stocks.291 
The more sobering assessments of ETF risks and returns may be 
especially propitious from the standpoint of overall market efficiency. As 
discussed earlier, following the events in February 2018, the International 
Monetary Fund raised the possibility of how problems with ETFs invested 
in high yield and emerging market bonds, in tandem with the increase in 
passive investing, may result in result in contagion across asset classes.292 
Some respected Wall Street veterans have become increasingly concerned 
that what they perceive as a blind rush to ETFs in search of low-cost passive 
exposure market indexes such as the S&P 500 may be contributing to a 
general stock market bubble.293 Concerns have also been raised about 
whether, because the percentages of certain popular blue chip stocks held by 
ETFs is so high, the presumptive liquidity of ETF shares may not be 
available in case of panic. Fuller investor understanding as to how the ETF 
portal may not prove frictionless may help curb possible irrational 
exuberance. 
The benefits of an MD&A-style analysis of the arbitrage mechanism 
extend well beyond such ETF investor-specific or overall market efficiency 
gains. The focus should provide additional incentives for ETF advisors to 
seek to improve its performance. This may involve adopting changes to the 
arbitrage mechanism in light of new learning (including changing the nature 
of the relationship with APs and stock exchanges) or seeking changes in SEC 
trading rules or other aspects of the regulatory environment. This greater 
focus should also be helpful to the SEC in structuring its rules or practices 
of general application, as well as helping the SEC in terms of its discretionary 
review of requests to introduce new ETFs. 
CONCLUSION 
Individual ETFs and the underlying innovation process together 
constitute a modern phenomenon of vital importance to individual investors, 
institutional investors, and society. ETFs now account for the bulk of the 
 
 291. ICI, 2017 FACT BOOK, supra note 3, at 72. 
 292. See supra notes 239–40 and accompanying text. 
 293. See, e.g., Howard Marks, There They Go Again . . . Again, OAKTREE CAPITAL (July 26, 2017), 
https://www.oaktreecapital.com/docs/default-source/memos/there-they-go-again-again.pdf (client 
memorandum written by Oaktree co-chairman Howard Marks). There are also respected Wall Street 
veterans with contrasting views. See, e.g., NOVICK, 2018 CASE STUDY, supra note 278, at 4–5. 
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most actively traded securities in the United States and a vigorous innovation 
process has made the ETF the key financial portal to an ever-expanding 
universe of asset classes, asset strategies, and forms of exposure. 
This phenomenon, however, poses an array of highly distinctive risks 
and other concerns that have not been addressed. Many of these concerns 
relate to the defining characteristic of an ETF, the presence of a novel, 
unique, and model-based arbitrage mechanism. 
The regulation of the ETF phenomenon is stuck in the past. There is no 
self-conscious body of ETF regulation, leaving the legal oversight in the first 
instance to a haphazard jumble of statutes that were never designed to deal 
with an ETF’s distinctive challenges. The United States is largely regulating 
ETFs as though they were mutual funds, commodity pools, or ordinary 
operating companies, even though in reality an ETF differs widely from 
these traditional financial products. 
To date, the SEC’s main solution to the need for ETF-specific 
regulation has been to regulate by dictate. At the core of current substantive 
regulation is a process by which the SEC individually reviews each proposed 
ETF and decides, ad hoc, whether it should be allowed to do business. This 
individualized review has turned out to be immensely flexible, but it has also 
hobbled the ETF innovation process by creating a system that is opaque, 
unfocused, cumbersome, and incapable of fair and consistent updating or 
change. Current SEC disclosure regulation, rooted in a mutual fund mindset, 
fails to comprehend the arbitrage mechanism’s significance or its model-
related complexities, and can mask major breakdowns in the mechanism. 
A better system is needed, one that is crafted with the distinctive 
characteristics of the phenomenon in mind. Our proposal, which would 
require no new statutory authorization from Congress, is to unify ETF 
regulation with the adoption of a single body of written rules. On the 
substantive side, a single system of written rules would finally offer the ETF 
industry and its investors the transparency, consistency, and simplicity they 
require and free the SEC to focus on ETFs that raise special risks for their 
investors or for capital markets. 
On the disclosure side, for the first time, investors would finally have, 
among other things, much-needed information about the performance of the 
arbitrage mechanism that defines the ETF and whose model-related 
complexities constitute a vital, little-understood, and evolving component in 
a true calculus of ETF risks and returns. The increased disclosure would also 
encourage ETF sponsors to improve their arbitrage mechanisms, help the 
SEC in its decision-making, and contribute to greater overall market 
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efficiency.  
ETFs are not the only pressing problem the SEC faces. But we believe 
that there are few, if any, subjects in financial regulation that are more 
important and for which the current rules are more outdated. ETFs have been 
a great success, but they also pose great risks. The time has come for a legal 
regime worthy of this phenomenon and its fascinating and complex new 
challenges. 
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APPENDIX: SUMMARY OF JUNE 2018 SEC PROPOSAL 
On June 28, 2018, the SEC proposed changes that would govern the 
operation of most existing Investment Company ETFs and simplify the 
introduction of most new Investment Company ETFs.a The proposal 
appeared about three months after the first two drafts of this Article were 
posted on SSRNb and just before the final version of this Article went to the 
printer for publication in this July 2018 issue of this law review. We will 
analyze the proposal and related matters in a forthcoming issue of this law 
review. 
In the interim, this Appendix offers a brief descriptive summary of 
major aspects of the rule at the centerpiece of the proposal, which the SEC 
is calling Rule 6c-11. We set forth the rule’s basic operation, the three major 
constraints on the scope of the rule, and various related substantive and 
disclosure requirements. 
A.  THE BASIC OPERATION OF THE RULE 
The rule would replace most of the individualized letters the SEC issued 
to exempt ETF sponsors from elements of the ICA. For covered Investment 
Company ETFs already in existence, the rule would revoke the individual 
exemptive letters that these ETFs and their sponsors had been relying on and 
replace the letters with the standardized exemption granted by the rule. The 
elements of the ICA for which exemptions would be granted by the rule 
substantially correspond to those for which exemptions have been granted 
by the old exemptive orders. In granting this standardized exemption, the 
rule aims to eliminate some of the inconsistencies among exemptive letters 
that now tilt the marketplace in favor of sponsors with older letters. 
The standardized exemption under the new rule would extend to new 
Investment Company ETF sponsors as well as existing ones, so that these 
new sponsors would no longer need to seek letters granting individualized 
relief from the provisions of the ICA.c Thus, at least as to the ICA-related 
aspects of the new ETF creation process, the principal obligation that would 
be created by the new rule for most new Investment Company ETFs would 
be the various conditions the rule prescribes. 
 
 a. See generally June 2018 SEC Proposal, supra note 15. 
 b. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (discussing the March 2018 SSRN drafts and 
regulatory, industry, media, and other materials referring to such research and the subsequent August 16 
SSRN draft). 
 c. June 2018 SEC Proposal, supra note 15, at 143. 
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B.  THE SCOPE OF THE RULE: THREE MAJOR CONSTRAINTS 
1.  Commodity Pool ETFs, Operating Company ETFs, and Investment 
Company ETFs Organized as Unit Investment Trusts 
The rule does not cover all ETFs. Because the legal effect of the rule is 
merely to exempt certain Investment Company ETFs from having to comply 
with elements of the ICA, the rule does not affect, among other funds, ETFs 
that are not organized under the ICA. Thus, Commodity Pool and Operating 
Company ETFs would remain unaffected by the rule and would still be 
subject to the existing regulatory regimes. 
In addition, the rule would exclude Investment Company ETFs 
organized as UITs. The UIT form was common in the earliest days of the 
ETF industry—SPY, the oldest and by far the largest ETF, is a UIT—but 
newer Investment Company ETFs are instead organized as open-end 
management investment companies. Like the other kinds of ETFs excluded 
from the rule, UITs could continue to operate and would remain subject to 
the same exemptive letters and regulatory regime as before the rule was 
proposed. 
2.  Leveraged, Inverse, and Share Class Investment Company ETFs 
The rule also excludes leveraged, inverse, and “share class” Investment 
Company ETFs.d Leveraged ETFs offer a multiple of the indices they track. 
Inverse ETFs offer the negative return (or a multiple of the negative return) 
of the indices they seek to track.e Share class ETFs are structured as share 
classes of pre-existing mutual funds that issue multiple classes of shares 
representing interests in the same portfolio.f 
The only advisers with exemptive letters that permit leveraged or 
leveraged inverse ETFs are ProShares and Direxion. The only adviser with 
an exemptive letter that permits share class ETFs is Vanguard.g The rule 
would leave these sponsors’ exemptive orders in place. 
The result is that some of the most significant inconsistencies in the 
status quo regulatory regime would remain untouched. ProShares, Direxion, 
and Vanguard would have the exclusive rights to continue operating their 
existing leveraged, leveraged inverse, and share class ETFs. ProShares and 
 
 d. The Proposal uses the term “leveraged ETFs” to refer to, in common parlance, both leveraged 
ETFs and inverse ETFs. See id. at 7 n.7; Proposed Investment Company Act Rule 6c-11(c)(4). 
 e. June 2018 SEC Proposal, supra note 15, at 28–30. 
 f. Id. at 137–39. 
 g. See supra Section II.C for further discussion regarding these exemptions. 
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Direxion would also have the right to continue creating new leveraged funds 
and leveraged inverse funds. 
3.  Stock Exchange Listing Standards 
Because the rule only addresses elements of the ICA, it leaves 
undisturbed the many provisions that govern ETFs—including Investment 
Company ETFs—in the 1934 Act. As an example, it leaves stock exchange 
listing standards and the procedures for changing them in place. Many new 
ETFs require a change in stock exchange listing standards, including all 
Commodity Pool and Ordinary Company ETFs and Investment Company 
ETFs that fail to satisfy listing standards as previously adopted. Under the 
proposed rule, these ETFs and the exchanges on which they hope to list 
would still have to apply and wait for the SEC’s permission to change their 
listing standards. 
C.  CONDITIONS: SUBSTANTIVE MATTERS 
After the scope, the second most important feature of the proposed rule 
is the set of conditions the rule imposes on funds that wish to rely on it. These 
conditions are the heart of the rule’s effort to regulate Investment Company 
ETFs. This Section C describes the conditions that relate to substantive 
matters (including disclosure requirements directed at APs and certain other 
market professionals) and Section D describes the conditions that relate to 
disclosure matters directed at investors. 
The first set of substantive conditions concerns the issuance and 
redemption of shares. Funds may generally issue and redeem shares only in 
transactions with APs and may limit the issuance and redemption of shares 
only in certain circumstances.h A fund must list on a national securities 
exchange and, if delisted, would no longer be eligible to rely on the rule.i 
A fund would have to disclose the contents of its portfolio on its website 
prior to the beginning of each trading day, but would not need to disclose 
subsequent changes in the portfolio over the course of the day.j The portfolio 
disclosure requirement applies to all funds, including both indexed and 
actively managed funds, and it requires a fund to disclose all of its 
investments, including cash, options, and short positions, in addition to 
securities.k 
 
 h. June 2018 SEC Proposal, supra note 15, at 66–67; Proposed Investment Company Act Rule 
6c-11(a). 
 i. Id. at 70–72; Rule 6c-11(a). 
 j. Id. at 76–87; Rule 6c-11(c)(1)(i)(A). 
 k. Id. at 82–83; Rule 6c-11(c)(1)(i)(A). 
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The rule would require a fund to disclose its creation and redemption 
baskets on its website prior to the start of each trading day.l Crucially, 
however, the rule would permit funds to construct their baskets on a 
customized basis.m In other words, all funds would now be able to construct 
creation and redemption baskets that do not reflect representative cross 
sections of their portfolios.n Currently, only certain older ETF sponsors have 
exemptive orders allowing them to construct customized baskets. Moreover, 
an ETF may use multiple different baskets for different APs. To protect 
against the risk that an AP might pressure a fund’s sponsors to construct 
custom baskets contrary to the interests of the fund or its shareholders, a fund 
must adopt detailed policies and procedures for constructing its custom 
baskets. 
D.  CONDITIONS: DISCLOSURE MATTERS 
Investment Company ETFs subject to the rule must meet certain 
investor-oriented disclosure requirements on their websites and in their 
registration statement Form N-1A’s.o In terms of content, the biggest 
changes concern three principal matters. 
First, for the first time, large deviations between the trading price and 
the NAV of ETFs would trigger certain disclosures if the deviations occur at 
the close of trading.p If any ETF’s premium or discount was greater than 2% 
for more than seven consecutive trading days at the close of trading, that 
information must be posted on the fund’s website, along with a discussion of 
the factors that are reasonably believed to have materially contributed to the 
premium or discount. In addition, the proposal would supplement current 
requirements for quantitative information presented in tabular form 
concerning at-the-close deviations with some presentation in graphic form.q 
Second, for deviations from NAV that occur during the trading day, the 
proposal imposes no disclosure requirements. The SEC considered such a 
requirement and chose not to include it in the proposal.r 
Notably, however, the SEC indicated its openness to reconsidering this 
and other arbitrage mechanism-related disclosure issues as well as the 
 
 l. Id. at 88–107; Rule 6c-11(c)(1)(i)(B).  
 m. Id. at 90, 105; Rule 6c-11(a), (c)(3). 
 n. Id. at 90, 93, 105; Rule 6c-11(a) (defining “Custom basket.”). 
 o. UTIs file Form N-8B-2 instead of Form N-1A. The June 2018 SEC Release contemplates 
changes to Form N-8B2 corresponding to changes in Form N-1A. Id. at 178–81. 
 p. Id. at 119; Rule 6c-11(c)(1)(v). 
 q. Id. at 116–19. 
 r. Id. at 46–47. 
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overarching issue of whether the distinctive characteristics of ETFs merit a 
more systematic approach to disclosure. The SEC acknowledged that 
additional information regarding intraday deviations could help investors 
and requested comment on the possibility of adopting requirements relating 
to such deviations.s In addition, the SEC asked for comment on whether it 
should require regular disclosure of a qualitative nature relating to the 
performance of the ETF’s arbitrage mechanism.t More broadly, the SEC 
acknowledged that, unlike mutual funds, ETFs rely on the arbitrage 
mechanism, and asked for comment on whether a new registration form 
should be created specifically for ETFs.u 
The SEC proposed to eliminate a requirement in existing exemptive 
orders that forced an ETF to widely disseminate its IIV, which is an intraday 
estimate of the NAV, generally at least once every fifteen seconds.v The 
effect of this change would be limited, at least initially, however, because 
exchange listing standards currently require a fund to disseminate its IIV, 
and the rule does not change these listing standards. 
Third, for the first time, a fund would be required to disclose certain 
information on bid-ask spreads. On its website and in its prospectus, an ETF 
would need to provide the median bid-ask spread for the ETF’s most recent 
fiscal year.w An ETF would also have to include on its Form N-1A 
information that would, among things, serve to educate investors about what 
our Article refers to as the “trading price frictions” that are present with 
ETFs, but absent with mutual funds (for example, frictions from bid-ask 
spreads and premiums and discounts to NAV).x  
 
 s. Id. at 113–14. 
 t. Id. at 176–78. 
 u. Id. at 176. 
 v. Id. at 72–76. 
 w. Id. at 114–16. 
 x. Id. at 153–64. 
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